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1Executive summary
Introduction
The issue of wages has attracted particular attention at European level since the onset of the 
economic crisis. Changes in economic governance, notably within the European Semester, have 
prompted discussions on wage‑setting mechanisms. While, overall, wage‑bargaining regimes have 
remained relatively stable over time in many countries, the most substantial changes were seen in 
Member States facing more difficult economic circumstances.
This report provides comparative time series on wage‑bargaining outcomes across the EU Member 
States and Norway. It presents and discusses pay developments against the background of different 
wage‑bargaining regimes and looks into the link between pay and productivity developments (in 
terms of nominal and real unit labour costs).
The report also investigates different systems and levels of minimum wages in Europe at present, 
carrying out an accounting exercise through a hypothetical scenario of a minimum wage set at 60% 
of the median national wage (with some alternative scenarios as well for comparison) in order to 
benchmark and evaluate minimum wage levels and systems in Europe, and to discuss the possibilities 
and difficulties of coordination in this matter.
Policy context
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly excludes pay from the set of fields 
in which the EU has competences to intervene and explicitly recognises the autonomy of the 
social partners in pay bargaining. Nevertheless, wage setting has been addressed by the European 
institutions such as the European Commission, the European Council and even the European 
Central Bank for at least two decades in the form of statements or recommendations about wages 
and wage‑related policy. Recently, this has become common in many policy instruments and forums, 
notably through the Commission’s recommendations resulting from the European Semester and the 
2013 attempt to establish a tripartite dialogue on wage developments. These interventions have to 
be seen in light of the non‑monetary policies within the institutional framework of Economic and 
Monetary Union and the calls for enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination, on the one hand, 
and fiscal and wage policies on the other.
Key findings
Pay developments in light of different wage-bargaining regimes
•	 Collectively agreed pay – to a larger extent than actual compensation – seems to act as a kind 
of insurance for employees in times of crisis. It does not track the fluctuations in output closely.
•	 Similar to many other studies, no clear association was found between bargaining systems and 
linking of pay to productivity in the medium term. Different regimes can produce similar outcomes 
and similar regimes can produce different outcomes in terms of linking pay to productivity (in 
terms of nominal unit labour costs).
•	 Looking at the distributional aspect of wages in terms of real unit labour costs or the wage share 
within the economy, the overall trend was of a declining wage share in most Member States; 
only in the Czech Republic, Finland and the United Kingdom was wage share growing. However, 
a return towards an increase was observed in many Member States in the period during and 
after the crisis. While the most commonly observed decline of the wage share was spread equally 
across all types of bargaining regimes, the cyclical return to growth predominantly took place in 
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non‑decentralised regimes. However, this cannot be entirely separated from the fact that countries 
that were affected most by the crisis (and hence experienced the highest wage cuts) did not see 
such a change of trend.
•	 At the sectoral level, disparities in terms of collectively agreed pay have increased over time 
between the public sector (local governments and civil service) and the private sectors covered in 
the study (metal, chemicals, retail and banking).
Minimum wage policies and levels in Europe: an accounting exercise
•	 Although all EU Member States have mechanisms in place to set minimum wages, there is a wide 
variety in terms of the systems and effective levels of minimum wages, and in the extent of low‑paid 
employment. Establishing a common criteria for minimum wage policy (for instance, a common 
threshold of 60% of the national median) has been discussed. The impact of establishing such 
common criteria would vary considerably across countries, and also depending on the degree and 
mode of coordination (from purely voluntary to centrally regulated).
•	 The biggest institutional difficulties of any coordination would most likely be associated with 
the countries where minimum wages are set by collective bargaining, since it would entail either 
changing this system (for instance, establishing a statutory minimum wage underlying the 
collectively agreed wages) or a high degree of coordination with the actions of social partners at 
the national level.
•	 The quantitative impact, measured as the proportion of workers currently below a hypothetical 
EU minimum wage threshold of 60% of the national median, would also vary considerably across 
countries: it would be largest in the Baltic countries, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Romania and the 
UK, and smallest in Belgium, France, the Nordic countries, Portugal and Slovakia.
•	 In the hypothetical case of a coordinated minimum wage policy, the countries where the 
institutional impact would be largest are those where the quantitative impact would be smallest 
and vice versa. This is because countries with collectively agreed minimum wages tend to have 
lower shares of low‑paid workers, and hence the impact of the common policy would be smaller, 
than countries with statutory minimum wages. The big exception is Germany, where collectively 
agreed minimum wages coexist with the largest proportion of low‑paid workers.
•	 A criteria of a minimum wage of 60% of the median national wage would disproportionately affect 
women and young workers, since such groups are more likely to have low‑paid jobs. The biggest 
impact would be in the personal services sectors and in small companies.
Policy pointers
•	 Collectively agreed pay is often neglected in discussions on pay developments: no harmonised 
data are available, and data and knowledge gaps around pay‑setting mechanisms are persistent. 
Yet, collectively agreed pay is an important driver of actual pay in many countries, and it is 
the component of pay that can be most influenced by the actors involved. Hence, a better 
understanding as to how collectively agreed pay relates to actual pay outcomes is needed.
•	 Regarding the two central indicators that summarise pay developments in relation to productivity 
developments (nominal and real unit labour costs), it is important to note some shortcomings: the 
current interpretation of both looks only at their change over a certain period, while their initial 
levels and their respective starting points in relation to other countries are essentially disregarded.
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•	 The existing treaties categorically exclude wages from EU competences. Therefore, any form 
of coordination of minimum wage policies would either require significant changes in the treaties 
or some form of voluntary soft coordination at the level of governments or social partners.
•	 Although all Member States have some form of minimum wages at present, the wide variety 
of systems across countries would make a coordinated approach difficult. In principle, any form 
of coordination would probably be easier in countries with statutory minimum wage systems than 
in countries where minimum wages are collectively agreed. Soft law mechanisms, however, could 
allow the development of common frameworks while respecting national institutional differences.

5 
Foreword
Contrary to other areas of work and employment, such as working time or health and safety, the area 
of pay is explicitly excluded from the competences of European institutions in the existing treaties.
In the years of crisis and beyond, however, wages have gained special attention at European level. 
Changes in economic governance, notably within the European Semester, have prompted discussions 
on wage‑setting mechanisms. While overall, wage‑bargaining regimes have remained rather stable 
over time in many countries, the most substantial changes were seen in programme countries and 
in other Member States facing more difficult economic situations. Some analysts even speak of ‘… 
a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach to collective bargaining from the acceptance of free collective 
bargaining to direct political intervention into national bargaining outcomes and procedures’ (Schulten 
and Muller, 2013).
Social partners also repeatedly voice their concerns about interference with their autonomy in pay 
bargaining.
Minimum wages can be considered as a cornerstone of the ‘European Social Model’. They exist in all 
EU Member States, even if they are set up and established in very different ways and do not cover all 
those who are employed in all Member States. The process of European integration has so far had 
very little engagement with minimum wages. But in the context of increasing European integration, 
it seems at least plausible that sooner or later there will be some attempt to coordinate this important 
aspect of social policy across countries.
This report is divided into two parts. The first contributes to the policy debate by providing 
a consistent time series on wage bargaining outcomes across the Member States and Norway. It sets 
out to do the following:
•	 summarise the European political context since the turn of the millennium;
•	 present and discuss pay developments against the background of different wage‑bargaining 
regimes;
•	 look at how pay is linked to productivity developments (in terms of nominal and real unit labour 
costs) and the extent of wage drift.
The second part sets out to do the following:
•	 discuss the theoretical and policy considerations surrounding a coordinated EU minimum wage 
policy;
•	 review the social sciences literature on the effects of a minimum wage;
•	 present a broad picture of the current debates around the coordination of EU minimum wage 
policy;
•	 discuss the institutional challenges that such a coordination would have to face.
This part also carries out a simple accounting exercise to evaluate how many and what types of 
workers would be most affected by a hypothetical coordination of the minimum wage policy in the 
different countries, using a baseline scenario of a single national wage floor of 60% of the median 
national wages, and drawing from the two most recent EU‑wide data sources on wages and income.
Part 1:  Pay outcomes and wage 
bargaining regimes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the participants in the expert workshop on pay developments, 
held in September 2013 in Dublin, as well as the members of the Advisory Committee for their 
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7In the years of crisis and beyond, the issue of wages has gained special attention at European level. 
Changes in economic governance, notably within the European Semester, have prompted discussions 
on wage‑setting mechanisms. The most substantial changes have been seen in programme countries 
and in other Member States facing difficult economic situations.
The aim of this report is to provide, for the policy debate, comparative data on wage bargaining 
outcomes across the European Member States. This is a timely exercise, meeting the demands voiced 
by the European Commission, which has concluded that:
More information on wage developments and wage setting institutions and 
bargaining characteristics seems needed [including]‘systematic and operational 
information on the outcome of collective labour contracts. This would permit 
a more timely assessment of wage trends.’
(European Commission, 2011a)
While data on actual wage developments are harmonised and available from national accounts 
(Eurostat, the Commission’s statistics database, as well as AMECO, the Commission’s annually 
updated macroeconomic database), there is an information gap regarding collectively agreed pay. 
While national information is available in several countries, there little cross‑European research and 
data. There are three (recent) exceptions to this:
•	 the attempt by the European Central Bank (ECB) to create an indicator of collectively agreed pay 
for the euro zone (ECB, 2002);
•	 the Collectively Agreed Wages In Europe project (CAWIE) (Van Gyes, 2012);
•	 Eurofound’s regular annual update on developments of collectively agreed pay.1
This report intends to present a consistent series of collective agreements on pay for those countries 
where such information is regularly collected within national databases, or present proxies for 
collectively agreed pay overtime, where feasible. Examples of such proxies include the following:
•	 outcomes of national‑level agreements;
•	 tripartite recommendations at national levels;
•	 outcomes of pace‑making agreements;
•	 a series of individual collective agreements at sectoral level.
Although it would be desirable and interesting to be able to present a harmonised indicator for 
collectively agreed pay increases across Europe, this is impossible, because of the different wage 
bargaining structures and systems, and the multitude of approaches in data collection. The more 
modest aim of this exercise is to present one series (or more) of collective agreements on pay from 
1998 to 2012 for each country, with a focus on their consistency, and a documentation of metadata 
around the series, which allows the reader to draw conclusions on the degree of comparability of 
data across countries.
1 See Eurofound (2013b) for the most recent one.
Introduction
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The collected data series are available on a designated web‑portal created by Eurofound; featuring 
quantitative and qualitative information regarding collective pay bargaining, it is available at www.
eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/.
Given the multitude of non‑harmonised data sources that have been used, no attempt has been 
made to arrive at a ‘European average’.
Pay developments (within and between countries over time) are influenced broadly by the following 
factors:
•	 cyclical factors;
•	 general labour market conditions;
•	 social factors;
•	 industrial relations factors;
•	 national legislation;
•	 national specificities as well as compositional factors.
All of these play a role in shaping pay and further economic outcomes; however, this report’s 
theoretical discussion is limited to the following key issues:
•	 the link between wages, labour productivity and economic growth;
•	 the link between wage bargaining regimes and pay outcomes.
Member States differ markedly in terms of their wage bargaining models and their collective 
bargaining coverage, which is mainly attributable to the (non‑)existence of extension mechanisms of 
collective wage agreements. In this sense, the relative impact of collectively agreed pay on aggregate 
measures of wage developments is much stronger in some settings than in others. The study uses 
a simple typology of wage bargaining regimes (based on the predominant bargaining level and the 
degree of coordination), and it presents the data in relation to these regimes.
The empirical analysis presented here is descriptive, using simple statistical methods. However, in future, 
a methodologically more advanced analysis could be carried out (for example, using panel estimation 
techniques across countries), which would allow simultaneous factors to be taken into account, controlling 
for constant differences over time and countries and providing statistical inference measures.
Despite these methodological difficulties and implied health warnings, this study has used the 
collected data to focus on the following questions for different subperiods.
•	 Which outcomes of pay bargaining can be observed for the total economy and for different sectors?
•	 Did collectively agreed pay increases keep in line with increases of labour productivity?
•	 To what extent did changes in actual compensation deviate from collectively agreed pay 
developments (for example, what is the degree of wage drift, if any?)
•	 Is it possible to observe any links between different wage bargaining regimes and the outcomes 
these systems generate, in terms of linking actual pay or collectively agreed pay with productivity?
•	 Did disparities in collectively agreed wages across sectors grow over time?
91
This chapter will attempt to provide a brief depiction of the main policy documents and instruments 
put in place by the chief policymaking actors at European level. These form the background in which 
pay developments took place during the first decade of the new century and beyond. The focus will 
be on wage‑related policies at European level over the period with influence over (or with the aim of 
influencing) wage‑setting mechanisms in the EU.
The treaties
The treaties on the European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union are the bedrock 
of the EU (European Union, 2012). The latter organises the functioning of the Union and determines 
the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements for exercising its competences. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union explicitly establishes in Article 153 that pay is excluded from 
the set of fields in which the EU can intervene. This aspect has been part of the treaties since 
the Maastricht Treaty, from 1991, and it was included under the Social Policy Chapter in the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It must be also underlined that the competences of the social partners 
in the social policy field are defined quite clearly in Articles 154 and 155 of the Treaty and include 
procedural involvement in the genesis of any initiative by the European Commission, how they wish 
to implement their agreements and the fact that they may decide on autonomous agreements in all 
social policy fields.
EMU and macroeconomic policy coordination
The contours of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU (EMU) started to be defined in the 
mid‑1990s and were finally implemented in January 1999. It was one of the most significant steps 
in the development and deepening of the EU since its creation. With the EMU, a framework for 
economic policymaking in Europe had been created. While the main objective is the maintenance 
of price stability, creating the basis for growth and employment in the EU, other areas such as fiscal 
policy and wage setting remained, in general, the preserve of Member States and other actors such 
as the social partners.
At the time of the EMU’s implementation, there had been strong convergence regarding the outcome 
of wage policies in terms of nominal wage increases; at the same time, however, most national wage 
bargaining systems had been remarkably stable. This meant that the EU had a great variety of national 
models of wage regulation, with multiemployer bargaining at sectoral or even intersectoral level as 
the most important form of wage bargaining across the EU as a whole. The EMU, however, would 
bring with it a new emphasis on the role of wage policy in the Member States (Eurofound, 2000).
In a communication on community policies in support of employment issued in April 1999, the 
European Commission emphasised the importance of the coordination of economic and employment 
policy objectives. The communication called upon social partners at European, national, regional, 
local and enterprise level to continue to support the objectives of the European employment strategy 
in wage negotiations and through discussions on the modernisation of work organisation. The 
Commission expected the social partners to continue their contribution to the implementation of 
a macroeconomic policy mix favourable to growth and employment in line with the 1999 Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (Eurofound, 1999).
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
Since 1994, the start of the second stage of EMU, the European Commission and the European 
Council have adopted annual ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ (BEPGs), which include 
Policy background
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recommendations on what is considered ‘appropriate wage developments’ within the euro zone. 
According to the Commission’s recommendation of 11 April 2000 (European Commission, 2000), it 
was necessary to do the following:
•	 insist upon nominal wage increases consistent with price stability; in the euro zone, that means 
insisting upon aggregate wage increases consistent with price increases within the price stability 
objective of the ECB;
•	 encourage real wages to increase in relation to labour productivity growth while taking into 
account the need to strengthen, where necessary, and subsequently maintain the profitability of 
capacity‑enhancing and employment‑creating investment;
•	 ensure that collective bargaining systems take account of productivity differences (whether 
according to skills, qualifications or geographical area) when determining wage levels;
•	 pursue policies aiming to reduce gender pay differences due to discrimination.
Until 1999, the key goals of the guidelines were sustained, non‑inflationary growth and high 
employment in accordance with Article 2 of the EC Treaty, whereas they subsequently became more 
closely aligned with the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the guidelines adopted the core of the European 
Union goal ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge‑based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion (Hein 
and Niechoj, 2007).’
The European Council meeting held in Cologne on 3–4 June 1999 adopted a Resolution on 
a European employment pact, also known as the Cologne Process, which aims at the:
coordination of economic policy and improvement of mutually supportive 
interaction between wage developments and monetary, budgetary and 
fiscal policy through macro‑economic dialogue aimed at preserving 
a non‑inflationary growth dynamic.
(European Council, 1999)
The same pact established the Macroeconomic Dialogue, a forum of discussion between the Member 
States, the European Central Bank, the Council, the Commission and the European social partners, 
the partners in question being:
•	 ETUC (the European Trade Union Confederation);
•	 CEEP (the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises);
•	 BusinessEurope (Europe’s main employer organisation);
•	 UAEPME (the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium‑sized Enterprises).
The creation of this forum was based on the idea that key stakeholders and decision makers in 
macroeconomic policy, as well as those responsible for wage formation, (such as employers and 
workers’ representative organisations) should have a proper understanding of each other’s positions 
and constraints. This mutual awareness would mean that the voice of social partners could be heard 
in European macropolicy making, and in reaching agreements on joint solutions, in order to better 
realise the EU potential for growth and employment. The Dialogue takes place twice a year, usually 
immediately before the European Council meetings.
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This governance structure, however, has always been informal. This is because the different actors 
involved view it differently. On the one hand, the ECB, some Member States and the European 
employer organisations have displayed no interest, so far, in such a coordination of European 
monetary, fiscal and wage policy. On the other hand, ETUC views the Macroeconomic Dialogue 
as a way of building a ‘consensual’ European monetary, fiscal and wage policy and has suggested 
a European ‘framework formula’ for collective bargaining, based on compensation for inflation plus 
productivity.
A new strategy and a new platform for governance
The developments described above took place during the implementation of the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy for 2000–2010. Then, in 2010, the European Commission adopted a new strategy for ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ – the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2010a). 
Unlike the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission, 2010b), which held that wage developments 
should not exceed productivity growth, Europe 2020 did not contain any direct, explicit reference 
to wage policies. However, the Europe 2020 Strategy included the introduction of a new platform 
of governance under which the EU and the euro zone coordinate their budgetary and economic 
policies, in line with the Strategy and the Stability and Growth Pact. This platform is known as the 
European Semester. According to the Commission, the platform’s goal is ‘to ensure that collective 
discussion on key priorities takes place at EU level, before and not after national decisions are taken’ 
(European Commission, 2011c). This would be crucial for further developments on wage policies in 
the EU, as will be shown below.
In the Commission’s assessment of the first European Semester of economic policy coordination, 
it was concluded that progress in correcting macroeconomic imbalances had been slow in some 
Member States and that some further corrections were required regarding the review of wage‑setting 
systems (in consultation with social partners), to ensure that wages support competitiveness and 
develop in line with productivity growth (European Commission, 2011c).
Euro Plus Pact
Wage policy and, more concretely, wage‑setting mechanisms, were brought again to the forefront of 
policy debate when the Euro Plus Pact was agreed by the euro zone heads of state or governments and 
joined by Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. This pact was aimed at further 
strengthening the economic pillar of EMU and economic policy coordination, with the ultimate 
objective of improving competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence, so 
reinforcing the social market economy (Eurofound 2011).
The Euro Plus Pact has four main commitments:
•	 to foster competitiveness;
•	 to foster employment;
•	 to enhance the sustainability of public finances;
•	 to reinforce financial stability.
It explicitly outlines wages as an important economic adjustment factor for overcoming macroeconomic 
imbalances and improving competitiveness. The pact states that each country is responsible for the 
specific policy actions it chooses to foster competitiveness, but also that some reforms will be given 
particular attention:
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(…) respecting national traditions of social dialogue and industrial relations, 
measures to ensure costs developments in line with productivity, such as…
review[ing] the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the degree of 
centralisation in the bargaining process, and the indexation mechanisms, while 
maintaining the autonomy of the social partners in the collective bargaining 
process; [and ensuring] that wages settlements in the public sector 
support the competitiveness efforts in the private sector (bearing in mind 
the important signalling effect of public sector wages).
(European Council, 2011, authors’ emphasis)
The Euro Plus Pact highlighted wage‑setting mechanisms, the degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, indexation mechanisms, and wage settlements in the public 
sector as areas that signatory countries to the pact, should pay attention to, review and eventually 
reform.
Sixpack
The Euro Plus Pact applies to a subset of EU Member States. However, the reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, through a set of legislative initiatives adopted in December 2011 (known as the 
Sixpack), concerned the whole EU. According to Schulten and Müller (2013) this reform contained 
two new major instruments for intensifying economic policy coordination:
One is the establishment of a new system of enhanced fiscal and 
macro‑economic surveillance through an alert mechanism for the early detection 
of macro‑economic imbalances based on a ‘scoreboard’ of economic indicators. 
The second is the introduction of an automatic procedure for imposing 
financial sanctions on those countries that fail to comply with the policy 
recommendations issued on the basis of the alert system.
(Schulten and Müller, 2013)
The main consequence, Schulten and Müller argue, is that, within this new European economic 
governance system, European policy recommendations for Member States lose their voluntary 
character and become almost compulsory. In practice, this means the EU having a greater influence 
on national wage policies, because ignoring EU policy recommendations means an increased risk of 
financial sanctions for Member States.
Those two instruments give support to the EU’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, which, on 
the basis of a set of economic indicators, alerts authorities to the existence of serious imbalances. 
In relation to wages, the procedure refers to a three‑year percentage change in nominal unit labour 
costs, with a threshold of 9% for euro zone countries and 12% for non‑euro zone countries.
Employment package
The Employment package, which the European Commission launched in April 2012, is the most 
recent set of policy documents that look at how EU employment policies intersect with a number 
of other policy areas in support of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The main purpose is to 
complement the employment priorities of the EU’s Annual Growth Survey with medium‑term policy 
guidance within the context of the Europe 2020 employment objectives (Eurofound, 2012).
In that context, in its Towards a job‑rich recovery (European Commission, 2012), the European 
Commission appeals for the modernisation of wage‑setting systems in order to align wages with 
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productivity developments, thus translating growth in output into job creation. The Commission 
states that ‘wage moderation’ can be considered for some sectors of activity or some Member States, 
but it does not exclude the possibility of ‘targeted increases’ to sustain demand:
Wage‑setting mechanisms ensuring that real wage growth reflects productivity 
developments and local labour market conditions are a precondition to ensure 
that output growth adequately translates into growing labour demand and 
ultimately job creation. In accordance with national practices of collective 
bargaining, wage developments should take account of the competitive 
position of the Member States. Although wage moderation or adjustment might 
be necessary for some sectors or Member States, targeted increases, which 
help sustain aggregate demand, might be feasible where wages have lagged 
significantly behind productivity developments.
(European Commission, 2012)
Commitments and recommendations over wage-setting mechanisms
The table below synthesises the commitments made in the Euro Plus Pact and the recommendations 
made by the European Commission, in the framework of the European Semester specifically 
concerning wage levels or the wage‑setting mechanisms.
Eight members of the EU27 received recommendations by the European Commission about their 
wage policies for 2013–2014. Most of these recommendations are along the lines drawn up in the 
Employment Package – for example, to review or reform the existing wage‑setting mechanisms 
in consultation with the relevant social partners (Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta, including the 
indexation system, and Italy). For Finland and Slovenia, the main message is that wage growth 
should ‘support competitiveness and job creation’.
For France, the recommendation concerning wage policy is to ‘lower the cost of labour’ and to make 
sure that the level of the minimum wage supports job creation and competitiveness. For Germany, the 
recommendation is the opposite, that wage growth supports domestic demand. This was reinforced 
in April 2013, when a European Commissioner called on Germany to increase wages significantly in 
order to fuel demand domestically and throughout the EU: there were fears that the currency union 
would break apart if Germany did not do so.
Table 1:  Commitments and recommendations on wage policy in Member States
Euro Plus Pact 
commitments in 2011
European Semester 
recommendations  
for 2011/2012
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2012/2013
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2013/2014
Financial assistance 
programmes
AT - - - - No
BE
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Reform wage 
bargaining and wage 
indexation 
 Reform wage-setting 
system including 
indexation
Reform wage-setting 
system including 
indexation
No
BG
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Link wage growth to 
productivity
- - No
CY
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Reform wage-setting 
and wage indexation
Reform of the system 
of wage indexation
Implement 
commitments under 
financial assistance 
programmes
Reform of the 
wage-setting 
framework
CZ n/a - - - No
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Euro Plus Pact 
commitments in 2011
European Semester 
recommendations  
for 2011/2012
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2012/2013
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2013/2014
Financial assistance 
programmes
DE - -
Wages in line with 
productivity
Wage growth to 
support domestic 
demand
No
DK - - - - No
EE - - - - No
EL
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Implement 
commitments under 
financial assistance 
programmes
Implement 
commitments under 
financial assistance 
programmes
Implement 
commitments under 
financial assistance 
programmes
Reform annual 
update mechanism of 
minimum wage
ES
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Comprehensive 
reform of the 
collective-bargaining 
process and the 
wage-indexation 
system
- - No
FI - -
Continue to align 
wage and productivity 
developments
Support alignment 
of real wage and 
productivity
No
FR -
Ensure development 
in the minimum wage 
is supportive of job 
creation
Minimum wage 
supportive of 
job creation and 
competitiveness
Lower cost of labour; 
ensure minimum 
wage supportive 
of job creation and 
competitiveness
No
HU - - - - No
IE
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Implement 
commitments under 
financial-assistance 
programmes
Implement 
commitments under 
financial-assistance 
programmes
Implement 
commitments under 
financial-assistance 
programmes
Wages not directly 
addressed
IT
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Ensure wage 
growth better 
reflects productivity 
developments
Monitor and if 
needed reinforce the 
implementation of 
the new wage-setting 
framework
Ensure effective 
implementation of 
wage-setting reforms
No
LT
Public sector wage 
developments
-  - - No
LU
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Reform wage setting 
and wage indexation
Reform wage 
bargaining and wage 
indexation
Reform wage setting 
and wage indexation
No
LV
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Implement 
commitments under 
Memorandum of 
Understanding of 
20 January 2009
- - No
MT -
Reform wage setting 
and wage indexation
Reform wage 
bargaining and wage 
indexation
Monitor 
wage-indexation 
mechanism and stand 
ready to reform (in 
the background 
considerations)
No
NL - - - - No
PL
Public-sector wage 
developments
- - - No
PT
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Implement 
commitments under 
Memorandum of 
Understanding of 
17 May 2011
Implement 
commitments under 
Memorandum of 
Understanding of 
17 May 2011
Implement 
commitments under 
Memorandum of 
Understanding of 
17 May 2011
Freeze wages in the 
government sector 
(nominal) 2012–2013;
promote wage 
adjustments in line 
with productivity at 
the firm level 
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Euro Plus Pact 
commitments in 2011
European Semester 
recommendations  
for 2011/2012
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2012/2013
European Semester 
recommendations for 
2013/2014
Financial assistance 
programmes
RO
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
Public sector wage 
developments
Implement 
commitments under 
Memoranda of 
Understanding (June 
2009 and June 2011)
Implement 
commitments under 
Memoranda of 
Understanding (June 
2009 and June 2011)
Complete the EU/IMF 
financial assistance 
programme
Wages not directly 
addressed
SE n - - - No
SI
Wage-setting 
mechanisms
-
Ensure wage 
growth supports 
competitiveness and 
job creation
Ensure wage 
growth supports 
competitiveness and 
job creation
No
SK - - - - No
UK n/a - - - No
Sources: Euro plus Pact Commitments in 2011 – Background on the Euro Plus Pact, European Commission; European Semester 
recommendations – European Commission, 2011a, 2012, 2013.
The recommendations for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania are that they should 
implement the commitments made under their respective Memoranda of Agreement in the context 
of the financial assistance programmes. It is important to note that, for three of these countries, 
the memoranda established measures affecting their wage‑setting systems. For Portugal, where the 
sectoral level is the principal or dominant level of collective bargaining, there was both a wage freeze 
in the government sector (over nominal wages) for 2012 and 2013, and also the promotion of ‘wage 
adjustments in line with productivity at the firm level.’ For Cyprus, the memorandum established 
the reform of the wage‑setting framework. In Greece, it set out the reform of the annual mechanism 
to update the minimum wage.
It is also important to note that those countries that did not sign the Euro Plus Pact – (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Sweden and the UK), as well as Austria, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands 
and Slovakia (which are signatories to the Euro Plus Pact) did not make commitments or receive 
any recommendations directly concerning wage levels or wage‑setting mechanisms. However, other 
countries made commitments and have been receiving recommendations since 2011 as regards 
reviewing or reforming their wage‑setting systems or frameworks; this is the case with Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta (although it is not in the Euro Plus Pact) and Slovenia.
Under the Euro Plus Pact, from 2011, Lithuania, Poland and Romania agreed to pay close 
attention to public‑sector wage developments in order to promote competitiveness. However, the 
recommendations emerging subsequently from the European Semester for these countries did not 
include any express reference to wage levels or wage‑setting mechanisms.
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Box 1: The principle of equal pay
The principle of equal pay has been part of the fundamental values of the European 
Union since the 1957 EEC Treaty prohibited unequal pay for men and women. EU policy 
orientations and legislation related to equal pay and the reduction, or elimination, of 
the gender pay gap have since evolved through a considerable number of documents, 
which cannot be scrutinised here. However, two important official papers must be 
mentioned. First, in the Women’s Charter, from 2010, José Manuel Barroso, the president 
of the European Commission, underlines the commitment to ‘work on gender equality 
in partnership with all stakeholders, including civil society, at national, European, and 
international levels and in particular on the principles’ of equal economic independence 
and equal pay for equal work and work of equal value (European Commission, 2010c).
Secondly, Directive 2006/54/EC, also known as the Recast Directive, also establishes 
two important reference points for collective bargaining on wages. It refers to the 
principle of ‘equal pay’ in which the main idea is the prohibition of ‘direct and indirect 
discrimination on grounds of sex’. It also states that Member States should promote 
social dialogue between the social partners in order to foster equal treatment:
‘Member States shall encourage the social partners, without prejudice to their 
autonomy, to promote equality between men and women, … with the aim of facilitating 
the reconciliation of work and private life, and to conclude, at the appropriate level, 
agreements laying down antidiscrimination rules in the fields referred to in Article 1 
[which establishes the purpose of the Directive and states that it contains ‘provisions 
to implement the principle of equal treatment in relation to: … (b) working conditions, 
including pay’ ] which fall within the scope of collective bargaining.’ (European 
Commission, 2006)
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To complete the picture, it is also important to take into consideration the views and positions of the 
social partners, particularly at European level. Recent public statements, notes and/or resolutions of 
representatives from the recognised European social partners (ETUC, BusinessEurope, UEAPME, 
and CEEP) have been used here to illustrate the main positions on macroeconomic coordination and 
wage setting, in particular.
Trade unions
Several speeches by ETUC General Secretary John Monks at the Macroeconomic Dialogue meetings 
clearly express trade union concerns about the calls for wage moderation. The main attention is 
on the ‘downward pressure’ over wages. Here are extracts from some of the speeches he has made 
since 2009:
We are very aware of downward pressure on pay. What might make sense 
in the context of an individual firm does not make sense if it leads to 
competitive wage cutting and to deflation and a reduction in spending power.
November, 2009
[about the discussions which are leading to a new system of extended economic 
governance system in Europe] The first point is that the proposals [to solve 
the crisis] are anti‑pay and wages. Wages – and labour markets did not cause 
this crisis. Lest we forget, it was the banks which were at the epicentre, feeding 
asset booms with excessive credit growth, resulting in unsustainable private 
sector debt loads. But the burden of adjustment is now switched to workers 
and their wages.
February, 2011
In 2012, ETUC in its Declaration on the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic 
and monetary union, stated that:
The need for economic governance is being used as a means of restricting 
negotiating mechanisms and results, attacking industrial relations systems and 
put downward pressure on collectively agreed wage levels; to weaken social 
protection and the right to strike and privatise public services. The ETUC 
actively resists these attacks, which, cumulated over the years, will dismantle 
a social model which is unique in the world.
(ETUC, 2012)
In the same declaration, ETUC claims that Europe needs a different economic union, with a strong 
social dimension based on a number of principles including a:
wage safeguard clause, imposing the full respect of the autonomy of social 
partners to bargain collectively and preventing the fiscal compact from 
intruding in the areas of wages, collective bargaining systems, wage formation 
systems, collective action and organisation. Wages are not a brake on the 
economy but its engine.
(ETUC, 2012)
Positions and views of the 
European social partners
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ETUC, in this document, was quite critical about the economic governance that had taken place 
previously. It says such governance must be ‘the contrary’ of what it has been so far:
the aim of the governance must be to avoid social and wage dumping, and it 
must help towards the setting up of a European framework to allow the Member 
States to get out of debt and correct the high unemployment rates which they 
are currently faced with.
(ETUC, 2012)
Employer organisations
In a 2010 meeting of the Macroeconomic Dialogue, UEAPME, the European craft and SME 
employers’ organisation, suggested that there should be debate at EU level on macroeconomic 
differences across Member States, including wage setting. The Secretary General, Andrea Benassi, 
said ‘We must discuss all the possible causes for the current situation, including the effect of wages 
on the economic performance of some Member States’ (Press release, Brussels, 14 February 2011).
Later in a Macroeconomic Dialogue meeting in 2011, UEAPME called for dialogue on wages at EU 
level:
… unsustainable wage developments are one of the main reasons of the current 
imbalances in the euro zone. Their effects do not stop at the border, especially 
in a closely linked and interdependent market such as the EU. At a time when 
the need for more economic policy coordination is clear and recognised, it would 
be unwise to exclude wages from the equation. I hope that trade unions will 
reconsider their staunch opposition in this respect and work at all levels with 
employers to find common solutions.
Press release, Brussels, 14 February 2011.
BusinessEurope claims that the competitiveness adjustments are not functioning properly or quickly 
enough due to ‘a combination of labour and product market rigidities’. Europe’s biggest employer 
organisation says this is partly due to ‘inflexible wage‑setting mechanisms’. Nevertheless, at meetings 
of the Macroeconomic Dialogue in February and October 2011, BusinessEurope said wage policies 
are of critical importance for social partners because this is their area of competence, and not 
a European competence, and for that reason calls on the social partners at national level to try to 
improve ‘wage flexibility’. The organisation also said existing automatic indexation mechanisms, 
acting as ‘inflation transmission belts’, are counterproductive.
BusinessEurope also considers that greater wage flexibility, based on wage moderation when 
necessary, is vital in supporting job creation and competitiveness, will better reflect labour market 
and productivity conditions, and will limit wage and price inertia. In a seminar hosted by Euractiv 
on the EU’s jobs and growth strategy, Maxime Cerruti, the employer organisation’s Social Affairs 
Director, mentioned Spain as a good example of wage flexibility:
In 2012, the Spanish social partners reached a major agreement which includes 
moves towards linking wage developments to GDP growth and economic 
situation of companies, including productivity. This agreement represents 
a significant step towards the necessary wage flexibility.
(Speaking notes, April 2013)
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Ensuring that wage developments reflect productivity is the key message BusinessEurope has been 
making, as at the St Petersburg Economic Forum and the Brussels Economic Forum in June 2013, 
for example. In both, BusinessEurope stated that:
Labour market competitiveness in many countries that were worst hit by the 
crisis may have started to improve, but we need to do much more to ensure that 
wage levels better reflect underlying productivity performance.
(Speaking points at Brussels Economic Forum, 
June 2013)
CEEP has been mainly concerned with the divergence of wage developments within the euro 
zone, which has contributed to the imbalance of the competitive positions; it therefore stresses the 
crucial role of ‘wage settlements’ (see for example, CEEP Spring note of April, 2007, or Autumn 
note of October, 2008). However, in 2009, CEEP also voiced its concern on the impact of wage 
developments on domestic demand, adding this issue to that of competitiveness, stating that both 
required a balanced approach (note of 22 January 2009). In January 2012, CEEP clearly backed the 
idea that wage increases should closely follow productivity by declaring that ‘incomes policy could 
make a contribution to more solid and more balanced growth by linking wages more closely to 
productivity developments’ (note of 31 January 2012).
The consultation meeting
In February 2013, the Employment Committee of the European Commission (EMCO) organised 
a consultation meeting of the social partners to obtain their views on three key areas:
•	 wage developments, productivity and prices;
•	 wages, employment and unemployment;
•	 wage inequalities.
The social partners were, in general terms, somewhat critical about the discussion, although each 
side presented contrasting perspectives. The trade unions stressed the need for alignment of real 
wages, instead of nominal ones, with productivity: they recommended that the European Commission 
include real unit labour costs (wage share) into the macroeconomic scoreboard. Meanwhile, the 
employers highlighted the importance of looking at labour costs in general (of which wages are just 
one part), because these affect the competitive position of companies as well that of vulnerable 
workers.
The trade unions also drew attention to the fact that not all Member States can save funds and at the 
same time reduce wages, making the point that fiscal austerity is not the way out of the crisis. Trade 
unions, although saying that it is important to look beyond wages and think about what happens 
to profits (and executive pay), support the idea that decent pay and adequate minimum wages 
are essential in low‑income countries. Moreover, they consider that decentralisation and greater 
flexibility in collective bargaining undermine the role of social partners, particularly trade unions, 
and that in the countries under the financial assistance programme, there should be no interference 
in collective bargaining.2
2 See the introductory remarks delivered by Bernadette Ségol, General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation, at a meeting 
of the Employment Committee with social partners on wage developments, on 1 February 2013.
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The employers consider that it is crucial to be competitive, particularly for small and open economies, 
and hold that company‑level bargaining can support competitiveness. In a position paper from 2012, 
BusinessEurope stated that:
in response to the Commission’s proposal to set up an EU tripartite format 
for monitoring and exchanging views on wage developments in relation to 
productivity, inflation and internal demand, unemployment and income 
inequalities, BusinessEurope considers that a bipartite format would be 
better. Such exchanges could take place in the context of the European Social 
Dialogue Committee, in which representatives of the social partners of the 27 
Member States take part.
(Key messages, July 2012)
Despite disagreements, the key common message from the social partners is that their autonomy 
in collective bargaining must be respected, and that strengthening it will function as a success 
factor. The Communication from the Commission on strengthening the social dimension of EMU 
(European Commission, 2013) seems to head exactly in that direction by underlining the importance 
of strengthening social dialogue as one of three main initiatives:
•	 promoting social dialogue in advancing the European social market economy;
•	 involving the social partners in policy debates and decision‑making processes;
•	 enhancing the effectiveness of policy coordination at euro zone level.
In the same document, the Commission also:
•	 highlights the social partners’ ‘role at national level in setting labour market rules and wages’;
•	 acknowledges the ‘diverse industrial relations in the EU’;
•	 supports Member States’ competence in organising wage bargaining.
Nevertheless, the Commission suggests that there is still ‘scope for improving the mechanisms to 
involve the social partners in the coordination of economic and employment policies at EU level’ 
(European Commission, 2013).
21
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Wages have different roles and functions to play in the economy:
•	 an individual (and for most people, the most important) source of income;
•	 (in economic terms) the ‘price of labour’ and a way of aligning the demand and supply of labour;
•	 a return on investment in human capital, guiding educational and occupational choices;
•	 a cost of production for the employer;
•	 a potential source of motivation for employees when set at higher levels than the going rate;
•	 at macroeconomic level they play an important role as the main part of income, which sustains 
consumption and aggregate demand (Eurofound 2013c).
This report will look into two kinds of ‘wages or ‘pay’ (these terms are used interchangeably, when no 
further distinction is needed): the first kind is collectively agreed pay (or wages) which, in this study, 
relates to increases in basic wages negotiated between social partners at various levels. The second 
is actual compensation (or actual wages or pay), taken from the AMECO database (of national 
accounts). This is the only time series of harmonised actual pay data available, and it is also used for 
the indicators used in the macroeconomic scoreboard. No distinction between net and gross wages 
is possible with this dataset.
Figure 1: Scope of pay-related terms used in report
Components
Terms used in report
Collectively agreed pay
Collectively agreed pay/wages
Wages/pay
Actual compensation (AMECO definition)
Basic wage (collectively agreed or individu-
ally negotiated
Performance-related pay, overtime payment, 
compensation in kind (and other elements)
Social security contributions and taxes 
(employer and employee)
Source: Own depiction, Eurofound
Theoretical background and 
empirical evidence
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Box 2: Key definitions of terms and data used in the report
Actual compensation: AMECO data is used.3 UWCD is the compensation of employees (in 
the entire economy (data taken from national accounts). It includes wages, salaries and 
employers social contributions. In national accounts, the OECD defines the compensation 
of employees as ‘the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an enterprise to 
an employee in return for work done by the latter during the accounting period’ (from 
the OECD online glossary of statistical terms). In this sense it can be interpreted as a total 
labour cost to an employer, paid from the gross revenues or the capital of an enterprise.
Average capital efficiency: This indicates again how much output (gross domestic 
product, or GDP) has in nominal terms (for example, by using the GDP price deflator) 
been produced by employing an economy’s capital stock (valued by the price of capital). 
Average capital efficiency equals capital productivity when the price of capital equals 
the price of the total output.
Capital productivity: This is a ‘physical’ or real measure, giving the amount of output 
(GDP) produced per unit of capital stock employed.
Collectively agreed wages: Those parts of actual compensation that have been 
determined in a process of negotiation between trade unions and employers (or employer 
organisations on their behalf). They usually refer to basic wages.
Inflation rate: The harmonised consumer price index from AMECO (ZCIPH) is used 
here. Such indices are compiled for international comparisons of price developments 
of consumer goods. Note, however, that for intra-country comparisons of collectively 
agreed wages, different national consumer price indices would be a preferable measure, 
to the extent that they have been used by the various actors in the bargaining process.
Labour productivity: This is here defined as gross domestic product per person employed. 
Hence, this is an ‘average’ figure for the amount of output (goods and services) that is 
produced in a year by a person (including both salaried employees and self-employed). 
Data and definitions stem from AMECO.
Nominal unit labour costs: A measure of the relationship between actual compensation 
per employee and labour productivity (in real terms). It indicates how much an ‘average 
employer’ has to pay to command one unit of national output, and is usually reported 
as changes in relation to a given base year. Increasing nominal unit labour costs imply 
that actual compensation has grown faster than labour productivity. This study uses the 
AMECO definition and data.
Real unit labour costs: A measure of the relationship between actual compensation per 
employee and labour productivity (in nominal terms). This is equivalent to nominal unit 
labour costs but deflated with the GDP deflator; it and can be interpreted as the ‘wage 
share’. The wage share is the proportion of GDP received by the people employed. (The 
profit share, when added to the wage share, gives the total gross domestic product, or 
the total value of goods and services that have been produced within an economy in 
3 The AMECO list of variables can be obtained at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/
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a given year). In a similar fashion to nominal unit labour costs, real unit labour costs are 
reported in relation to a selected base year. The AMECO definition is applied here.
Return on capital: The ‘profit rate’, or the amount of profit generated in an economy 
in relation to the stock of capital that has been employed to generate it. Profits at the 
level of the whole economy are essentially defined as output (GDP) minus the wage bill.
Wage drift: The difference between actual compensation and collectively agreed pay. 
In this report, wage drift is taken to mean the difference between increases in actual 
compensation per employee, and increases in collectively agreed pay, expressed in 
percentage points. A positive wage drift means that actual compensation has increased 
faster than the part of it that can be attributed to collective agreements. A negative 
wage drift means that collectively agreed pay has outpaced actual compensation in terms 
of growth.
Wage share – Profit share/profit margin: The fraction of total gross domestic product 
that goes into wages (and salaries). It is equivalent to real unit labour costs and, expressed 
in percentage terms, it complements the profit share (or profit margin). Both together 
add up to 100%.
Pay developments (within countries and between countries over time) are influenced by a multitude 
of factors. These factors could be grouped as follows:
•	 cyclical factors;
•	 general labour market conditions;
•	 social factors;
•	 industrial relations factors;
•	 national legislation and national specificities;
•	 compositional factors.
Cyclical factors determining wages are those linked to economic growth over the business cycle,4 
such as:
•	 the number of working hours;
•	 the amount of overtime worked;
•	 bonuses linked to company performance;
•	 the amount of frictional unemployment or concessions made in bargaining.
4 Messina et al (2009) looked into the cyclicality of real wages in 18 OECD countries and suggest that country differences remain important 
even after controlling for differences in data and methods. Three groups of countries emerge: (1) those with mainly pro‑cyclical real 
wages; (2) countries with mainly counter‑cyclical real wages; (3) countries with either cyclical real wages or with very different patterns 
of cyclicality across deflators. They find that more open economies and countries with stronger unions tend to have less pro‑cyclical (or 
more counter‑cyclical) wages. A similar finding was obtained by Rumler and Scharler (2011): looking at 20 OECD countries, they found 
that unions operating in a highly coordinated system of wage bargaining tend to reduce business cycle volatility. Coordination stabilises 
inflation rates, so they concluded that monetary policy may benefit from increased coordination of wage bargaining.
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Some components of actual compensation (such as overtime payments or bonuses) go down in times 
of slower economic growth. Wages (or wage increases) could do the same, as a response to pressures 
from higher levels of unemployment or as a result of concessions made in individual or collective 
bargaining.
General labour market conditions include the following:
•	 the amount of structural unemployment;
•	 possible labour shortages;
•	 the speed of job creation and reduction.
•	 the degree of labour mobility (nationally or internationally) or the effectiveness of the process of 
matching demand for labour with its supply.
High levels of structural unemployment can constrain wage developments relative to other nations 
or regions,5 while possible labour shortages (be they within occupations or regions) could lead to 
wage premia. This could interact, however, with the extent of labour mobility and whether workers 
(or companies) react to shortages and possible wage differentials. In relation to the effectiveness of 
the matching process, it would be expected that companies would be more likely to offer wage premia 
when they find it difficult to attract the required workforce.
Social factors affecting pay developments derive from concerns that the principles of social inclusion 
and cohesion should not be undermined by low wages. It is established that high wage differentials 
(between the highest and lowest wages, between different occupations, or between the genders) 
are related to poor public health and the perception of unfairness, and may lead to situations of 
social exclusion and unrest. Pay development may be partly determined by policies, measures or 
agreements devised to counter such wage differentials. The policy aim of narrowing the gender pay 
gap is perhaps the most well‑known example of this but there are also instances of government 
measures or social partner agreements to reduce wage differentials through relatively greater pay 
increases for low‑paid workers. However, pay developments might be determined or influenced by 
the determination to combat in‑work poverty – whereby a person, although working, has an income 
below a certain threshold and can be considered poor – or to guarantee that workers are not paid 
below a living or subsistence wage, which is the minimum income necessary to meet such basic 
needs as housing, clothing and nutrition. Linked to this is the existence or otherwise of statutory 
minimum wages, their levels and the degree of compliance. See Part 2 of this report for an extensive 
discussion on the topic.
Industrial relations factors which could theoretically have an impact on the level and development 
of wages comprise the following:
•	 the type of bargaining regime (in terms of coverage of employees and companies or the existence 
of extension or derogation mechanisms);
•	 the importance of single agreements as opposed to multiemployer ones;
5 The existence of regional wage curves (an inverse relationship between regional wages and unemployment) has often been observed in 
empirical research. An interesting study in this context, connected to industrial relations, is Blien et al (2009) for Germany. They found 
that a regional wage curve exists for plants with a firm‑level collective agreement, while works councils dampen adjustment to the regional 
situation. They find no wage curve in plants without collective agreements or with sector‑level agreements.
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•	 coordination of wage bargaining (for example, by means of pattern setting) and articulation 
between different levels;
•	 the type of bargaining (existence of tripartite wage pacts, concession bargaining);
•	 bargaining power (trade union density, mandate of employer organisations, rules as regards 
representativeness);
•	 timing of bargaining rounds (multiannual or once a year);
•	 references used in bargaining (inflation, productivity growth, labour productivity, firms’ 
profitability, fairness issues);
•	 compliance with wage agreements.
Some of these items are discussed in more detail below. It should be also borne in mind that wage 
agreements are typically broader and can also contain provisions on working time, training, variable 
elements of pay, or provisions on payments in kind. All of these are subject to negotiation and could 
influence the final pay outcome. The extent to which the scope of collective agreements is broader 
or narrower is highly country‑specific.
National specificities or legislation in relation to wage‑setting will help explain cross‑country 
differences in wage outcomes and differences in developments over time and over the business cycle. 
Countries differ in the role government plays in the wage‑setting process depending on whether they 
have done the following:6
•	 set a minimum wage;
•	 established legally binding mechanisms of pay indexation;
•	 declared negotiated wage agreements to be generally binding or allow derogation from them;
•	 introduced other wage‑related legislation (such as rules for overtime);
•	 changed the taxation or social security system,7 and the system of basic or minimum wages; the 
generosity of these systems also differs.
Even the political orientation of the government is a factor.8 Different monetary policies are also 
linked to pay and competitiveness outcomes. In terms of monetary policy, Member States belonging 
to the euro zone have less freedom compared with their non‑euro zone counterparts. When seeking 
to improve their international competitiveness, the latter can still use devaluations of their currencies 
as substitute for adjusting wages downwards.
In economic terms, countries differ in the following aspects:
•	 the degree of flexibility or rigidity of wages (how quickly at least parts of the wages can be 
adjusted to changing economic circumstances);9
6 Bayo‑Moriones et al (2013) stressed the role of the national context (in relation to the bargaining system and level of regulation) when 
looking at the role various factors play in pay adjustment. Comparing the United Kingdom with Spain, they found that UK firms had 
a stronger focus on firm‑level productivity while, in Spain, more importance was attached to social dialogue.
7 For OECD countries, Koskelka and Schöoeb (2012) find that a higher degree of tax progression always leads to wage moderation.
8 Johansen et al (2006) estimate that the change from a conservative to a social democratic central government in Norway significantly 
reduced manufacturing wages and made wages more responsive to unemployment.
9 Du Caju et al, 2008, recall from the literature that the average duration of wage agreements limits the relative flexibility of wages, whereas 
greater union density and union coverage increase real wage rigidity.
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•	 the degree of openness of their economies;
•	 their sectoral composition and – a related issue – the mobility of capital (and labour);10
•	 what role labour costs play in attracting investments (to what extent countries are specialised in 
labour‑ or capital‑intensive industries, and knowledge‑ or labour‑intensive industries).
Countries can also pursue different wage policies, such as:
•	 general moderation to preserve jobs in weaker companies;
•	 high‑wage routes to foster adoption of highly productive technologies;
•	 policies promoting equality of pay developments between sectors, occupations and individuals;
•	 policies promoting pay that is in line with sectoral or individual productivity developments.
Finally, compositional factors play some role in explaining differences in pay levels and pay 
developments. Countries differ in relation to the following elements:
•	 their workforce (age structure and its relation to seniority‑based pay or the likelihood of exit of 
and entry into the labour force, the skill level and wage differentials in relation to skills);
•	 their sectoral composition (degree of labour/capital intensity and knowledge intensity);
•	 the composition of firms (multinationals, small and medium‑sized companies).11
Multinationals, for instance, could (depending on the industrial relations systems) have different 
approaches to local companies in determining wages. And expanding its business to foreign countries 
could also affect a multinational’s bargaining position in its home country (Eckel and Egger, 2006).
These factors will not be further analysed here, but it should be borne in mind that they are potential 
determinants of wage developments and need to be taken into consideration if the aim is to arrive at 
a general model explaining pay outcomes.
This report focuses on two key issues:
•	 the link of wages to labour productivity and related economic growth;
•	 the link between wage bargaining regimes, pay and pay outcomes.
10 For Lithuania, for instance, Elsner (2012) showed that emigration had a significant positive effect on the wages of (male) workers who 
remained in the country: a one percentage‑point increase in the emigration rate predicted a 0.67% increase in real wages.
11 Based on German data from 1997–2004, Zwick (2011) showed that large, profitable establishments, and those with a highly qualified 
workforce, pay high seniority wages. They also showed that collective bargaining coverage, the presence of works councils and reduced 
working time for older employees are positively correlated with seniority wages; however, they found that the higher proportion of 
foreigners and women in the workforce, along with initial wage levels for job entrants, are negatively correlated with the payment of 
seniority wages.
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework
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Source: Authors’ illustration
This study takes the view that there is no direct link between wage bargaining regimes and economic 
outcomes (such as growth of output, labour productivity, unemployment, unit labour costs.) However, 
a number of qualifications to this statement should be borne in mind.
•	 Any potential link between wage‑setting mechanisms and economic growth is an indirect one. 
It is mediated predominantly by wage outcomes in relation to productivity, and the implied link 
between wages and levels of employment and unemployment; hence, it is important to look into 
the pay outcomes different systems generate.
•	 Different wage‑bargaining regimes influence various components of pay to a different extent. The 
direct influence that social partners can exercise in their negotiations is first and foremost on 
the collectively agreed part, which embraces mainly basic wages, but could also go beyond this.
•	 Different wage‑setting systems are only one variable among many that may have an impact on 
economic outcomes.
•	 Wage‑setting mechanisms (or different bargaining regimes) do interact in many ways with other 
(labour market) policies and such interaction can be crucial in arriving at different growth 
outcomes. Such complementary policies could explain why similar systems can lead to different 
outcomes.
Links between wages and labour productivity
When looking at the relationship between wages (whether collectively agreed or actual compensation) 
and labour productivity three points need to be noted:
•	 The relationship between wages and labour productivity can go in either direction.
•	 Labour productivity, as well as the level of (expected) price increases, is one of the most important 
indicators used in wage negotiations (Du Caju et al, 2008; Eurofound, 2013b).
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•	 Increases in labour productivity can stem from increased labour intensity, but may also stem 
from increased capital productivity or increased capital intensity or technological advancements.
Efficiency‑wage theories have stressed the role of wages in stimulating individual labour 
productivity – provided they are set at levels above the going market rate. From a macroeconomic 
or country‑level perspective, the decision to pay relatively high wages (in relation to other countries) 
could – potentially, in the longer‑term – promote labour productivity, since only the most competitive 
companies survive. It could also stimulate the adoption of technologies that enable companies to 
reach a high level of productivity and hence be able to afford to pay high wages. Such a wage policy 
is part of the so‑called ‘Swedish model’ (or the ‘Rehn‑Meidner’ model).
Alternatively, (standard) economic theory predicts that, in equilibrium, labour productivity equals 
wages. Were labour productivity to exceed wages, profit‑oriented companies would have an incentive 
to hire new workers; with returns to scale diminishing, this would bring labour productivity down. 
On the other hand, wages exceeding labour productivity would lead companies to shed labour with 
a subsequent rise of labour productivity.
Figure 3: Wages and labour productivity
Collectively agreed wages
Actual wage development Labour productivity 
Wage drift
Link negotiated wages 
with productivity
Link actual wages with 
productivity
Source: Authors’ own depiction, Eurofound
Wage-bargaining regimes, pay and economic outcomes
The link between different wage‑bargaining regimes and economic growth or other related economic 
outcomes has been discussed in academia for a long time, although a clear and empirically sound 
conclusion has, to date, not been reached. In the 1980s, the prevailing view among political scientists 
was that corporatist policies (within which wages are set centrally and wage setters would recognise 
broader interests) would lead to better performance. This was questioned by Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) who introduced the so‑called ‘hump‑shaped’ theory: they argue that ‘extreme’ configuration of 
wage‑bargaining regimes would lead to better economic performance (in terms of lower unemployment 
and by means of wage moderation, such as ‘institutional wage restraint’) than ‘intermediate’ 
configurations would do. They argued that highly decentralised systems of wage bargaining would 
do well (provided that product markets were perfectly competitive), because unions in such systems 
have limited ‘market power’; this would in turn lead to wage moderation. However, they also said 
that highly centralised systems would do well because, in these systems, all‑encompassing trade 
unions would naturally recognise their market power and take into account both the inflationary 
and unemployment effects of wage increases. In ‘intermediate’ systems, however, with bargaining 
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taking place at sectoral level, unions can exert some market power, but they would be more inclined 
to ignore the macroeconomic implications of their actions.
This work has been debated widely among academics – for instance, by Soskice (1990) who reassessed 
Calmfors and Driffill’s hypothesis. Rather than referring to levels of bargaining and looking at the 
degree of centralisation, he suggested looking at the degree of coordination in the bargaining process. 
Coordination can be achieved by various mechanisms: through peak‑level organisations; by means 
of pace‑setting mechanisms; unilateral coordination by either unions or employer organisations; and 
actions by public authorities varying from ‘signalling’’ to the imposition of norms. The actors might 
be government or monetary authorities.
Soskice showed that if coordination, rather than the degree of centralisation, had been chosen in the 
empirical work, the hump‑shaped pattern detected would have disappeared. As for the theoretical 
construct, he acknowledges that the theory is correct on its own assumptions, yet these assumptions 
‘seldom match the reality of uncoordinated company‑level wage setting’.
Another work in this field is that of Traxler (1995), who speaks of ‘organised decentralisation’, 
where he distinguishes between two types of industrial relations regimes, both of which deal more 
in decentralised (sector or company‑level) bargaining. Organised systems are those which, while 
having moved away from economy‑wide concertation, still have a high degree of coordination of 
bargaining activities in place, either through peak‑level employer organisations and trade unions 
and/or pace‑setting sectors. In disorganised systems, the shift to bargaining at lower levels has been 
accompanied by more restricted coordination goals and/or capacity.
The existence of this ‘hump‑shape’ has still not been confirmed, as Driffill himself showed (Driffill, 
2006).
An example of one such empirical study within the context of this theoretical discussion is one 
produced by the OECD (2004), which seeks to reassess whether the claims made by a 1994 OECD 
study on the superiority of decentralised bargaining do hold. Based on a panel of data from OECD 
member states, it fails to establish such a link between aspects of collective bargaining systems and 
economic performance (growth of labour productivity), which leads the authors to the following 
conclusion:
… the great difficulty encountered by researchers attempting to identify robust 
associations between differences in bargaining organisation and differences in 
macro‑economic performance suggest that quite different organisational forms 
may be capable of similar performance.
(OECD, 2004, p.166).
Another theory regarding the link between wage‑setting mechanisms and growth is what economists 
call ‘The Swedish Model’ (or the ‘Rehn‑Meidner’ model). More centralised or coordinated bargaining 
(such as in Sweden through pace‑setting industries) leads to a more compressed wage distribution 
with equal pay for equal work. Such bargaining‑induced compression reduces the potential of wage 
competition. In the medium to long term, and provided that wages are set high enough, this means 
that less productive firms cannot remain in business, as the collectively agreed wage will knock 
them out of the market. On the other hand, it will hold down wages in highly productive firms. 
This thus serves to reallocate labour and capital from activities of low productivity to those of high 
productivity with a further implication for long‑term growth. Two components of the Swedish model 
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that complement this are active labour market policies, which are seen as a high, shared priority 
(with strong social partner involvement) and a balanced macroeconomic policy, which seeks to keep 
inflation down and to ensure there is a supportive demand framework.
Such a policy, especially in the short term, conflicts with standard economic theory, in which higher 
wages are expected to lead to higher unemployment, with the potential to prolong or even reinforce 
periods of economic downturn.
Some further recent empirical research has been conducted across and within countries and there 
is evidence for some links between bargaining regimes and wage outcomes. Brandl (2012) looks 
into the effectiveness of wage pacts in terms of their capacity to enhance economic performance. 
Theoretically, he suggests, exposed‑sector pattern bargaining (in which the sector exposed to 
international competition sets the pace for further pay bargaining rounds by means of horizontal 
coordination) is most likely to deliver pay moderation (in terms of nominal wage growth and growth 
of real unit labour costs). This would be followed by pacts with a high degree of governability, while 
peak‑level coordination with a low degree of governability would be least likely to achieve pay 
moderation. He suggests that other bargaining forms (uncoordinated decentralisation, state‑imposed 
policy, pacts under low governability and peak‑level coordination under high governability) fall 
between the two extremes. Using a sample of 20 countries – from western Europe and from outside 
Europe – he finds, within his basic model, a number of outcomes: exposed‑sector pattern bargaining 
as compared with uncoordinated bargaining is able to deliver pay moderation; pacts under high 
governability also achieve pay moderation; and peak‑level coordination under low governability 
shows a higher growth rate for nominal wages than it does under decentralised and uncoordinated 
bargaining. His findings also suggest that wage pacts have a comparative advantage relative to 
peak‑level coordination within the same category of governability: under low governability, pacts 
record significantly lower wage inflation than their peak‑level counterpart (which more strongly 
inflates wages than any other category). Yet, Brandl concludes, wage pacts are not a magic bullet: 
if the intention is to deliver pay moderation, other forms (such as exposed‑sector bargaining) might 
equally deliver such results. Wage pacts, in his interpretation, are a special form of government 
intervention: their merits – relative to simple peak‑level coordination – lie in a government’s 
opportunity to prioritise the exposed industry.
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Figure 4: Bargaining types and economic outcomes
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Another recent study from the International Labour Office (ILO) (Cazes et al, 2012) looked into the 
relationship between the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and employment 
rates, and found it to be non‑linear. Highly decentralised systems with company‑level bargaining and 
no coordination are associated with the lowest employment rate. Moving towards more coordinated 
and centralised systems, a U‑shape has been detected: decentralised, coordinated systems, as well 
as centralised, coordinated systems have the highest employment rates. Systems with intermediate 
degrees of coordination fare worse in terms of employment rates, but still better than the completely 
decentralised uncoordinated systems.
Other recent studies linking the bargaining system to economic outcomes have been produced by 
McGuiness et al (2010) and Baccaro et al (2007) who both suggested that a key driver of Irish 
growth before the crisis was the reduction of labour costs resulting from centralised bargaining within 
both the indigenous and foreign‑owned sectors, although the relative advantage was greater among 
foreign‑owned firms.
Rusinek and Rycx (2013) used firm‑level data for Belgium and showed that, in regimes of decentralised 
bargaining (where renegotiation at firm level is often practised), a positive relationship between wages 
and firm‑level profitability can be found (regardless of whether firm‑level collective agreements exist). 
In more centralised regimes, however, where firm renegotiation is less common, they find no link 
between wages and firm‑level productivity in general – only for those where firm‑level renegotiation 
takes place.
Tronti (2010) looked at developments in labour productivity in Italy between 1993 and 2008 and the 
role of the bargaining model introduced by the tripartite 1993 ‘protocol’. This protocol introduced 
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an income policy framework, which promoted wage moderation with a view to reducing inflation, 
boosting employment and supporting firm competitiveness, and foresaw a two‑tier bargaining 
structure based on sectoral level agreements and decentralised bargaining – usually at firm level. 
While sectoral agreements should preserve real wages, the subsequent local firm‑level bargaining 
was meant to link wages to productivity, profitability or quality targets. According to Tronti, since 
local‑level wage bargaining failed to reach a large proportion of the workforce, the wage moderation 
effect prevailed and wages only moderately increased their flexible component, and neither economic 
growth, nor productivity was boosted. Conversely, having relatively cheap labour, employers did 
not invest in labour‑saving technologies, but boosted employment (rather than modernising their 
equipment), with a negative impact on labour productivity and economic growth. Echoing previous 
literature on bargaining models, Tronti suggests that better economic performance would be achieved 
by a bargaining system that distributes productivity gains more evenly, especially through sectoral 
agreements, given the constraints on expanding the coverage of decentralised bargaining beyond 
a minority of firms and employees.
Box 3: Wage cuts – empirical research evidence
Recently published empirical findings from the Central Bank of Ireland (Du Caju et al, 
2013) based on a survey in 14 EU Member States, but pre-dating the crisis, suggest that 
firms have been quite reluctant to cut nominal wages and have used wage cuts as a last 
resort. Firms in all countries and sectors commonly felt that base wage cuts are best 
avoided in order to sustain morale and effort, and to keep the most productive workers. 
The surveyed countries varied most in terms of the importance that firms attach to 
labour regulations and collective bargaining. Firms in euro zone Member States attach 
a far greater importance to these as the main reasons for avoiding wage cuts than 
do firms in non-euro zone countries (where collective bargaining is, on average, less 
prevalent).
More recent information, on wage cuts made during the crisis, stems from Eurofound’s 
fifth Working Conditions Survey of 2010 (analysed in Eurofound 2013d). The report finds 
that the extent to which workers experienced wage reductions is closely dependent on 
the Member State: in most countries, few workers saw their wages reduced (though 
this number was larger than that reported by Du Caju et al (2013) preceding the crisis). 
Countries with more than 20% of workers seeing their pay reduced in 2010 were the 
Baltic States, Ireland and Romania. The report also found that older workers were 
more likely to experience pay cuts, while younger workers were more likely to face 
a weakening of their job security.
Wages, profits and growth
The extent to which wage developments (and changes in the wage share of GDP) impact on economic 
growth is, at first glance, not clear. While wages can be used for consumption (and savings), 
a declining wage share (hence an increasing profit share) would leave room for investments and 
launch investment‑led growth, particularly in small export‑oriented economies. The magnitude of 
these opposing forces is subject to empirical assessment. This has led economists (Stockhammer and 
Onaran, 2012) to distinguish between ‘wage‑led systems’ and ‘profit‑led systems’. In the first system, 
growth of the wage share stimulates economic growth by means of increased demand; in the second, 
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by contrast, economic growth is curtailed. Growth in a profit‑led regime, with declining wage shares, 
could come only from the expansion of exports or be debt‑led, if investments did not respond to 
declining wage shares. Stockhammer and Onaran (2012) also summarised empirical studies on this 
issue and suggested that demand in most economies seems to be domestically wage‑led, meaning 
that both consumption and investment decline as the wage share goes down, because consumption 
responds much more sensitively to the decline than investments do. Profit‑led regimes would be 
those where the effect of a declining wage share on net exports is strong enough to compensate 
for the decline in domestic demand – and this is likely only in small and open economies.12 They 
suggest that the aggregate euro zone is wage‑led, implying that simultaneous wage moderation would 
have a negative effect on demand and, ultimately, growth. As for the supply side, they suggest that 
labour market institutions can have a positive impact on labour productivity growth: good industrial 
relations can improve the propensity of workers to contribute to the production process and high 
wages can lead capitalists to rationalise the production process and speed up technological progress. 
They therefore suggest a wage‑led growth policy, with stable or increasing wage shares, strengthened 
unions and collective bargaining and minimum wage policies. (See also Box 4: ‘Beyond wage‑related 
competitiveness’.)
12 The empirical studies that Stockhammer and Onaran summarised show that, for the euro zone, only Austria and the Netherlands could 
be examples for such profit‑led growth regimes.
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Before moving on to the core of this report, which is the reporting on developments in collectively 
agreed pay into the new century across EU Member States, it is important to show the context in 
which pay is set in the various Member States. Firstly, a simple classification of wage bargaining 
regimes is presented, and then major trends in pay developments from 1998 to 2012 are shown, 
for both collectively agreed pay and actual compensation of employees. Based on these data, this 
part of the report then investigates to what extent both types of pay have grown in line with labour 
productivity developments – a requirement that, through the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’s 
scoreboard, is currently on the radar of European policymakers.
This study also looks into wage‑drift, that is, the extent to which changes in actual compensation 
deviated from changes in collectively agreed pay.
Wage-bargaining regimes 1998–2012
The ways in which pay setting and wage bargaining function vary across the Member States. Beside 
the levels at which wages are set (central, cross‑sectoral, sectoral, branch or company‑level) the 
following must also be taken into account:
•	 whether multiple bargaining levels exist at the same time;
•	 the extent to which bargaining at various levels is interlinked (or ‘articulated’);
•	 the extent to which coordination occurs between the actors at different levels and across sectors, 
branches or companies;
•	 the timing of bargaining rounds;
•	 the extent to which government intervenes in the wage bargaining (for example, by setting 
statutory minimum wages;13 the legal extension of agreements to non‑affiliated parties; or whether 
it is legally possible to opt out or derogate from agreements);
•	 the existence of ‘automatic’ mechanisms of pay indexation;
•	 the extent to which certain sectors or agreements could act as ‘pace‑setters’ for other bargaining 
rounds.
In the context of this study, it is useful to distinguish between Member States according to 
their wage‑bargaining regimes. The grouping proposed is simple, drawing on two variables: the 
predominant level of bargaining and the degree of coordination in the wage‑bargaining process. 
The reason for the choice of these two features is based on the literature surrounding the 1988 
Calmfors and Drifill hypothesis, and the fact that these two received the greatest attention in the 
discussions afterwards. The choice was also driven by the availability of empirical data; another 
obvious candidate would be the collective bargaining coverage, but attempts to obtain recent data 
in a time series were rather unsuccessful.
This study uses the ICTWSS 4.0 database as a starting point for the generation of the two variables. 
The database, drawn up by Jelle Visser and hosted by the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour 
Studies (AIAS), is the most comprehensive collection of variables and indicators in the field of 
industrial relations for the EU and OECD Member States. It provides time series ranging (in many 
13 See Part 2 of this report for an extensive description of minimum‑wage systems in place throughout Europe.
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cases) from the 1960s up to 2010 or 2011. During the writing of this report, national correspondents 
from Eurofound’s European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) were also asked to update 
selected wage‑setting related time series for 2012 and to discuss and debate, where necessary, any 
doubts in relation to the provided classification. In some cases (for example, Italy and the Czech 
Republic) the originally indicated series was then slightly modified.
Table 2:  Variables to classify wage bargaining regimes
ICTWSS Code ICTWSS Description Eurofound classification
Predominant bargaining level
A level is ‘predominant’ if it accounts for at least two-thirds of the total bargaining coverage rate in a given year and country. If it 
accounts for less, but for more than one-third of the coverage rate, there is a mixed or intermediate situation, between two levels. 
A mixed situation also occurs when bargaining levels alternate and/or it is impossible to assess which of the two contributes more 
to actual regulation of employment relations.
5 Bargaining predominantly takes place at central or 
cross-industry level and there are centrally determined 
binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements 
negotiated at lower levels
Rather centralised
4 Intermediate or alternating between central and 
industry bargaining
Rather centralised
3 Bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or 
industry level
Intermediate
2 Intermediate or alternating between sector and 
company bargaining
Intermediate
1 Bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or 
company level
Rather decentralised
Wage coordination
Based on Kenworthy (2001a; 2001b). Note that this is an indicator of the ‘degree, rather than the type of coordination’ (Kenworthy, 
2001a, p.78), ‘based on a set of expectations about which institutional features of wage-setting arrangements are likely to generate 
more or less coordination’ (Kenworthy, 2001a, p.80).
5 a) centralised bargaining by peak association(s), with or 
without government involvement, and/or government 
imposition of wage schedule/freeze, with peace 
obligation (for example, Sweden before 1980)
Highly coordinated
4 b) informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining 
by a powerful and monopolistic union confederation 
(Austria prior to 1983)
Highly coordinated
3 c) extensive, regularised pattern setting and highly 
synchronised bargaining coupled with coordination of 
bargaining by influential large firms (Japan prior to 
1998)
Medium level of coordination
2 a) centralised bargaining by peak associations with or 
without government involvement and/or government 
imposition of wage schedule/freeze, without peace 
obligation (for example, Ireland 1987–2009);
b) informal (intra-associational and/or interassociational) 
centralisation of industry and firm-level bargaining by 
peak associations (both sides) (Spain 2002–2008;
c) extensive, regularised pattern-setting coupled with 
a high degree of union concentration (Germany, 
most years)
Medium level of coordination
1 a) informal (intra-associational and/or interassociational) 
centralisation of industry and firm-level bargaining by 
peak associations (one side, or only some unions) with 
or without government participation (Italy since 2000);
b) industry-level bargaining with irregular and uncertain 
pattern setting and only moderate union concentration 
(Denmark 1981–1986);
c) government arbitration or intervention 
(UK 1966–1968, 1972–1974)
Low level of coordination
Source: Visser, 2013; ICTWSS 4.0, codebook
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The maps in Figure 5 show the result of this classification exercise. The two variables on the 
predominant level of wage bargaining and the degree of coordination were crossed, drawing on the 
broader categories. The outcome is straightforward: countries in which pay is set at higher levels 
generally also have higher levels of degrees of coordination (which is partly already implied by the 
definition of the wage coordination variable). Nonetheless, there are some exceptions. Countries 
with intermediate levels of bargaining (sectoral, branch level or alternating between sector and 
company level) show the full spectrum of coordination outcomes. The only country which falls 
outside this general pattern is Greece, with a rather centralised level of pay‑setting, but a low degree 
of coordination. In the pre‑crisis Greek system, social partners agreed, at national level, on the 
setting of the minimum wage which, at the same time, served as the minimum increase to be granted 
in other agreements as well. When Greece became a programme country, and after the introduction 
of several Memoranda, this national ‘EGSEE’ agreement was suspended, sectoral agreements were 
not renewed and bargaining was delegated to the company level.14
There is no country in Europe with a decentralised but highly coordinated bargaining system. Such 
countries do exist globally: the most often‑cited example is China, where bargaining takes place 
locally, but is highly coordinated in annual bargaining rounds taking place at the same time.
Overall, the maps suggest relatively stable systems, with the major changes occurring in the post‑crisis 
period after 2009, mainly within the programme countries, but also in those countries that received 
wage‑related recommendations in the European semester. So, for instance, the Irish central social 
partner agreement in the private sector was not renegotiated and pay bargaining was delegated to 
company level. In Slovenia and Romania, also, the central tripartite agreements were suspended 
or not renewed, with sector‑level bargaining being predominant. While other sources do suggest 
accelerated tendencies of decentralisation (Eurofound 2013a), with more bargaining being delegated 
to the company level, this has not affected the predominant level of bargaining in most Member 
States – at least not for the time being.
14 More detailed information, is available in Eurofound (2013b) and the EIRO articles on Greece: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/
country/greece.htm
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Figure 5a: Wage-bargaining regimes in Europe in 1999
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Figure 5b: Wage-bargaining regimes in Europe in 2005
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Figure 5c: Wage-bargaining regimes in Europe in 2012
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5Major trends in pay developments
Before reporting on pay developments, it is useful to consider the actual levels of compensation, 
and how these vary between countries. This disparity has narrowed in the period of observation,15 
but is still persistent. Actual pay ranged from around €6,200 per employee in Bulgaria in 2012 
to around €58,000 per employee in Luxembourg. Higher growth rates of actual compensation per 
employee, mainly in the new Member States, reflect how these countries are catching up with 
European averages. It is also worth noting that cross‑country differences in wages are closely linked 
to cross‑country differences in productivity (compare Collignon, 2013b, and Figure 10), although 
some exceptions of course prevail at the individual country level.
Figure 6: Level of compensation per employee, 1998 and 2012, EU28 (thousands of euros)
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European countries show a wide range of developments of pay in terms of actual compensation.16 
Between 1998 and 2012, actual compensation per employee rose, on an annual average, 0.9% in Italy 
and 22% in Romania. This, of course, reflects differences in price developments as well as differences 
in productivity developments (these will be investigated further in Chapter 6: ‘Pay developments and 
labour productivity’). The median European increase stood at 3.5% per year (Malta). The largest 
annual increases in actual compensation per employee were seen in the new Member States in central 
and eastern Europe (ranging from 4.5% in Croatia to 10% in Latvia), while the lowest increases took 
place (besides Italy) in Germany, Austria, Cyprus and France (all between 1% and 3%).
Pay and its links to the business cycle
Pay developments are inevitably linked to the economic business cycle, which differs between the 
various Member States. It comes as no surprise that pay developments have been much lower during 
the crisis in most Member States. Countries experienced the highest average annual increases of 
actual compensation per employee in the early years of the new century, with the exception of 
Germany. In these early years of boom, annual increases ranged between 1.4% in Germany and – 
because of substantial inflation in the years of transition – 42% in Romania. Between 2009 and 2012 
15 The coefficient of variation fell from 0.64 in 1998 to 0.52 in 2012, which means that the countries now cluster more closely around the 
‘average’ compensation than before.
16 Compensation of employees is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for 
work done by the latter. In particular, it also includes social contributions paid by the employer (Eurostat, national accounts).
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they ranged from ‑3.4% in Greece to +8.4% in Bulgaria. The only exceptions are Austria and Germany 
with growth in actual compensation in the years following the crisis that was higher than those 
countries’ medium‑term average. During what was a period of growth in most other Member States 
(2004–2008), Cyprus, Germany, Malta, Poland and the Netherlands experienced the lowest growth 
in actual compensation per employee (Table 7 in Annex 1 provides an overview of these figures). 
In most Member States with available data, collectively agreed pay (in nominal terms) rose more 
slowly than, or more or less in line with, actual compensation – Germany, Greece, Romania and Italy 
being major exceptions to this (see Figure 9). Collectively agreed annual pay increases ranged from 
2.2% in Denmark and the Netherlands to 25% in Romania. The European median in this regard 
stood at 2.8% (the median countries being France and the UK); however, this is not fully comparable 
across Member States – because, as is the case with many data reported – not all levels where pay 
is actually set in collective agreements are necessarily covered by the data source from which the 
series reported here were taken. See Table 8 in Annex 1.
Outcomes of collectively agreed pay increases fluctuate much less over the business cycle than does 
actual compensation of employees (compare Table 8 in Annex 2). On the one hand, this is due to 
the fact that collectively agreed pay increases refer – by and large – to basic wages, while actual 
compensation per employee also includes variable elements such as performance‑related pay or 
profit‑sharing schemes, overtime payments, allowances, benefits in cash and in kind. These are the 
first to be cut in recessions and are likely to increase in more prosperous times. On the other hand, 
wages react to developments in the labour markets: as employment levels increase and there are 
tighter markets from the employer’s point of view, the ‘market price’ for labour goes up. The opposite 
is true when unemployment goes up in relation to the available vacant positions. Such market‑driven 
developments might not be reflected in collectively agreed pay to the same extent as they are in actual 
wages. For this reason, one could think of collectively agreed pay as having a kind of ‘insurance’ 
function for employees. Indeed, most Member States – also across the different wage bargaining 
regimes – show a fairly similar pattern when it comes to developments in collectively agreed pay in 
relation to changes in labour productivity. Increases in collectively agreed pay are below increases 
in labour productivity in times of boom, but are higher than declines in labour productivity in times 
of crisis. In this sense they might thought of ‘shielding’ the workers from cyclical ups and downs.
Pay across bargaining regimes
As wage bargaining regimes did not remain stable over time (compare Figures 5a, b and c), displaying 
results of pay outcomes by bargaining regimes is sensitive to the year of classification used, and can 
vary in some cases.
The breakdown of the average annual pay increases in 1998–2012 (in this depiction broken down 
by bargaining regime as of 2005) shows that a range of outcomes can be observed in every regime.
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Figure 7: Average annual growth rate of pay 1998–2012*, wage bargaining regime as of 2005
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
BE ES FI IE SI RO EL DE AT NL DK SE NO IT CY FR PT LU CZ SK BG MT UK HR PL LT HU EE LV
High coord. Low
coord.
High coord. Med. Low coord. Low coord.
Centralised Intermediate Decentralised
A
ve
ra
g
e 
an
n
u
al
  p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
in
cr
ea
se
(1
99
8-
20
12
 
Actual compensation Collectively agreed pay, nominal Collectively agreed pay, real
RO: 22 and 24%
Source: AMECO, various national data‑sources; EIRO, Eurofound own calculations
Note: * for some countries, shorter time series of collectively agreed pay are available; in such cases, the annual average is 
reported for a shorter period. In Romania and Hungary, no agreement or recommendations were made in certain years. These 
years have been taken into account with a value of zero increase. Ireland: the series ends in 2008, hence the collectively 
agreed pay reflects increases from 1998–2008 only.
A comparison of group medians within each wage bargaining regime shows that actual pay outcomes, 
on average, during 1998–2012 were lowest in systems with a high or medium degree of coordination 
(see Table 3).
However, countries with low levels of bargaining coordination – be it at sectoral or company level – 
had higher increases of actual pay on average. It should however be noted that in all regimes (except 
perhaps for the case of highly coordinated sector‑level bargaining) the range of outcomes is rather 
broad. In the ‘median’ of those countries that have automatic indexation mechanisms (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta), average annual compensation per employee increased by 3.6%.
Findings differ slightly in the case of collectively agreed pay (see Table 4), with the sector level (high 
and medium‑coordinated countries) displaying the lowest outcomes; somewhat higher outcomes were 
observed in countries with low levels of coordination as well as in the highly centralised countries. 
Note however that, as compared with outcomes of actual compensation, the range of group medians 
is much narrower in the case of collectively agreed pay. In addition, they do not refer to the full set 
of countries, but only to those for which data are available.
In real terms, increases in collectively agreed pay were lowest in the country group with sector‑level 
and highly coordinated bargaining (the median stood at 0.5%), while they were highest in countries 
with intermediate‑level bargaining and a low degree of coordination (in which the median stood 
at 1.9%). Figure 8 in Annex 2 depicts these data for the individual countries expressed as index values.
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Table 3:  Median increases of nominal actual compensation per employee by wage bargaining 
regime and subperiods
  1998–2012 1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012
Wage bargaining regime as of… 2005 ‘Dominant’ 1999 2005 2012
Centralised, highly coordinated 3.1 3.1 6.5 3.9 2.6
Intermediate level, highly coordinated 3.1 3.2 3.8 3.2 2.3
Intermediate level, medium level of coordination - 2.8 4.1 - 1.7
Intermediate level, low level of coordination 3.6 3.6 5.3 3.5 2.4
Decentralised, low level of coordination 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.1 2.4
Indexation mechanisms present 3.6 3.6 4.2 2.9 2.2
Note: The ‘dominant’ wage bargaining regime has been defined as the one most often observed during the period of observation.
Source: AMECO, Eurofound (own calculations).
Table 4:  Median increases of nominal collectively agreed pay by wage bargaining regime and 
subperiods
  1998–2012 1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012
Wage bargaining regime as of… 2005 ‘Dominant’ 1999 2005 2012
Centralised, highly coordinated 2.9 2.9 3.8 3.2 2.0
Intermediate level, highly coordinated 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.1
Intermediate level, medium coordinated - 2.5 3.5 - 1.8
Intermediate level, low level of coordination 3.7 3.6 4.4 3.7 2.9
Decentralised, low level of coordination 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.1 1.5
Note: The ‘dominant’ wage bargaining regime has been defined as the one most often observed during the period of observation.
Source: various national sources, Eurofound (own calculations).
Figure 8: Pay developments from 1998–2012, EU28 and Norway
 
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
In
d
ex
 1
99
8 
=
 1
00
 
Austria 
Nominal collectively
agreed wages 
Real collectively
agreed wages 
Actual compensation
per employee  
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
In
d
ex
 1
99
8 
=
 1
00
 
Belgium 
Actual compensation per employee Real labour productivity 
Real collectively agreed wages Nominal collectively agreed wages 
Source: Statistik Austria, Tariflohnindex, AMECO Source: FOD WASO, Index of Collectively Agreed Wages, 
AMECO
 
Major trends in pay developments
45
 
80
130
180
230
280
330
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
In
d
ex
 1
99
8 
=
 1
00
 
Bulgaria 
Actual compensation per employee  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
In
d
ex
 2
00
1=
 1
00
 
Cyprus 
Actual compensation per employee 
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Source: The Industry Agreement, AMECO Source: Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 
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Italy 
Source: National Social Partnership Agreements, AMECO Source: ISTAT, Retribuzioni contrattuali per contratto – dati 
mensili e annuali (hourly rates), AMECO
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Norway 
Source: Economic Policy Department, Ministry of Finance 
Economic Survey (blue‑collar workers only), AMECO
Source: Ministry of Labour VMPI database, AMECO
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Collectively agreed pay and actual wage developments: Wage drift
The difference between actual wage developments and collectively agreed pay is referred to in the 
literature as ‘wage drift’.
As mentioned above, there are a number of reasons why collectively agreed pay developments might 
differ from actual wage developments.
•	 ‘Collectively agreed pay’ most likely refers to basic wages only, while actual wage bills include 
overtime payments, bonuses, stock options or other forms of variable pay.
•	 Firms might be willing to pay more than what has been collectively agreed, in order to encourage 
workers’ commitment or discourage shirking. Economists call such payment ‘efficiency wages’.
•	 In countries where collective bargaining coverage is not high, this may be due to the non‑covered 
sector paying different market wages than the covered sector.
•	 Wage drift can be influenced by derogation mechanisms.
In this report, wage drift is defined as the difference between increases in actual compensation per 
employee and increases in collectively agreed pay, expressed in percentage points. Figure 9 shows 
this gap, summed and expressed in percentage points per annum. A negative wage drift means 
that collectively agreed pay rose more strongly than actual compensation, while a positive wage 
drift means that actual compensation rose more than collectively agreed pay. In general, wage drift 
is likely to be greater in times of boom and less in times of crisis. In this sense, wage drift is also 
sensitive to the choice of base year or, more generally, the period covered.
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Figure 9:  Gap between actual compensation and collectively agreed pay (wage drift), 
average 1999–2012
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Wage drift – on average – was negative in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Romania over the 
observed period; it was close to zero in Austria, France and Portugal and positive in the remaining 
countries with available data. Again, the wage‑bargaining context does not add much to the 
explanation of such differences: positive and negative wage drift of different sizes can be found in 
each of the regimes, with the exception of decentralised regimes, where only positive wage drift was 
recorded. However, it is in this regime that the biggest gaps in data exist.
There is a further point worth drawing out from Figure 8. In those countries that received 
recommendations to reform their wage‑bargaining mechanisms and in which there was a change 
in the level of wage bargaining and/or degree of coordination (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania and 
Slovenia), together with countries that were recommended to make reforms (Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain) in 2009–2010, there was a turning point in which the index of actual compensation fell under 
the collectively agreed wages index, and the gap between the two started to widen, implying that 
actual compensation grew more slowly than the collectively agreed amount.
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6Pay developments and labour 
productivity
As with the level of wages, labour productivity also converged across countries over the period 
of observation.17 In 2012, labour productivity (GDP per person employed) ranged from around 
12,000 euros per person employed in Bulgaria to 145,000 euros per person employed in Norway (or 
around 117,000 euros in Luxembourg within the EU). Such differences in labour productivity are 
heavily influenced by the type of technology applied in the respective countries – such as what kind 
of capital is used and how intensively this is being used to generate output.
Figure 10:  Level of labour productivity, 1998 and 2012, EU28 and Norway (thousands of euro 
per person employed)
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Two indicators have been widely used when it comes to the link of pay developments with 
developments in labour productivity. The first is nominal unit labour costs, which are also part of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure scoreboard, with a threshold being defined as a compounded 
increase of nominal unit labour costs by 9% over three years for euro zone members and by 12% 
increase for non‑euro zone members. Nominal unit labour costs refer to the relationship between 
compensation per employee and real labour productivity (in terms of people employed). In this sense, 
they indicate how much a ‘unit of labour’ costs in relation to the output it generates. As they are 
affected by both productivity and price developments, they are used as an indicator for international 
(cost) competitiveness.
The second indicator is the real unit labour cost. Real unit labour costs are measured in terms of 
nominal actual compensation per employee in relation to nominal labour productivity (in terms of 
people employed). Real unit labour costs can be expressed in terms of the deflated nominal unit 
labour costs and they are equivalent to the wage share (the share of wages in the total GDP of an 
economy).
17 The coefficient of variation fell from 0.64 in 1998 to 0.57 in 2012, which means that Member States now cluster more closely around the 
‘average’ labour productivity than before.
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From a political perspective – and put rather simplistically – the focus on nominal unit labour costs 
is stronger on the employer’s side, the production‑oriented side of the coin;18 in contrast, trade unions 
are more inclined to look at the development of real unit labour costs, the distribution side of the 
coin. Moreover, trade unions have also asked that the relationship between developments in real 
wages and developments in real labour productivity be looked at (which is equivalent to looking at 
real unit labour costs).19
Before turning to these figures, it might be useful, though, to have a quick look at simple correlations 
of pay and current productivity and productivity increases of the previous year, as they yield insights 
on top of the information that unit labour costs give. Such correlations show to what extent the two 
respective time series (increases in nominal pay and increases in real productivity) have moved 
together. The closer the correlation coefficient is to 1, the more closely the patterns of change of the 
two series resemble each other. Note, however, that this only refers to the direction of the increases, 
not the levels. Figure 11 shows the results in relation to actual compensation, Figure 12 the results 
in relation to collectively agreed pay; a number of points emerge from the two figures.
•	 Overall, the correlation of increases of actual compensation with labour productivity is higher 
than the correlation of collectively agreed pay with labour productivity. This is intuitive, as in 
many countries not all employees are covered by collective wage agreements and the scope of 
collective wage agreements mainly refers to basic wages only; in contrast, actual compensation is 
broader in terms of its scope and encompasses more of the components of pay, which are actually 
also part of the output measure used for deriving labour productivity.
•	 Correlation of actual compensation with real labour productivity is higher in countries with more 
decentralised bargaining systems (Figure 11).
•	 In many countries with non‑decentralised bargaining systems, there is a negative correlation 
of collectively agreed pay with real labour productivity, which underlines the earlier observed 
‘counter‑cyclical’ behaviour of collectively agreed pay (Figure 12). Nevertheless, in some of these 
countries (Finland, Greece and Ireland), actual pay increases did correlate to a greater extent with 
labour productivity over the previous year. This signals some kind of ‘lag’ in the determination of 
pay and the fact that, in many countries, actors in collective bargaining can look only at past or 
forecast data of labour productivity.
18 See also the discussions outlined in Chapter 1: ‘Policy background’.
19 One can also interpret the indicator of real unit labour costs as comparing real labour productivity with real wages (the deflator would 
cancel out in this case).
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Figure 11:  Correlation of increases of actual compensation with current real labour 
productivity and real labour productivity of previous year
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Figure 12:  Correlation of increases of collectively agreed pay with current real labour 
productivity and real labour productivity of previous year
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It cannot be concluded from this, at this stage, that more decentralised countries fare better in linking 
pay to productivity. While these correlations refer to the direction of the increase, they do not take 
into account the level of these increases. A further look at unit labour costs will add to the picture.
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Nominal unit labour costs – wage-related competitiveness
Entire period of observation
Nominal unit labour costs have increased in every Member State. The median increase in this period 
stood at 2.4%. Countries with the highest annual recorded increases were Romania (16.5%), and 
Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria (around 5% in each case). Countries with the lowest annual increases 
were Germany (0.7%), and Austria, Sweden, Lithuania and Ireland (around 1.5%).
Figure 13: Average annual increase of nominal unit labour costs 1998–2012
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Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
Note: For some countries shorter time series of collectively agreed pay are available; in such cases, the annual average is 
reported for a shorter period. In Romania and Hungary, no agreement or recommendations were made in certain years. 
These years have been taken into account with a value for the increase of zero. In Ireland, the series ends in 2008: hence, 
the collectively agreed pay reflects increases from 1998 to 2008 only.
These increases were not evenly spread across the whole period but were higher between 
1999 and 2003 (median: 2.7%) and lowest during 2008 and 2012 (median: 1.7%). In fact, while the 
only countries with a decrease in nominal unit labour costs during 2004 and 2008 were Germany 
(‑0.4% per annum) and Lithuania during 1999–2003 (‑1.6%), some other countries did experience 
a fall in their nominal unit labour costs from 2008 onwards. These were mainly the countries hit 
hardest by the crisis: Latvia (‑3.7%), Ireland (‑3.2%), Lithuania (‑1.9%), Spain (‑1.4%), Greece (‑0.7%), 
Portugal (‑0.6%) and Estonia (‑0.1%). Countries with higher increases of nominal unit labour costs 
during the crisis and onwards were Bulgaria (+5.3%), Luxembourg (3.8%), Norway (3.7%) and Finland 
(3.0%). The related figures are summarised in Table 9 in Annex 2.
Figure 13, above, displays the countries grouped by their wage‑bargaining regimes (as of 2005). The 
light green bars show that there is no clear link between the wage‑bargaining regime and the outcome 
in terms of growth of nominal unit labour costs. Every regime is associated with a range of outcomes. 
The ‘median’ outcomes of these systems show that systems with a higher level of coordination did 
have a lower growth rate of nominal unit labour costs than systems with low‑level coordination over 
the full period observed. However, these findings do not hold for the various subperiods.
In countries where wage indexation mechanisms are present, nominal unit labour costs over the full 
period of observation increased at 2.5% per year. The increase in these countries was less in the boom 
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(with the median standing at 1.8% p.a. during 2004 and 2008), but was among the highest (similar to 
countries with centralised and highly coordinated bargaining) during the crisis (2009–2012).
Table 5:  Development of nominal unit labour costs – Median annual average increase by 
bargaining regime (%)
1998–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012 1998–2012
Wage bargaining regime as of… 1999 2005 2012 2005
Centralised, highly coordinated 2.7 3.0 2.5 2.0
Intermediate level, highly coordinated 2.4 1.5 2.1 2.0
Intermediate level, medium level of coordination 3.3 n.a. 1.7 n.a.
Intermediate level, low level of coordination 2.6 2.0 2.0 2.7
Decentralised, low level of coordination 2.6 3.5 0.6 2.7
Indexation mechanisms present 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.5
Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
Note: The composition of the bargaining regimes varies over the years.
The dark green bars in Figure 13 show the outcome of a ‘hypothetical’ calculation of nominal unit 
labour costs, based on collectively agreed pay instead of actual compensation. They indicate the 
hypothetical amount of average per annum increase in nominal unit labour costs, if all employees 
in the respective economy had been covered by an embracing collective agreement and if all parts 
of their wages as well as other parts of their compensation had increased by the same amount 
as that indicated as ‘average collectively agreed pay’ for the total economy (see Figure 7 for the 
respective countries). If this had been the case, overall growth of nominal unit labour costs between 
1998 and 2012 would have been substantially lower in Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, the UK and Hungary. Nominal unit labour costs would have been 
broadly the same in Finland, Belgium, Portugal and France. And they would have been higher in 
Spain, Germany, Greece, Austria and Romania. In Ireland, nominal unit labour costs in terms of 
collectively agreed pay would have grown by 2.7% on average over 1998–2008; in fact, in the same 
period, actual nominal unit labour costs grew by 2.5%.
The period of crisis and beyond
Figure 14 displays the average annual increase in nominal unit labour costs, for 2009–2012, with 
countries being sorted by their wage bargaining regime as of 2012. The picture suggests that, within 
some countries with decentralised bargaining systems, nominal unit labour costs decreased (and 
even faster than in countries with different systems). Does this mean that decentralised systems 
can react more quickly to pressures on wages related to the crisis? Possibly. The fact that bargaining 
coverage is low, and collectively agreed pay sometimes responds less sensitively to, and lags behind, 
economic changes, could be an explanation for this. On the other hand, this picture shouldn’t be 
interpreted without considering the following factors:
•	 the degree to which the respective countries were hit by the crisis;
•	 the extent to which this could have been caused by earlier wage‑related factors (for example, the 
large increase in actual compensation in Latvia and Estonia);
•	 the extent to which other (non wage‑related) factors related to competitiveness affected the 
economy and put pressure on wages.
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Figure 14:  Average annual increase of nominal unit labour costs 2009–2012, wage bargaining 
regime as of 2012
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Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
The dark green bars, again, refer to the hypothetical situation in which the ‘average’ collectively 
agreed pay would have applied to all employees within an economy and would have embraced 
all components of pay. In this period, only Denmark, Malta and the UK would have seen a lower 
increase in their nominal unit labour costs, had the collectively agreed pay been the general increase. 
For Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and France the situation would 
have been broadly the same. For Spain, Portugal, Slovakia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Romania and 
Greece, nominal unit labour cost growth would have been higher.
Real unit labour costs – the distributional side
The major trend as regards real unit labour costs between 1998 and 2012 was one of decline. In the 
median country – Hungary – the real unit labour costs decreased by ‑0.3% per annum. The highest 
growth of real unit labour costs was observed in the Czech Republic (+0.8%), followed by Finland, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Denmark and Belgium (all between 0.1 and 0.4% per year). The 
largest decreases were recorded in Poland (‑1.6%), Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Norway, Greece and 
Spain. Again, there is no obvious link with different wage bargaining regimes over the full period: 
both decline and growth in real unit labour costs was observed in all types of bargaining regimes.
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Figure 15:  Average annual change of real unit labour costs 1998–2012, wage bargaining 
regime as of 2005
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Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
The general trend of a declining wage share (decreasing real unit labour costs) was reversed during 
the period dominated by the crisis (2009–2012) (see Table 10 in Annex 2). During that period, real 
unit labour costs in the median country – Austria – rose by 0.3% per annum. This – according to the 
European Commission – is a cyclical pattern: during an economic downturn (with a decline in output 
and employment), nominal compensation per employee is less responsive, hence a (temporary) halt 
of the overall trend could be observed. The overall pattern, however, is attributed to structural factors 
(such as the increase in capital intensity, technological change, and globalisation).
Figure 16 shows the development of real unit labour costs for this subperiod and in relation to the 
wage bargaining regime prevailing in 2012. Here, for the first time, the connection becomes a little 
clearer. In the majority of countries with decentralised bargaining systems, real unit labour costs did 
still decline during the crisis; in contrast, in the majority of countries with other systems, real unit 
labour costs increased. It is also worth noting here that the average annual changes in this period 
were much higher in both directions.
A possible interpretation for this is the ‘stabilising’ influence of collectively agreed pay, notably 
in those countries where collective bargaining coverage is higher. On the other hand, this is also 
a question of the degree to which countries affected by the crisis (such as Spain, Portugal and 
Romania, all with rather high levels of bargaining coverage before the crisis) have reacted to changing 
circumstances.20
20 In Spain, social partners at central level came to a tripartite agreement on wage moderation. This was accompanied by a decline in 
collective bargaining coverage and/or an increase in derogation from wage agreements. In Romania, the government suspended the 
multiannual tripartite wage agreement. Portugal saw a dramatic fall in collective bargaining coverage due to many collective wage 
agreements not being renewed.
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Figure 16:  Average annual change of real unit labour costs 2009–2012, wage bargaining 
regime as of 2012
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Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
Wage bargaining regimes and pay–productivity links
Is there any relationship between the type of wage bargaining regime in place and the linkage of pay 
(be it actual or collectively agreed pay increases) with labour productivity?
Figure 17 gives an overview of the outcomes derived in the previous section as regards unit labour 
costs in terms of actual compensation and collectively agreed pay with the grouping of countries 
in relation to the wage bargaining regime. Rather than focusing on wage drift (the difference in 
outcomes between collectively agreed pay and actual compensation), it aims to summarise the 
relationship across countries and gauge to what extent country developments have deviated from 
the development of the median country.
On the horizontal line, nominal unit labour costs in terms of collectively agreed pay are depicted; 
this indicates (between 1999 and 2012) how much collectively agreed pay increases deviated from 
labour productivity. On the vertical line, nominal unit labour costs are depicted, indicating to what 
extent actual compensation deviated from labour productivity. This is an equivalent depiction of 
the data presented above in Figure 13, with the exception of those countries for which no data on 
collectively agreed pay are available.
The most obvious message from this graph is that there seems to be no straightforward link between 
wage‑bargaining regimes and the relationship of pay to productivity: different regimes can produce 
similar outcomes and similar regimes can result in different outcomes.
The only exception to this could be the fact that all countries with sector‑level and highly coordinated 
bargaining systems can be found in the quadrant with the lowest increase in nominal unit labour 
costs, in terms of both measures for pay.
It is worth noting as well that most of the countries in which there was a change in the wage‑bargaining 
mechanism and that received recommendations for reforms in those same mechanisms are almost 
all to be found in the same quadrant: Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Belgium. They had 
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comparatively high increases of collectively agreed pay in relation to other countries, whereas they 
had lower‑than‑medium increases in terms of actual compensation.
From the recent recommendations on linking pay and productivity, it could be inferred that 
policymakers suggest that decentralised systems fare better in coupling wages with productivity. 
In countries with decentralised systems, company bargaining is the predominant level; hence, 
this group of countries has the biggest data gaps in relation to collectively agreed pay. Averages of 
collectively agreed pay increases can be reported only for the UK and Malta, plus a series of pay 
recommendations for Hungary. None of the figures here supports such a hypothesis for decentralised 
systems, because countries with a relatively decentralised system and a low degree of coordination 
do not systematically have their wage developments linked with productivity developments. While 
there are some examples of such countries (notably the UK and Malta for both collectively agreed 
pay and actual wages) or Lithuania and Poland (for actual compensation), there is an equal number 
of counter examples: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia (for actual compensation).
Figure 17:  Plot of nominal unit labour costs in terms of collectively agreed pay and actual pay 
increases from labour productivity, by wage bargaining regime 2005
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Box 4: Beyond wage-related competitiveness
The sole focus on wages and labour productivity and hence the interpretation that 
(nominal) unit labour costs are the only determinant of competitiveness is a  rather 
simplistic view. Collignon (2013a) and Collignon and Esposito (2013) have criticised this and 
present an alternative indicator of competitiveness, which also takes capital productivity 
(or capital efficiency) into account. One of their points of criticism is that the currently 
used indicator on unit labour costs looks only at changes over time within a country, 
while a reference to levels (which takes into account the actual situation in comparison 
with other countries at a  respective starting point) is missing. Their second point of 
criticism is that the sole focus on wages and labour productivity neglects changes in 
capital productivity (or capital efficiency) and profit margins. They propose an alternative 
indicator of competitiveness, which is based on the return on capital. See the section 
‘Collignon and Esposito’s (2013) index of competitiveness’ for a more formal description 
of the index.
The return on capital goes up, if the profit margin increases (hence unit labour costs 
decrease) or if capital efficiency (and capital productivity) increase.
In efficient markets, the return on capital should be the same in all regions in equilibrium. 
Taking the euro zone as a field of observation, this would imply that, in a given Member 
State, the return on capital should be the same as the average return on capital in the 
euro zone.
This means that, in equilibrium, relative wage shares must equal relative differences in 
capital efficiency. The index the authors propose is defined as a country’s actual unit 
labour costs in relation to the equilibrium unit labour costs. Its competitiveness index 
(CCI) is then a function of average capital efficiency (ACE), prices and unit labour costs.
 
The index thus shows to what extent a country’s unit labour costs are over, or under, 
valued in relation to the euro zone. An increasing index means a  deterioration of 
competitiveness, while a decrease means an improvement in a country’s competitiveness 
in relation to the euro zone.
Calculating this index from the 1990s until present, the authors show that:
…northern member states are generally undervalued. In Finland this undervaluation goes back 
to the crisis years in the early 1990s, in the Netherlands it started around the time of monetary 
union in 1999, and in Germany it occurred with the Schröder labour market reforms. France has 
moved from undervaluation to overvaluation, Italy has persistently lost competitive advantages 
over the last two decades, but having started from a much undervalued position it is now close 
to equilibrium. In the crisis countries, Spain has become more and more overvalued during its 
property boom; Portugal and Ireland have also lost competitiveness, but they are still undervalued. 
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Cyprus has oscillated in a range below equilibrium. Most surprising, Greece has reduced 
its overvaluation disadvantage before the crisis, but had not yet reached equilibrium. Despite 
a draconian austerity regime, the country has experienced a slight deterioration in competitiveness 
since the crisis erupted.
(Collignon and Esposito, 2013)
Sector-related collectively agreed pay
Data on collectively agreed pay in relation to sectors are even more heterogeneous and patchier 
than data for the total economy. Data have been drawn from two different sources. Where available, 
sectoral breakdowns were used from data collected in databases of collective agreements. In the 
majority of countries, however, data stem from the biggest sector‑related collective agreements and 
have been compiled by the EIRO national correspondents in a consistent way in the course of the 
project. The collected data series are available on a designated web‑portal by Eurofound, featuring 
quantitative and qualitative info around collective pay bargaining, available at www.eurofound.
europa.eu/eiro/cwb/, and sources are listed in detail at www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/
collectivesources.pdf.
Most agreements are overlapping, sectionally overlapping or cover just parts of the NACE code 
below. In this sense, their comparability across countries is limited. Within countries and over time, 
however, they provide a consistent mapping of outcomes of collective agreements.
Table 6: Sectoral demarcation in this study
Sector Core NACE
Metal sector 24, 25
Chemical sector 20
Retail 47
Banking 64
Civil service 84
Local government 84 (same activities as in 84, but depending on the level, which is 
not specified in the NACE code). 
The sectoral series are displayed in Annex 2, in Tables 11 to 16. As many countries could provide 
data only for a selected number of years, annual averages are not reported here.
Following all these words of caution, Figure 18 shows the development of the annual median nominal 
increase percentage increase from 1999–2012 and Figure 19 presents the same data in an index 
format, with 1998 equalling 100.
Collectively agreed pay increases across all sectors ranged between 2% and 3.5% per year until 2007, 
peaked at around 3.5% to 4% in 2008 and went down to a range of between 0.7% and 2% until 2010, 
to pick up slightly afterwards. Increases over the years were highest in the chemical, metal, and retail 
sectors and lowest in the civil service and local governments.
Disparities between sectors increased, particularly between the public sectors (civil service and local 
governments) and the remaining sectors which were mapped. This development started slowly between 
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1998 and 2005, gained momentum up to 2009 and speeded up in the years following the crisis where, 
in many countries across Europe, pay was frozen or only moderately increased in the public sector.
Figure 18: Change of nominal collectively agreed pay by sector 1999–2012, median
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e 
ch
an
g
e 
to
 p
re
vi
o
u
s 
ye
ar
, m
ed
ia
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
Banking Civil service 
Local government Metal 
Retail 
Chemicals 
Source: Median of countries for which data are available. See Table 11 to Table 16 in Annex 2.
Figure 19: Development of nominal collectively agreed pay by sector 1998–2012, median
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Policy background
Despite the fact that, according to the European treaties, pay is a subject outside the European 
institutions’ remit, wage setting has been addressed by the Commission, the Council and even the 
European Central Bank for at least two decades, in the form of statements or recommendations about 
wages and wage‑related policy. Recently, this has become common in many policy instruments and 
forums – namely through the Commission’s recommendations resulting from the European semester 
and the 2013 attempt to establish a tripartite dialogue on wage developments.
Constraints placed on non‑monetary policies by the EMU institutional framework soon became 
evident: calls were made for enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination and fiscal and wage 
policies. The argument was that existing constraints could be smoothed out through the coordination 
of available policy instruments, which, in the right mix, would be conductive to higher growth and 
employment levels. Attempts to coordinate monetary, fiscal and wage policies at a single point in 
time might be risky and, in the end, could destroy the balanced institutional framework in the EMU 
with its sound and clear assignment of objectives to individual policymakers (Issing, 2002).
However, more recent moves towards what some analysts call ‘the new system of European economic 
governance’ seem to ‘mark a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach to collective bargaining from 
the acceptance of free collective bargaining to direct political intervention into national bargaining 
outcomes and procedures’ (Schulten and Muller, 2013).
Finally, it is also important to underline how the social partners have been voicing their concern 
about the interference by the European institutions in a topic at the heart of collective bargaining. 
The call for respect of the social partners’ autonomy in collective bargaining, particularly in terms 
of wages, has perhaps been the most fundamental message to emerge from the period studied here.
Empirical findings
This report has sought to contribute to the policy debate around wages by adding the dimension of 
collectively agreed pay to the picture of differences in wage bargaining regimes.
Overall, it is important to stress that many findings are contingent on the period that is looked at, 
since they change over the business cycle. It is important therefore to look back at a longer series of 
data over the medium and short term. Here, one can distinguish between the times of ‘boom’ and 
‘crisis or post‑crisis’ within the full period of observation (clearly, these were not the same in the 
different Member States).
One, time‑sensitive, finding in this sense is the observed ‘countercyclical’ aspect of collectively 
agreed pay. Collectively agreed pay – to a greater extent than actual compensation – seems to act as 
a kind of ‘insurance’ for employees in times of crisis. It doesn’t follow entirely the ‘ups and downs’ 
of fluctuations in output. Together with the fact that, in many systems, pay increases lag behind 
productivity developments, it is advisable to look at medium and long‑term developments instead of 
focusing on short‑term outcomes. Systems with more decentralised bargaining structures and less 
bargaining coverage seem to have less of this insurance function for employees, leading to a higher 
exposure of employees in terms of wages (and jobs) at risk.
Collectively agreed pay is only one part of actual compensation and of total labour costs. 
Labour‑cost‑related competitiveness can hence be only partly determined by developments in 
collectively agreed pay. Depending on the ‘wage drift’ between actual compensation and collectively 
Summary and conclusions
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agreed pay, nominal unit labour costs in some countries were made stronger by collectively agreed 
pay than in other countries. The findings of this research show that, in the majority of countries with 
available data, nominal unit labour costs would have been lower or equal to the actual nominal unit 
labour costs, had all employees been covered by a (notional) central collective agreement and had 
all components of their compensation been raised by the collectively agreed rate.
In line with many other studies, no clear link was found between bargaining systems and pay on 
one hand, and productivity on the other, in the medium term. Different regimes can produce similar 
outcomes, and similar regimes can produce different outcomes in term of linking pay to productivity 
(in terms of nominal unit labour costs).
Because of the descriptive nature of this work, however, no empirically sound conclusions can be 
reached as to whether certain wage bargaining regimes fare better in linking pay with productivity, 
as this research could not control for any other potential influences. However, these preliminary 
and descriptive findings suggest that more coordinated bargaining regimes (with sectoral bargaining 
being predominant) had the closest link between pay and productivity over the medium term (1999–
2012) and hence the smallest loss of wage‑related competitiveness.
As nominal unit labour costs are part of the Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’s 
scoreboard, the competitiveness‑related aspect of wage developments currently seems to feature more 
prominently on the (European) political agenda. However, trade unions have repeatedly stressed that 
real wage developments (as compared with nominal ones) should proceed in line with real labour 
productivity. Hence, workers should be compensated, taking inflation into account, so that the wage 
share remains stable. Unions have also asked that real unit labour costs be considered. A constant 
wage share would support domestic demand, contribute to price stability and avoid deflation.
This part of the report also looked at this distributional aspect of wages, in terms of real unit labour 
costs or the wage share within the economy. The overall trend was that of a declining wage share 
in most Member States (except in the Czech Republic, Finland and the United Kingdom, where the 
wage share is growing). A return towards an increase was observed in 14 Member States during and 
after the crisis, whereas real unit labour costs (wage share, in other words) started or continued to 
fall in 12 Member States. This is because wages generally do not fluctuate to the same extent as 
output over the business cycle. While the most commonly observed decline of the wage share was 
equally spread across all types of bargaining regimes, the cyclical return to growth mostly took 
place in non‑decentralised regimes. However, this cannot be entirely separated from the fact that 
the countries that were most affected by the crisis (and hence experienced the deepest wage cuts) 
did not see such a change in trend.
In light of the discussion regarding the two central indicators (nominal and real unit labour costs), it 
is also important to note some shortcomings. The current interpretation of both looks only at their 
change over a certain period, while their initial levels and their respective starting points in relation 
to other countries are essentially disregarded.
In relation to the sectoral level, this part of the report has shown that disparities in terms of collectively 
agreed pay have increased over time between sectors – in particular, between the public sector (local 
governments and civil service) and the remaining sectors considered here.
This report is only a modest beginning; more research is needed along these lines. Eurofound intends 
to advance it by using a multivariate modelling framework (using panel‑data observations) to see 
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whether the observed links (or lack thereof) between wage‑bargaining regimes and pay outcomes 
persist, once other factors are taken into account and controlled for. Such macrodata‑based research 
should also look into the determinants of wage drift, and to what extent this could be driven by 
different wage‑setting regimes.
A further step would be to study micro‑level data, which allow more detailed insights into 
developments at company and sector level. An obvious dataset (because it is harmonised), is the 
European Structure of Earnings Survey, which includes information on collective agreements at 
company level. This dataset could be extended with information on sector‑level and national‑level 
bargaining so that, within a multi‑level modelling approach, more detailed insight into the impact of 
wage bargaining on pay outcomes could be achieved.
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Annex 1: Methodological notes
Datasources on collectively agreed pay
Eurofound national correspondents were asked to report data on collectively agreed pay, stemming 
from datasources that gather collective agreements (at various levels) and enable the reporting of 
‘averages’ of collectively agreed pay for the whole economy and/or for selected sectors. This is the 
case in a number of countries – see Table 7.
Where such ‘average’ figures are not available, the national correspondents were asked to report on 
outcomes of national agreements or wide‑ranging cross‑sectoral agreements that affect major parts 
of the economy, pace‑setting agreements or pay recommendations.
Table 7:  Datasources used for the generation of series of collectively agreed pay, total 
economy
Country Institution Source
AT Statistik Austria Tariflohnindex TLI
BE
Federal Administration of Employment, Work and Social 
Dialogue (FOD WASO)
Index of the conventionally agreed wages
CZ Trexima
Informa ní systém o pracovních podmínkách (Working 
Conditions Information System, ISPP),
CY Cyprus Labour Institute (INEK)
Information provided from the two union confederations 
PEO and SEK
DE
Institute for Economic and Social Research (WSI) within the 
Hans Böckler Foundation (Hans Böckler Stiftung) The Collective Agreement Archive (Tarifarchiv)
ES Ministry of Labour Labour Statistics Bulletin
FI Statistics Finland Index of the negotiated wages and salaries
FR
Ministry of Employment’s Office for Research and Statistics 
(Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des études et des 
statistiques du ministère de l’Emploi, DARES.
Annual Collective Bargaining reports (La négociation 
collective)
IT Italian Statistical office, Istat 
(a) Istat ‘Contratti collettivi e retribuzioni contrattuali’, 
26 January 2012;
(b) Istat ‘Contratti collettivi e retribuzioni contrattuali’ 
21 December 2012
MT Department of Industrial and Employment Relations (DIER) Economic Survey
NL
Inspection of the Ministry of Social affairs and Employment, 
which includes the former Labour Inspectorate I-SWZ
PT Ministry of Economy and Employment
Variação média ponderada intertabelas (Average weighted 
variation between wage tables)
SE National Mediation Office (Medlingsinstitutet) Avtalsdatabasen (The Agreement Database)
SK MPSVR SR and Trexima Ltd. 
The annual sample survey Informa ný systém o pracovných 
podmienkach (ISPP)
UK
Labour Research Department (LRD), a private, trade 
union-linked, subscription-based service (on the basis of the 
database)
Payline database
Collignon and Esposito’s (2013) index of competitiveness
This is equivalent to:
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or alternatively:
(Whereby average capital efficiency equals capital productivity if the price of the capital good evolves 
at the same rate as the GDP deflator.)
Expressed in terms of unit labour costs, this would be equivalent to:
Or:
The return on capital goes up, if either the profit margin increases (hence unit labour costs decrease) 
or if capital efficiency (and capital productivity) increase.
In efficient markets, the return on capital should be the same in all regions in equilibrium. Taking the 
euro zone as the field of observation, this would imply that in a given Member State, the return on 
capital should be the same as the average return on capital in the euro zone. This is the case when
Whereby NULC = nominal unit labour costs, P is the GDP deflator, the subscript ‘A’ refers to 
a particular Member State and EZ is the average of the euro zone.
This means that, in equilibrium, relative wage shares must equal relative differences in capital 
efficiency. The index the authors propose is defined as a the country’s actual unit labour costs 
relatively to the equilibrium unit labour costs. The countries’ competitiveness index is then a function 
of average capital efficiency (ACE), prices and unit labour costs.
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Annex 2: Tables and figures
Data for the total economy
Table 8:  Annual average growth rates of actual compensation per employee in different 
subperiods (%)
1998–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012 1998–2012
AT 1.7 2.8 2.3 2.1
BE 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.7
BG 7.9 10.1 8.4 8.9
CY 5.3 2.8 2.5 3.6
CZ 7.6 5.7 2.7 5.3
DE 1.4 0.8 2.6 1.4
DK 3.8 3.5 1.8 3.2
EE 10.7 14.2 2.7 9.1
EL 6.8 3.5 -3.4 3.1
ES 2.9 3.9 0.1 2.7
FI 3.0 3.6 2.7 3.1
FR 2.7 3.0 2.4 2.6
HR 6.4 5.1 2.7 4.7
HU 12.0 7.1 2.4 7.1
IE 6.5 5.0 -0.6 3.8
IT 2.2 2.7 1.1 2.0
LT 4.5 13.4 1.9 5.9
LU 3.4 3.5 2.0 3.0
LV 6.6 22.5 4.3 9.9
MT 5.1 3.1 1.3 3.5
NL 4.1 2.6 1.3 2.8
NO 4.9 5.4 4.2 4.8
PL 7.6 3.8 4.0 5.2
PT 4.5 3.2 -0.5 2.8
RO 42.6 21.6 1.9 22.0
SE 3.8 3.2 2.2 3.1
SI 9.3 6.5 1.7 6.1
SK 8.4 8.2 2.7 6.6
UK 4.7 3.8 2.3 3.7
Median 
increase
4.9 3.8 2.3 3.6
Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
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Table 9:  Annual average growth rates of collectively agreed pay per employee in different 
subperiods (%)
1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012 1998–2012 Comments
AT 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5
BE 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.5
BG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CZ 5.6 4.2 2.9 4.4
DE 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.3
DK 2.4 2.6 1.4 2.2
EE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EL 4.3 5.7 1.6 4.3
ES 3.5 3.8 2.0 3.2
FI 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.6
FR 3.2 3.2 2.2 2.8 1998-2001: first 
subperiod; full period: 
2002–2008 (no data 
for 2002). 
HR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HU 8.3 6.2 No recommendations 
given in 2010 and 2012
6.2 Years where no 
recommendation 
was given in the 
subperiod 2009–2012 
were considered with 
a value of 0 for the 
full period.
IE 4.9 4.7 No central agreement; 
no information 
on decentralised 
bargaining available
1.8 (1999–2008)
n.a.
IT n.a. 2.9 1.8 2.5 2005–2008 in 
subperiod 2
LT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
MT 3.4 2.4 1.1 2.3 2000–2003 in 
subperiod 1
NL 3.6 1.3 2.2 2000–2003 in 
subperiod 1
NO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT 3.5 2.9 1.8 2.9
RO 50.4 15.2 5.3 24.5 Years without 
recommendation have 
been considered with 
a value of zero
SE 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.4
SI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SK n.a. 6.3 3.6 5.3 2003–2012
UK 3.4 3.1 1.5 2.8
Source: National statistics on collectively agreed pay, time series of central agreements – all country specific. See Annex 1 for 
further details.
 
Annex 2: Tables and figures
75
Table 10: Annual average growth rates of nominal unit labour costs in different subperiods (%)
1998–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012 1998–2012
AT 0.4 1.5 2.1 1.3
BE 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.0
BG 2.5 6.4 5.3 4.7
CY 4.1 1.5 2.0 2.7
CZ 3.8 1.7 1.7 2.5
DE 0.6 -0.4 2.1 0.7
DK 2.5 3.1 1.4 2.4
EE 3.9 10.0 -0.1 4.9
EL 3.3 2.4 -0.7 1.8
ES 2.8 3.7 -1.4 1.9
FI 1.3 1.9 3.0 2.0
FR 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9
HR 3.7 3.1 1.5 2.9
HU 8.5 3.9 2.4 5.1
IE 2.7 4.5 -3.2 1.6
IT 2.4 2.5 1.7 2.2
LT -1.6 7.3 -1.9 1.4
LU 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.1
LV 0.6 17.1 -3.7 4.9
MT 2.9 1.7 2.6 2.4
NL 3.3 1.0 1.7 2.0
NO 3.1 5.6 3.7 4.2
PL 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.6
PT 3.5 2.0 -0.6 1.8
RO 33.2 13.3 1.9 16.5
SE 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.4
SI 6.2 3.0 2.2 3.9
SK 4.8 2.6 1.0 2.9
UK 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.5
Median 
increase 2.7 2.5 1.7 2.4
Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
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Table 11: Annual average growth rates of real unit labour costs in different subperiods (%)
1998–2003 2004–2008 2009–2012 1998–2012
AT -0.5 -0.8 0.3 -0.4
BE 0.2 -0.4 0.6 0.1
BG -2.1 -0.7 1.7 -0.5
CY 0.9 -2.2 0.4 -0.4
CZ 1.4 -0.2 1.3 0.8
DE 0.0 -1.3 1.1 -0.1
DK 0.3 0.3 -0.4 0.1
EE -1.3 2.5 -1.6 0.0
EL -0.1 -0.8 -1.5 -0.8
ES -0.9 0.2 -1.7 -0.8
FI -0.1 0.4 1.1 0.4
FR 0.3 -0.3 0.7 0.2
HR -0.4 -1.0 -0.1 -0.5
HU 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3
IE -1.9 3.4 -2.2 -0.1
IT -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3
LT -1.3 0.5 -3.6 -1.3
LU -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
LV -2.3 4.3 -5.4 -0.9
MT 0.0 -0.5 0.4 -0.1
NL 0.0 -0.7 1.0 0.0
NO -1.7 -1.8 1.3 -0.9
PL -1.8 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6
PT 0.2 -0.4 -1.2 -0.4
RO -1.4 0.0 -2.7 -1.3
SE 0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1
SI -0.4 -0.1 1.2 0.2
SK -1.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.4
UK 0.5 -0.2 0.8 0.3
Median 
increase
-0.1 -0.4 0.3 -0.3
Source: AMECO, Eurofound own calculations
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Data in relation to the sectors
Table 12: Collectively agreed pay in metal sector, change in relation to previous year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
5 AT 2.4 3.7 3.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.5 3.1 2.6 3.6 3.9 1.5 2.5 5.3
14 BE 0.7 2.5 1.7 3.5 1.2 2.4 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 3.9 0.9 1.4 3.7
15 BE 0.0 5.0 1.5 4.9 2.0 3.4 1.5 2.3 1.7 2.3 5.0 0.9 1.4 3.0
20 BE 0.9 2.5 1.9 4.3 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.1 4.1 0.8 1.5 3.6
21 BE 1.7 4.0 2.4 5.2 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.3 1.7 5.0 0.9 1.4 3.0
25 CY 3.1 3.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.0 1.1 0.0
31 CZ 7.9 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.1 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2 5.8 4.0 2.8 2.9 2.8
43 DK 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.4 1.2 1.7 1.3
56 FI 1.9 3.1 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.5 1.9 4.4 4.1 0.5 1.0 2.5
63 FR 0.0 3.7 3.4 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.4 2.1 0.0 3.4 3.4
37 DE 4.1 2.5 1.7 3.6 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.6 3.8 2.7 3.6 0.7 1.6 3.3
69 EL 2.5 4.2 3.3 5.4 3.9 6.5 6.5 6.0 5.8 6.5 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.0
79 IT 3.7 2.5 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.4 2.3
92 MT 3.7 4.1 4.6 2.5 5.1 5.2 4.0 1.6 1.7 2.5 0.5
87 NL 3.9 3.3 2.7 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.0 4.2 3.8 1.0 1.4 2.2
102 PT 3.9 7.1 6.0 8.6 3.9 3.1 4.7 7.5 3.9 3.6 3.3 4.0 3.6 1.9
107 RO 26.7 31.6 28.0 25.0 20.0 12.5 11.1 15.0 10.1 0.0 11.8 0.0
122 SK 7.0 7.0 5.8 6.5 7.1 5.0 3.5 3.7 3.6
115 SI 2.1 2.8 5.1 6.6 5.0 2.9
50 ES 3.4 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 2.1 2.2 3.2 1.5
111 SE 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.7 1.1 1.5 3.4
129 UK 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 1.8 4.8 4.0
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/collectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
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Table 13: Collectively agreed pay in chemical sector, change in relation to previous year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
6 AT 2.3 1.9 2.9 1.3 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.9 2.6 1.2 3.2 4.5
12 BE 0.2 3.9 2.5 4.0 0.5 2.7 2.2 2.3 3.2 5.5 1.6 0.7 3.2 2.0
13 BE 2.0 3.7 4.0 3.9 2.0 1.1 2.7 3.3 2.0 5.3 2.0 0.9 4.0 2.3
18 BE 2.8 1.2 6.1 2.9 1.2 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.3 2.6 0.6 2.2 3.5
19 BE 3.6 0.9 6.4 2.8 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.8 2.6 5.7 2.0 1.8 4.0 4.8
26 CY 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 1.0 1.0
32 CZ 7.1 4.7 5.5 3.6 3.6 4.6 4.5 5.0 6.0 3.1 2.9 2.7
44 DK 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.4 1.2 1.7 1.3
57 FI 1.7 3.8 3.1 2.3 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.4 1.8 3.4 3.8 2.9 0.5 2.5
64 FR 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.2 1.9 2.3 1.5 0.5 2.1 1.7
39 DE 2.6 2.3 2.1 3.6 2.7 2.5 1.6 3.4 2.2 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.9
70 EL 5.5 5.0 3.1 5.8 4.5 5.9 6.5 6.0 6.0 5.5 6.7 6.1 1.6 1.6
80 IT 2.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.6
93 MT 5.2 2.8 4.6 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.8 0.5
89 NL 4.5 5.1 2.6 1.3 1.8 2.8 1.8 1.8 4.4 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7
105 RO 30.8 29.8 16.9 13.0 9.5 9.5 6.3 7.3 4.4 6.0 5.9 2.8
123 SK 6.0 5.0 4.7 5.2 4.2 4.1 2.9 2.4 2.3
116 SI 2.5 3.9 3.5 1.8 1.8
51 ES 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.9 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.2 4.8 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.7 0.7
112 SE 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.7 1.1 1.5 3.4
130 UK 3.3 3.0 3.2 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.6 1.3 2.7 3.5 3.0
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/collectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
Table 14: Collectively agreed pay in the banking sector, change in relation to previous year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
8 AT 2.2 1.4 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.3 3.0 2.6 3.3 3.5 0.7 1.9 3.1
17 BE 1.2 2.9 2.5 3.6 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.2 1.9 3.3 3.2 -0.1 2.5 3.2
23 BE 1.0 1.6 2.6 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.6 3.4 -0.2 2.5 3.4
27 CY 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.6 0.7 0.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
34 CZ 4.3 2.5 2.3
46 DK 2.9 2.8 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.0 4.0 3.7 1.1 1.0
59 FI 1.6 2.9 3.7 2.1 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.0 3.5 3.4 3.6 1.5
66 FR 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.5 7.6
38 DE 2.9 1.9 3.6 2.0 2.5 2.7 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.4 0.2 2.5
72 EL 3.4 6.8 6.0 4.2 3.8 6.0 5.9 5.6 5.6 8.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
82 IT 2.6 0.2 5.4 2.0 2.6 1.1 0.8
94 MT 4.7 1.4 2.2 1.2 11.5 3.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 0.4
88 NL 6.5 3.8 2.5 1.7 0.8 3.3 1.8 3.6 2.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
103 PT 3.2 3.2 3.9 3.1 2.5 2.6 4.9 2.6 5.5 3.7 3.1 2.0 1.4 0.1
125 SK 6.0 4.0 3.7 4.2 3.6 3.5 2.8 2.9 2.6
118 SI 6.7 1.2 16.1 2.2
53 ES 2.7 3.1 2.5 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.7 3.0 3.8 2.6 2.0 3.0 0.1 0.0
132 UK 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.9 3.0 2.0 5.0 2.5
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/collectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
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Table 15: Collectively agreed pay in the retail sector, change in relation to previous year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
7 AT 2.2 1.8 3.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.7 2.4 3.1 3.7 1.5 2.3 3.6
16 BE 1.9 1.5 3.3 3.6 2.4 2.3 1.9 3.3 1.7 4.2 3.4 0.1 3.2 2.9
22 BE 2.6 1.7 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.3 3.3 2.6 1.9 2.7 4.7 -0.3 2.5 3.4
33 CZ 6.3 5.0 6.0 3.1 3.7 2.1
45 DK 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 3.2 2.3 2.3 1.0 1.7
58 FI 2.0 2.6 3.7 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.6 1.7 1.8 4.9 3.4 1.7 2.0
65 FR 2.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 1.2 0.0 12.2 3.6 0.0 3.8 0.0
42 DE 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.9 2.7
71 EL 3.7 4.4 8.0 5.0 6.6 6.0 6.0 5.7 7.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
81 IT 1.6 2.3 2.1 3.9 3.2 2.0 1.7
95 MT 4.4 3.0 5.6 2.6 3.1 3.7 1.7 3.1 1.8 2.5 0.6
90 NL 4.3 3.5 2.7 1.6 0.4 1.2 1.9 2.8 2.5 1.1 1.0 1.5
101 PT 4.1 4.5 4.4 3.4 4.6 0.0 3.6 4.9 5.7 3.4 3.2 3.7 1.0
106 RO 48.6 12.0 18.0 9.1 22.2 20.6 16.7 0.0 10.8 4.2
124 SK 5.0 6.0 4.9 5.6 5.8 6.1 4.0 4.1 3.6
117 SI 2.1 9.8 1.6 5.9
52 ES 2.7 3.9 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.5 2.1 1.9 2.7 1.2
131 UK 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.0
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/collectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
Table 16:  Collectively agreed pay in the civil service sector, change in relation to previous 
year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4 AT 2.6 1.6 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.7 3.5 1.1 1.1 2.8
9 AT 2.5 1.5 2.3 0.8 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.7 3.6 0.9 0.9 2.6
28 CY 2.8 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
35 CZ 11.1 6.9 14.6 9.8 8.5 7.2 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.1 4.5 4.2
48 DK 3.1 3.0 3.5 4.8 3.1 2.2 2.3 1.5 1.9 3.3 2.5 2.4 1.5 1.7
60 FI 1.9 2.8 3.2 2.2 2.9 2.4 2.5 1.6 1.8 4.5 4.0 2.7 1.3 2.0
67 FR 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.3 0.0 0.5 1.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0
40 DE 3.2 1.9 1.8 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.7 4.4 3.9 0.8 1.9 2.2
73 EL 2.1 2.0 5.5 5.8 5.8 6.3 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
77 IE 2.5 5.5 7.5 4.0 0.0 7.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 5.0 3.5 2.5 0.0 0.0
83 IT 5.5 1.1 5.2 3.3 0.7 0.2 0.0
108 RO 28.3 68.8 89.3 26.9 47.8 12.0 10.7 6.5 18.2 30.8 17.6 0.0 11.7 4.5
126 SK 7.0 4.0 6.4 6.5 4.4 5.5 1.7 3.4 2.8
119 SI 1.9 1.3 5.5 1.2 0.8 0.6
54 ES 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 3.0 0.7 0.4 0.2
113 SE 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.7 1.2 1.3
133 UK 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/coll ectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
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Table 17:  Collectively agreed pay in the local government sector, change in relation to 
previous year (%)
ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
10 AT 1.5 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.4 3.3 3.6 0.9 0.9 2.6
29 CY 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
47 DK 1.4 1.8 3.0 2.2 3.7 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.5 5.7 0.8 1.5 0.0 2.7
61 FI 1.8 2.8 3.4 2.5 3.1 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.4 4.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.4
41 DE 3.2 1.9 1.8 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.4 4.7 3.8 0.4 1.6 2.4
74 EL 2.1 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
84 IT 3.4 2.4 3.6 3.3 2.6 0.2 0.0
91 NL 4.3 3.9 3.0 0.4 0.4 3.3 2.8 3.7 2.1 2.0 0.0 1.0
109 RO 28.3 68.8 89.3 26.9 47.8 12.0 10.7 6.5 18.2 30.8 17.6 0.0 11.7 4.5
127 SK 7.0 4.0 6.4 6.5 4.4 5.5 1.7 3.4 2.8
120 SI 1.9 1.3 5.5 1.2 0.8 0.6
114 SE 2.7 3.3 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 3.1 3.0 2.1 1.2 1.4
Source: Various national sources, see www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/wages/collectivesources.pdf. More detailed metadata 
are available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/cwb/
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Minimum wages exist in practice in all EU Member States, even if, as discussed in this report, 
they are set up in very different ways. Minimum wages can be considered a cornerstone of the 
European Social Model. However, the ongoing process of European integration has so far had very 
little involvement with wages, which are explicitly excluded from the competences of European 
institutions under the existing treaties – unlike other areas of work and employment, such as working 
time or health and safety.
On top of the diversity in the models of minimum wage setting across countries, there is also a 
significant variation in their levels. What may be the most adequate level to ensure equitable wages 
without negatively affecting employment levels is a topic on which there is considerable debate both 
at the national and European level, with thresholds such as 60% of the median or 50% of the average 
wage mentioned, among others. In this debate, the possibility of moving towards a certain threshold 
or introducing some form of coordination has also been mentioned by some European academics 
and policymakers.
Progressing towards a goal of adequate minimum wage levels can be achieved in many different 
ways in Europe: it can be done through purely national‑level governmental decision‑making, through 
national‑level collective agreements or even through some form of European coordination. This 
report will discuss the different systems and levels of minimum wages in Europe at present, carrying 
out an accounting exercise through a hypothetical scenario of a minimum wage set at 60% of the 
median national wage (with some alternative scenarios as well for comparison) in order to benchmark 
and evaluate minimum wage levels and systems in Europe, and to discuss the possibilities and 
difficulties of coordination in this matter. Although the option of some form of European coordination 
of minimum wages in Europe is very unlikely in the short term (as will be discussed in this report, 
many key European and national actors are opposed to such an option), using it as a basis for a 
hypothetical scenario can shed some light on this debate.
This part of the report is organised in two sections. The first, consisting of Chapters 1 to 3, discusses 
minimum wage policy from a theoretical and policy perspective. It reviews the social sciences 
literature on the effects of minimum wages and presents a broad picture of the different minimum 
wage systems existing in Europe and the possibilities and potential difficulties for their coordination. 
The institutional difficulties that would face such a coordination are discussed. In sum, this first 
section will try to provide a balanced summary of the theoretical and policy arguments around the 
debate. 
The second section, Chapters 4 to 7, will aim to complement these arguments with some facts by 
carrying out a simple accounting exercise to evaluate how many workers, and what types, would be 
most affected by a hypothetical minimum wage policy using a baseline scenario of a single national 
wage floor of 60% of the median national wages; this exercise will draw from the two most recent 
EU‑wide data sources on wages and income.
Since the 19th century, trade unions have tried to introduce (and raise) wage floors for their 
constituencies, but wide‑coverage minimum wages only became established in the second half 
of the 20th century. Where unions were strong, minimum wages were often established through 
collective bargaining, were usually sector‑specific and sometimes non‑binding (that is, affecting only 
union members, if nevertheless the vast majority of employees). Where unions were less strong, 
governments established statutory minimum wages or extended by law collectively agreed wage 
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floors, in most cases with a single national threshold and no exclusions. These varying origins are 
the source of the differing existing systems of minimum wage setting in Europe shown in Table 1.21
Table 1: Different systems of minimum wage setting in Europe
Statutory regulation Collective agreements
Single national 
minimum wage
Western countries: France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK
Southern countries: Malta, Spain, Portugal
Eastern countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia
Bipartite agreements: Belgium, Estonia, Greece
Tripartite agreements: Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia
Sectoral and/
or occupational 
minimum wages
Cyprus Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden
Continental countries: Austria, Germany, Italy
Source: Schulten, 2012
Today, the majority of EU Member States have national statutory minimum wages, as can be seen 
in Table 1. The predominance of this system was reinforced by EU enlargement to the east, because 
most of the countries of central and eastern Europe had adopted statutory minimum wages in the 
1990s. But even in the countries that were Member States before 2004, recent developments have 
reinforced the predominance of the statutory model. Most importantly, these include the adoption of 
national statutory minimum wages in the UK and Ireland at the turn of the century, and the possible 
(now planned) introduction of a national statutory minimum wage in Germany in the near future 
(Eurofound, 2013). So, although the diversity in the mechanisms and structure of minimum wages 
across Europe is still important, such diversity has been considerably reduced in recent years, and 
it is likely to be even further reduced in the future.
21 For obvious reasons, the historical origins of the minimum wage systems in eastern European countries do not entirely fit this narrative. 
But although they were established much later and in very different circumstances, the fact that they all opted for the statutory system 
is surely related to the weakness of their industrial relations systems.
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1Literature on the effect 
of minimum wages
Minimum wage policy is a highly controversial subject in the specialised literature, which often 
contains surprisingly contradictory theoretical and empirical arguments. This first section of Part 
Two of the report will offer a brief overview of the main arguments about the potential effects of 
minimum wages on employment, poverty and inequality, competitiveness and other social and 
economic issues.
Employment effects
In the standard neoclassic model, which is taught in most introductory economics textbooks, the 
minimum wage is either irrelevant or produces unemployment. In the context of a competitive 
labour market, a minimum wage set below the equilibrium level (the one that results from the free 
interaction of suppliers and buyers of labour) would simply be irrelevant. But a minimum wage set 
above the equilibrium level would necessarily lead to unemployment, since it would make some 
low‑paid (normally low‑skilled and/or young) workers too costly for employers to hire at a profit, 
while simultaneously increasing the number of people willing to work because of the attractiveness of 
higher salaries. Therefore, from this perspective the minimum wage policy tends to actually damage 
those that it intends to help.
According to the Keynesian approach, on the other hand, higher minimum wages do not necessarily 
increase unemployment at the macroeconomic level, but they will affect relative prices of the 
affected industries, altering the structure of demand and supply with unpredictable effects on overall 
employment. But since workers receiving minimum wages have a higher propensity to consume, it is 
often argued from this perspective that minimum wage rises may actually lift aggregate demand and 
output, and hence employment (Herr and Kazandziska, 2011).
Standard economic theory predicts that a minimum wage may also increase employment under 
certain scenarios. For instance, in the case of a monopsony, where a single buyer of labour exists, 
a binding minimum wage (that is, one which is set above the monopsonic equilibrium level) 
can increase the number of people employed by a company.22 Moreover, even if we assume that 
a minimum wage has a potentially negative impact on the employment of the least productive 
workers, a binding minimum wage could give such workers an incentive to improve their skills level 
in order to raise their productivity and remain employed (Cahuc and Michel, 1996). Under efficiency 
wage models,  the productivity of labour depends on the wage paid, so that employees will be more 
productive when earning higher wages because of their greater commitment; this may encourage 
employers to maintain or expand their labour force (Georgiadis, 2012).
So, overall, the impact of minimum wages on employment is disputed in economic theory. While the 
simple neoclassical model assumes a negative impact, the effect only holds in a purely competitive 
model, which is hardly ever found in reality. In non‑competitive labour markets, this effect is unclear 
even from a neoclassical perspective; in Keynesian approaches, the impact of minimum wages on 
employment depends on their impact on demand and price structures, this again being highly 
uncertain. In other words, theory alone cannot resolve this issue, which makes it necessary to turn 
to empirical analysis.
22 In monopsony, a company is not a price‑taker: it can reduce wages by employing fewer workers. This means that both employment and 
wages will be lower than in the conditions of a competitive market. In this context, a skilfully set minimum wage can increase employment 
(and efficiency) by imposing a (higher) wage level – closer to the one that would obtain in competitive conditions. For a discussion, see 
Manning, 1995.
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At an empirical level, the employment effect of minimum wages is one of the most researched topics 
in labour economics, but again the results are inconclusive. The consensus among mainstream 
economists until the early 1980s was that minimum wages had a negative impact on employment, 
especially for low‑skilled and younger workers, as summarised by the statement of Brown et al (1982) 
that ‘a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by 1 to 3%’.23 However, these 
results were challenged in the early 1990s by a new wave of studies on minimum wages.
Using both natural experiments (Card and Krueger, 1994; 2000) and other robust empirical approaches 
(Allegretto et al, 2011), these more recent studies found much smaller negative employment effects of 
minimum wages, even for teenagers, and often not statistically significant. Despite the higher levels 
of minimum wages in Europe, different empirical studies (Dolado et al, 1996; Vaughan‑Whitehead, 
2010) also failed to identify significant disemployment effects. As summarised by Martin and 
Immervoll (2007), ‘the evidence shows that an appropriately set minimum wage need not have large 
negative effects on job prospects, especially if wage floors are properly differentiated (e.g. lower rates 
for young workers) and non‑wage labour costs are kept in check.’
Some researchers have pointed out that this apparent contradiction between standard economic 
theory and empirical results can be explained by the existence of adjustment channels to maintain 
profitability when minimum wages are established or increased without it being necessary to lay 
off workers. Such adjustment channels would include: cost reductions resulting from lower labour 
turnover; efficiency improvements by the organisation or by more motivated staff; reductions in 
wages of higher earners (‘wage compression’); small price increases; a reduction in working hours; 
and cuts in training or other fringe benefits (Schmitt, 2013).
Inequality and poverty
In general, minimum wages are not explicitly aimed at reducing wage inequality and poverty, 
but at establishing a minimum rate under which any employment relationship is considered to be 
unacceptable (in other words, the establishment of morally based labour standards). However, 
minimum wages are obviously related to both wage inequality and poverty. Indeed, minimum wages 
compress the wage distribution by raising the lowest wages and therefore reduce inequality, provided 
the increase in the minimum wage is not matched by a similar increase in other wages. To the 
extent that such an increase would affect some workers under the poverty line, it would also reduce 
poverty. But, as was the case for employment, the scale and importance of the effects are largely an 
empirical issue, which depends on the number of workers affected by the increase and the household 
distribution of income.
It is a well‑established fact that wage inequality has increased considerably over the last few decades 
across most advanced market economies, but most of that increase has taken place at the upper tail 
of the distribution24 (Atkinson et al, 2011; see also Gordon and Dew‑Becker, 2008). The earnings of 
the highest paid (the upper 10%, 1% or even 0.1%) have increased much faster than those of everyone 
else and this on its own explains most of the increase in inequality. Since minimum wages have an 
23 Brown et al (1982) also concluded that for young adults (aged 20–24 years) the impact is negative, but smaller than for teenagers; for 
adults, the impact is uncertain, both according to theory and empirical research.
24 This increase in wage inequality is the main driver behind a more general increase in income inequality. ‘This rise of top income shares is 
due not to the revival of top capital incomes, but rather to the very large increases in top wages (especially top executive compensation). 
As a consequence, top executives (the “working rich”) replaced top capital owners (the “rentiers”) at the top of the income hierarchy during 
the twentieth century’ (Piketty and Saez, 2006).
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effect only on the lower tail of the distribution of wages (they obviously have no impact on very high 
wage levels), this suggests that they can have only a relatively low impact on overall inequality.
That said, most existing research on this issue does show that minimum wages (and their evolution) 
play an important role in explaining the patterns of wage inequality in the lower tail of the 
distribution – not only directly by raising the lowest wages, but also indirectly through spillover 
effects (Teulings, 2003; Autor et al, 2010). Of course, the impact of a rise in the minimum wage on 
the wage distribution will be larger in those cases where there are many workers currently paid at 
minimum wage levels.25
On the other hand, some argue that the effect of minimum wages on poverty reduction is not so 
clear‑cut because most minimum wage earners are not found in poor households – for instance they 
are more likely to be teenagers in middle‑class households – and therefore minimum wage rises 
would have a limited impact on poverty at a household level (Brown, 1999). To the extent that one of 
the main causes of poverty in Europe is being out of employment (one would not expect minimum 
wages to raise the living standards of households in which nobody works), welfare systems would 
be better tools than minimum wages to fight poverty. For instance, according to Maître et al (2012), 
most low‑paid employees in Europe live in households with more than one wage earner and are 
not affected by relative household poverty. The literature indicates that household composition and 
the number of wage earners, rather than the level of minimum wages, are the key factors behind 
household poverty levels (Marx et al, 2012).
Competitiveness and other economic effects
In the current economic situation, European policy places a strong focus on the relationship 
between national wage developments and international competitiveness, as underpinned by the 
recent Euro Plus Pact.26 Fostering competitiveness is one of the four objectives of the Pact, and it 
places a strong emphasis on the idea that wages should evolve in line with productivity to keep unit 
labour costs stable. If unit labour costs – equivalent to the ratio between labour costs per hour and 
labour productivity (output per hour) – increase significantly, competitiveness may be damaged.27 It 
could be argued that if a country decides to increase its minimum wage without any corresponding 
increase in productivity, the costs faced by national companies will increase and they will become 
less competitive than competitors from other countries. This effect will be larger in labour‑ intensive 
industries, where labour costs represent a higher proportion of the total costs faced by firms.
There are a number of potential objections to the previous argument. First, increases in minimum 
wages tend to foster increases in productivity (Rizov and Croucher, 2011; McLaughlin, 2007), so that 
the final result in terms of unit labour costs and therefore competitiveness may even be positive. 
After all, it is empirically the case that the most competitive European economies tend to have higher, 
25 If minimum wages are set at a relatively high level and there are no spillover effects, there can be some unintended social consequences. 
A large spike in the bottom of the wage distribution can create excessively compressed wage structures for some low‑paid jobs, practically 
eliminating wage increases during the career of the worker, for instance (Gautié, 2010). Such an effect largely depends on the strength of 
collective bargaining in each country and even sector (Grimshaw et al, 2013).
26 The Euro Plus Pact was agreed by the euro zone Heads of State or government and joined by Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania; see European Commission (2011).
27 More concretely, the Euro Plus Pact states: ‘To assess whether wages are evolving in line with productivity, unit labour costs (ULC) will 
be monitored over a period of time, by comparing with developments in other Euro area countries and in the main comparable trading 
partners. For each country, ULCs will be assessed for the economy as a whole and for each major sector (manufacturing; services; as well 
as tradable and non‑tradable sectors). Large and sustained increases may lead to the erosion of competitiveness, especially if combined 
with a widening current account deficit and declining market shares for exports.’
 
Pay in Europe in the 21st century
88
rather than lower, minimum wage levels (for instance, the Nordic countries). Secondly, low‑paid 
employees are not typically concentrated in trade‑intensive industries such as manufacturing, but in 
non‑trade sectors such as services – especially personal services (Dolado et al, 1996). This means that 
an increase in minimum wages will have a limited impact on internationally competitive industries, 
since moderate wages are rarely the key factor behind international competitiveness, at least in 
Europe.28 Furthermore, competitiveness is influenced both by price factors (wages and productivity, 
which together explain unit labour costs, and also exchange rates and inflation) and non‑price factors 
(such as product quality and design, marketing and consumer after‑sales service). Wages, or even 
unit labour costs, are just one element among many, and many researchers have warned against 
taking unit labour costs as a comprehensive measure of competitiveness (Ark et al, 2005).
Minimum wages may also have an effect on inflation, since companies employing minimum wage 
workers may adjust their prices upwards following a minimum wage rise. The effect would not be 
across the board, but would be concentrated on those industries that employ minimum‑wage workers, 
and hence would alter the price structure in ways that are difficult to predict. And – indirectly – it 
may have a cascade effect on other industries, even in those not directly employing low‑paid workers, 
since the input of certain industries is the output of others. To what extent this would be a problem is 
open to interpretation and depends also on the general economic conditions: some have argued that 
in the context of a crisis such as the current one, minimum wages could be used as a tool to prevent 
deflation (Herr and Kazandziska, 2011).
As already mentioned, some argue that minimum wages foster productivity and efficiency (Kaufman, 
2009). They can increase the incentive to work and the motivation of employees and also reduce staff 
turnover (Card, 1995). On the other hand, by acting as a ‘beneficial constraint’ for employers, they 
make it difficult to choose a low‑cost competitive strategy, fostering instead efficiency and innovation 
(Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988; Kleinknecht, 1998). Although the link has been difficult to establish 
empirically, some recent studies in the UK have been able to identify it, especially in large firms 
(Rizov and Croucher, 2011; Riley and Bondibene, 2013).
The literature mentions other economic effects of a minimum wage increase. One is demand 
stimulation: even if an increase of minimum wage is just a redistribution of income from profits 
to wages, it could increase aggregate demand and output because low‑wage earners have a higher 
propensity to consume (see Herr and Kazandziska, 2011; Stockhammer, 2011). Another is reduced 
welfare spending: since the increase in the minimum wage raises the income of the lowest paid, it 
reduces the need for redistributive and welfare programmes for those groups; some argue that this 
amounts to ensuring that employers pay the full social costs of low‑paid employment, rather than 
subsidising low‑paid jobs as do other forms of redistribution (see Freeman, 1996; Kaufman, 2009).
The interaction between minimum wages and industrial relations
Of course, minimum wages do not exist in a vacuum. They interact with other wage‑setting 
institutions, most importantly with collective bargaining, in ways that crucially determine their final 
impact on employment, inequality, and all the other aspects discussed so far (Grimshaw et al, 2013; 
Lee, 2012). Some of the literature, particularly in the economic mainstream, often disregards such 
interaction, though modern institutionalist and heterodox approaches do bring this aspect to the fore 
(see the contributions to Grimshaw (ed.) 2013; also to Vaughan‑Whitehead, 2010). It is particularly 
28 A counter‑argument would be that a wage increase in the non‑traded sector may exert pressure on wages in the traded sectors. Spillover 
effects in the context of industrial relations systems are discussed later in the second section of this report.
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important to take this issue into account when evaluating the possibility of coordinating minimum 
wage policy across Europe, because the wide differences in industrial relations systems may lead to 
very different outcomes for the same minimum wage policy. 29
Although minimum wages have a direct effect only on those workers whose wages fall below the 
specified threshold, they often have an indirect effect on wages above the threshold; this effect 
can extend to a sizeable part of the lower half of the earnings distribution (Freeman, 1996). These 
‘ripple’ or ‘spill‑over’ effects exist because the minimum wage level is often used as a reference in 
individual or collective wage negotiations at the bottom of the wage distribution, with workers often 
aiming at maintaining their relative distance from the threshold. Sometimes, these ripple effects 
can have a bigger impact on the wage distribution at the bottom than the minimum wage increase 
on its own. The relative strength of collective bargaining in the different countries is one of the 
main determinants of the existence and scale of these ripple effects (Grimshaw et al, 2013): where 
collective bargaining is very weak, it may not be able to capitalise on a minimum wage increase to 
facilitate a more‑or‑less general increase of wages in the low‑paid sector. Where this is the case, an 
increase in the minimum wage would simply compress wage distribution at the bottom, potentially 
leading to some undesirable results such as excessively flat earnings trajectories in the low‑paid 
sectors (generating a ‘low‑wage trap’; see Gautié, 2010). Where collective bargaining is stronger, an 
increase in the minimum wage level can lead to a more‑or‑less generalised expansion of wages in 
the low‑paid sectors, multiplying its effects in terms of pay equity.
But this interaction is made even more complicated by the fact that minimum wages can also have 
an effect on the strength and structure of the collective bargaining system. Some researchers have 
argued that high statutory minimum wages can have a ‘crowding out’ effect on collective bargaining 
in the low‑pay sector (Aghion et al, 2008), by reducing both the need and the incentive to engage 
in collective bargaining for setting wages (which may apply both to workers and employers). To 
the extent that this argument is based on the empirical correlation between statutory minimum 
wages and the strength of collective bargaining, it may inadvertently reverse causation. As already 
said, statutory minimum wages have often been introduced as a substitute for ineffective collective 
bargaining, and hence the observed correlation may be explained in exactly the opposite way (weak 
collective bargaining leads to statutory minimum wages, and not the other way round). Still, some 
empirical evidence does suggest (though not prove) the possibility of ‘crowding out’ effects, and the 
reluctance of unions to support statutory minimum wages in some European countries is partly 
based on their own perception of this possibility (Eldring and Alsos, 2012).
29 In fact, as already mentioned, in countries without a strong industrial relations tradition, in which unions were not strong enough to 
establish a functioning collective bargaining structure, statutory minimum wages were introduced to ensure an adequate minimum 
standard. In countries with strong industrial relations and efficient bargaining structures, wage floors were established directly by 
collective agreement, without need of government intervention. In other words, statutory minimum wages can be understood as 
a substitute for effective collective bargaining.
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In principle, the EU has no competences with respect to wage levels or wage‑formation mechanisms. 
Article 153 of the Lisbon Treaty, which deals with EU attributions for work and employment (including 
the areas of working conditions, health and safety, social security and employment protection), 
finishes with a sentence (point 5), which succinctly says ‘the provisions of this article shall not apply 
to pay’. According to this, the level of minimum wages and mechanisms for establishing them are 
a matter for the Member States.
That does not mean that the issue of minimum wages has never concerned European bodies. For 
instance, the European Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about low pay and minimum 
wage levels across Europe. The Council of Europe has even explicitly asked Member States to ensure 
that minimum wage levels reach at least a certain percentage of the average or median national 
wages (normally 50% or 60%).30 But the European Commission has not attempted to transform such 
concerns into some form of soft or hard regulation because of the explicit exclusion of wages from 
EU competences in the treaties.
However, the current economic crisis has changed the situation. Under the assumption that the 
crisis in the periphery was largely a problem of competitiveness that could only be resolved through 
wage reductions (internal devaluations) and structural reforms, and with European support for 
strained public finances acting as a disciplinary device, European institutions (most importantly, 
the Commission and the Central Bank) have increasingly intervened in wage developments and 
wage‑formation mechanisms. Countries receiving EU bailouts have had to sign memoranda that 
often included reductions in minimum wage levels, public pay levels and decentralising reforms of 
the collective bargaining systems (Busch et al, 2013). Furthermore, such interventions have been 
reinforced by recent intergovernmental pacts (Six Pack, Euro Plus Pact), which – aside from committing 
countries to strict financial rules in the short and long term – explicitly include a compromise with 
austere wage developments and wage decentralisation.
So, even though the treaties still exclude wages from EU competences, the crisis has made wages 
(both their development and the mechanisms of their formation) one of the central targets of EU 
policymaking. This is surely one of the reasons why the debate on establishing more explicit 
mechanisms of wage policy coordination, in particular minimum wage levels, is currently re‑emerging 
in European policy and academic circles.31, 32 In this section, the debate is briefly reviewed. First, its 
history is revisited. Then, it considers the different modes of coordination that have been discussed.
A brief history of the debate
In the early stages of the European project, the main concern was the establishment of a common 
market, and employment and social issues remained squarely at the national level. But, from the 
1960s to the 1990s, the competences of EU institutions in social and employment issues expanded 
considerably, and there were even some attempts at wage coordination, including minimum wages. 
The 1961 European Social Charter of the Council of Europe established the right of workers to 
a fair remuneration for a decent standard of living, and the Council’s European Committee of Social 
Rights put forward some definitions of what decent wages could be in the 1970s (68% of the national 
30 The Council of Europe is an international organisation comprising 47 European countries; it is not an EU body.
31 Luxembourg premier Jean‑Claude Juncker, while leading the euro zone’s finance ministers, said in January 2013 that he considered it 
‘indispensable to agree on a European legal minimum wage’ (Bloomberg, 2013). László Andor, EU Commissioner for employment, social 
affairs and inclusion, also suggested the introduction of minimum wages across Europe (Euractiv, 2012).
32 The origins of this debate can be traced back to Schulten et al, 2005. More recent contributions include Schulten 2012 and Eldring and 
Alsos 2012.
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average gross wage) and 1990s (60% of the national average net wage).33 Following the adoption 
of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers in 1989, which included the right to an 
‘equitable wage’, the European Commission and Parliament made some proposals that can be seen 
as early attempts to coordinate national minimum wages at the European level (Eldring and Alsos, 
2012). In 1993, the European Commission asked Member States to ‘take appropriate measures to 
ensure that the right to an equitable wage is protected’ (Opinion on an Equitable Wage, 19OJC 248, 
11 September 1993), while a report from the European Parliament encouraged them ‘to establish 
a minimum wage which amounts to a certain proportion of the national average wage’ (Schulten, 
2008). But because of resistance from several Member States, the idea was more or less abandoned 
by the second half of the 1990s, which explains the explicit exclusion of wages from EU competences 
in the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon, or the lack of any mention of wages in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The debate on minimum‑wage coordination resurfaced around the second half of the first decade 
of the new millennium, first related to the EU enlargements and concerns about their impact on low 
wages and social dumping, and then (more strongly) in the context of the economic crisis and the 
already mentioned de facto increasing levels of wage coordination that were becoming more common. 
The EU‑level debate partially echoed the national debates that were current in some countries, such 
as Germany (Box 2). In 2007, the European Parliament stated that ‘the minimum wage is set very 
low or at below subsistence level’ in many European countries (European Parliament, 2007) and in 
the following year called on the Council ‘to agree an EU target for minimum wages... to provide for 
remuneration of at least 60 percent of the relevant... average wage’ (European Parliament, 2008), 
later asking the European Commission to study the impact that the introduction of a minimum 
income at the EU level would have in each country.34 As previously mentioned, the Commission has 
also recently expressed interest in this matter.35
However, many key European actors are opposed to the idea of coordination of minimum wage 
policy, which makes such coordination highly unlikely in the short run. Nordic Member States, and – 
more generally – countries where minimum wages are set up by collective bargaining rather than 
statutory regulation, have traditionally opposed the idea, believing that it may undermine the existing 
national wage‑setting mechanisms. Germany used to belong to this category, but a more‑or‑less 
general dissatisfaction with the results of the current minimum wage‑setting mechanisms has led to 
a shift towards the statutory model, which will probably happen soon (Eurofound, 2013). European 
social partners have also sometimes opposed the idea of an EU minimum wage policy, defending 
the need to respect national specificities in wage‑setting mechanisms as well as national and social 
partner sovereignty. Nonetheless, after stressing that negotiations between social partners at the 
relevant level are the best tool to secure good wages and working conditions, the ETUC calls for 
a substantial increase in the statutory minimum wage in those countries where trade unions consider 
this necessary. The ETUC stipulates that ‘in any event, all wage floors should respect Council of 
Europe standards on fair wages’ (ETUC, 2012). European employers have argued that minimum 
wages should remain a responsibility of Member States according to the subsidiarity principle 
(Business Europe, 2012).
33 The change from a gross to a net definition of decent wages was much criticised for bringing the complex issues of tax and benefit systems 
into the picture, and for placing the responsibility for adequate wage levels on the state instead of employers (Lorcher, 2006; Murray, 2004).
34 ‘The Commission should study the impact which a legislative proposal it might submit concerning the introduction of an adequate 
minimum income at European level would have in each Member State; suggests, in particular, that any such study should examine the 
difference between the adequate minimum income and the minimum wage in the Member State concerned’ (European Parliament, 2010).
35 See for instance European Commission (2012). See also footnote 27.
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What type of coordination?
If Member States wanted to coordinate their minimum wage policies or levels across Europe, there 
would be different ways to do so; these can be discussed along three axes:
•	 the mode of regulation (hard law as opposed to soft law in EU terminology);
•	 the extent of coordination (levels versus systems);
•	 the definition of target levels (a proportion of median or average wages, gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, or others).
Mode of regulation
Several of the proponents of the idea of an EU minimum wage policy (for instance, Schulten, 2008) 
have argued that the coordination could be carried out using the mechanisms of ‘soft law’ that have 
been applied in recent years to the coordination of employment and social policies in Europe (called 
the Open Method of Coordination – OMC – in EU terminology). The OMC consists of a commitment 
to broadly defined European objectives by Member States, which must then develop nationally 
specific action plans. Progress towards the objectives is periodically reviewed through commonly 
agreed indicators, and a common discussion of results aims to spread best practice and common 
learning and improving.36
Considering the important existing differences in national minimum wage systems, it has been 
argued that the OMC provides ‘a very practicable way to introduce a European minimum wage 
policy’ (Schulten, 2008, p. 431). Some have argued, though, that the OMC has delivered few results in 
terms of actual policy coordination and harmonisation (its explicit goals), since the lack of any type 
of enforcement mechanism renders it ineffective in practice (for a review, see Borrás and Radaelli, 
2010). A ‘hard’ form of regulation, such as a directive, would surely be more effective but, since pay 
is currently explicitly excluded from the treaties, this method could only be used if the treaties were 
amended; this would involve a considerably greater degree of harmonisation and might be opposed 
by many countries and EU actors, as mentioned in the previous section.37
Extent of coordination
Most proposals for an EU minimum wage policy refer to a common target level (for instance, 
a proportion of average wages), without mentioning the institutional mechanisms that should bring 
about minimum pay levels in each country. Some of the proposals explicitly argue that the system for 
setting out the minimum level should be decided by each country according to its own institutional 
and industrial relations traditions. What this would imply is that countries in which minimum wages 
are set up by collective agreement could maintain such a system, only adopting the compromise to 
ensure that it is at least as high as the common target.
Although that would make the policy much more feasible on the face of it, given the existing diversity, 
there would be some problems. A minimum wage system established solely by collective agreements 
(such as the one in Sweden or Denmark) leaves some workers uncovered. If the common target level 
is defined as a minimum for all workers, it may require the extension of collective agreements or 
36 For more details, see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm.
37 Since the treaties exclude wages so explicitly from the remit of EU institutions, it is not clear whether they would allow for even the type 
of soft coordination associated with the OMC. Probably, other options for voluntary and ‘soft’ coordination would have to be explored, 
such as autonomous agreements concluded by the EU social partners (www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/
definitions/autonomousagreement.htm).
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the establishment of some kind of second‑level statutory floor. In both cases, this would imply an 
important change in existing industrial relations practices, with a higher degree of state intervention.
Taking this a step further, the EU coordination could aim at harmonising not only levels, but also 
systems, requiring that below the collectively agreed minimum wages (that are generally higher), 
there would be a statutory minimum threshold corresponding to the EU target. If this was the case, 
the impact of coordination would differ considerably across Europe. In those countries that currently 
have statutory minimum wages, only the level would change, not the system; in those countries 
where they are collectively agreed, the system itself would have to change and the institutional 
impact would be more significant. This is discussed in more detail in the following section. It is 
important to note that, even in the latter case, the statutory minimum wage would not need to replace 
the collectively bargained level, but could supplement it by setting an absolute minimum covering the 
whole workforce; nothing would prevent social partners agreeing higher basic pay for specific sectors.
Definition of target levels
A final important aspect in which current proposals differ is in how the target levels should be 
defined. The most frequently mentioned target is a proportion of median or average wages, normally 
50% or 60%. For instance, the European Parliament has mentioned a level of 60% of the median. 
Other proposals anchor the target to GDP per worker rather than to wages (for instance, the proposal 
by Rasmussen and Delors, 2006).
The choice of the target level is obviously not trivial, since it has important distributional implications 
and implies different interpretations of what would be a fair distribution of income. For instance, 
anchoring the minimum level to the median wage (the wage that occupies the middle position of 
the wage distribution in each country) makes it insensitive to developments at the very high end of 
the wage distribution, which is precisely where most recent changes in wage inequality have taken 
place. Recent increases in inequality are mostly due to a disproportional increase of wages at the 
top end of the distribution. In other words, using the median as reference could mean that even with 
a massive growth in overall income, if all such growth is located in the upper tail of the distribution, 
the minimum wage level would not change. Using the average rather than the median as the anchor 
would solve this problem, ensuring that the minimum wage level would be sensitive to changes in 
the upper tail. In general, when using the average as reference, the target levels proposed tend to be 
lower since the average is usually significantly higher than the median wage.
Using GDP per capita or per worker, on the other hand, has the advantage of linking the minimum 
wage to the evolution of overall productivity in the country, irrespective of whether such evolution 
is reflected in the structure of wages. GDP per worker is a more adequate measure of productivity 
in this respect, but in the context of a crisis and rising unemployment, it could lead to increases 
in minimum wage levels that are difficult to defend. Of course, a final option would be to have no 
target level at all, but just some type of EU‑level council (similar to the UK Low Pay Commission) 
that would adjust the target on a yearly basis, depending on its own evaluation of the economic and 
social situation.
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Box 1: Arguments for and against a coordinated EU minimum wage policy
With respect to the arguments in favour and against establishing a  common EU 
minimum wage threshold, these can be differentiated at three levels:
•   those associated with an increase in minimum wage levels; these mostly concern those 
countries that already have statutory minimum wage systems (in nearly all of which 
the level is currently below the hypothetical scenario of 60% of the median);
•   those associated with the introduction of a statutory wage floor or something similar; 
these mostly concern those countries that currently establish their minimum wages 
through collective bargaining;
•   those associated with the coordination of minimum wage policy; these concern the 
EU as a whole.
For more details, see Chapters 1 and 2 of this second part of the report. Table 2 outlines 
the main arguments at each of those three levels.
Table 2: Arguments for and against a coordinated EU minimum wage policy
Related to: Arguments in favour Arguments against
1. Increasing MW levels 
(countries with statutory 
MW systems)
Increases the standard of living of the lowest wage 
earners. (1)
Generates disemployment effects, especially 
among the youngest and least skilled workers. 
(7)
Reduces wage inequality (overall and linked 
to disadvantaged groups, such as women or 
migrants). (2)
Hampers the competitiveness of firms in the 
low-paid sectors. (8)
Increases motivation of low-paid workers and 
incentive to innovate in low-skilled sectors. (3)
Can generate low-wage traps, excessively flat 
earnings trajectories for low-skilled workers. (9)
Boosts overall demand, since low earners have 
a higher propensity to consume. (4)
Serves as an anchor against deflation in times of 
crisis. (5)
Reduces poverty and state expenditure. (6)  
2. Introducing a statutory 
wage floor (countries 
without statutory MW 
systems) (10)
Expands coverage of the minimum wage 
provisions, making it comprehensive.
Undermines existing collective bargaining 
systems.
Reduces social exclusion and labour segmentation.
May have a knock-down effect on low wages 
(by deincentivising wage bargaining).
  Crowding out effect on collective bargaining.
3. Coordinating MW policy 
at the EU level (11)
Multiplies the demand boost by making it 
simultaneous across the EU.
Requirement to change existing treaties, 
political difficulties.
Minimises the negative effects on competitiveness 
(simultaneous increase in main trade partners) and 
employment (demand boost).
Undermining of industrial relations tradition 
of some countries.
Limits some problems of market integration, such 
as social dumping and race to the bottom.
Unpredictable institutional interactions in 
different countries.
Important step in European integration, 
embodiment of the European Social Model.
Difficulty of adapting a single policy to 
national needs and specificities.
Notes: (1) Freeman, 1996; (2) Card, 1995, Teulings, 2003; (3) Kaufmann, 2009; (4) Herr and Kazandziska, 2011; (5) Herr and 
Kazandziska, 2011; (6) Freeman, 1996, Kaufman, 2009; (7) Brown et al, 1982; (8) Abbot, 2012; (9) Gautié 2010; (10) policy 
debate, see Dostal, 2012 for Germany, Eldring and Alsos, 2012 for a Nordic perspective; (11) see Schulten, 2008 and 2012 for 
an academic perspective and the second section of this Part for the policy debate.
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3Varieties of minimum wage systems 
and difficulties of coordination
The main difficulty for any kind of coordination of minimum wages in the European Union is the 
wide diversity across countries in the existing systems. As already mentioned, the main divide in 
this respect is between countries where minimum wages are set by government regulation (the 
statutory model) and countries where minimum wages are set by collective bargaining. But even 
within each of those two sets of countries there are further elements of differentiation that could be 
a complicating factor in any attempted policy coordination. The following points summarise these 
elements of differentiation and how they may make EU coordination difficult, broadly classifying 
countries along each axis.
Degree of social partner involvement
Although in nearly all cases there is some degree of social partner involvement (the only possible 
exception is Hungary; see Schulten, 2012: p. 90), it varies considerably between countries. Of course, 
the highest level of involvement is in those countries where minimum wages are set by collective 
bargaining, with no (or very little) government intervention. This is the case in the Nordic countries, 
Austria, Germany and Italy. In some of these countries, there is some marginal intervention by 
the government, either to extend the coverage of collective agreements in some cases (Finland and 
Germany) or to establish some kind of statutory legal minimum in particular cases (Austria and Italy).
A second level of involvement is in those countries where there are national minimum wages but 
they are set by national‑level collective agreements, either bipartite (Belgium, Estonia and Greece) 
or tripartite (Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia). This category is really a hybrid. As in the statutory 
model, there is a single minimum wage level and the intervention of the government is crucial for 
transforming what has been agreed into binding regulation (and often, the government can have the 
final word if the social partners cannot reach an agreement). As in the collectively bargained model, 
it is the agreement of social partners that determines the threshold.
In all other Member States, minimum wages are set directly by the government, although in most 
cases social partners are consulted. Often, they are formally part of some type of advisory body that 
recommends adjustments to the minimum wage on a regular basis, such as the well‑known UK Low 
Pay Commission.
The coordination of a minimum wage policy would be easier in the third group of countries 
(the statutory model), because the complexity of the system and the number of actors involved 
is smaller and would only require a commitment by governments to move gradually towards an 
EU‑agreed framework. In the second group (the nationally agreed model), the degree of institutional 
disruption would be higher, since moving towards a common EU threshold would diminish the role 
of social partners in the setting of minimum wages. The highest degree of institutional disruption 
and difficulties would be in the first model, because it would either involve a shift towards a kind 
of second‑level statutory model (which would underlie the collectively agreed system) or it would 
require a commitment to the EU target from all the partners involved, at all levels.
Universal versus segmented wage floors
Although in most cases this second differentiation is linked to the previous one, it is conceptually distinct. 
Where minimum wages are collectively agreed, they tend to be sector‑ or even company‑specific; 
in constrast, most of the countries with statutory minimum wage systems tend to have a single universal 
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wage floor.38 There may, however, be some exceptions or sub‑minima. Cyprus is something of a hybrid 
case, since it has an occupation‑specific statutory minimum wage underlying the collectively agreed 
levels (Eurofound, 2011). As far as the authors know, none of the proposals of EU minimum wage 
coordination mentions the possibility of differentiating by sector or occupation, and therefore it can be 
assumed that it would be a universal threshold within each country. Therefore, this is a second axis 
of institutional difficulty for countries where minimum wages are set by collective agreement; they 
would have to move from sector‑specific thresholds to a single universal wage floor. For countries with 
a statutory system, this would not be a problem.
Scope
Even in countries with statutory national minimum wages, there are often provisions allowing 
sub‑minima for specific groups, or even exclusions. But, again, the most important difference in the 
scope of minimum wages is associated with the divide between the statutory and collectively agreed 
models. In the purely collectively agreed model, only workers covered by collective agreements are 
affected by the minimum wages. Although most of these countries have very high levels of collective 
bargaining coverage (above 80%), in some cases (such as Germany) the coverage is much lower 
(around 60%), which leaves many workers unprotected. Some of the countries with the collectively 
agreed model solve this problem, at least partially, by different means – such as extending the 
collective agreement if half of an industry is covered (in Finland) or making it obligatory to be 
a member of an employer organisation (in Austria). In the statutory system, on the other hand, the 
coverage tends to be comprehensive but often allows sub‑minima for specific categories – typically 
young workers (in all countries except Portugal and Spain) and/or apprentices. There are other types 
of differentiation in particular cases, such as for disability in France or Portugal, for unskilled workers 
in Luxembourg or for managers and unmarried workers in Greece (Eldring and Alsos, 2012).
Assuming that EU policy would require a universal wage floor, perhaps with a subminimum for young 
workers (as already exists in most countries), the biggest changes would again take place in those 
countries where minimum wages are set by collective agreement, because it would mean a significant 
expansion of coverage. For countries with the statutory system, some national specificities might 
have to be eliminated, but it would probably not have a very large impact.
Enforcement
Obviously, if there are wide differences in the degree of enforcement of minimum wage provisions, 
the institutional difficulties of EU‑wide coordination would increase considerably. Although some 
relatively well‑known aspects of the various labour markets, such as differences in the size of the 
informal sector or the existence of bogus self‑employment, do point to differences in enforcement 
across Europe, there is no reliable source of comparable data, so it is difficult to evaluate in this 
context. Drawing on Eurofound’s network of correspondents, some exploratory information on this 
issue has been compiled.
The enforcement of minimum wage levels is a legal requirement which obviously depends on the 
judiciary system (once an employee reports a violation of employment regulation) and on the 
monitoring capacity of each country, typically through labour inspections. Data on non‑compliance 
is also rare at the national level and has been publicly documented only in some countries: in Ireland 
(based on 1,169 inspections in 2011, more than 100 cases of pay breaches were found); in the UK 
38 In some countries, there is also some regional differentiation (for instance, in Bulgaria and Finland).
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(around 1% of the labour force was estimated to be earning wages below the national minimum wage 
in 2010, according to data from the Office for National Statistics); in Poland (3% of employers under 
inspection paid wages below the minimum wage in 2003); and in the Netherlands (only 0.3% of 
the employees earned less than the legal minimum wage they were entitled to according to a study 
in 2006).
Several factors influence the potential number of people paid less than legal requirements. In 
countries where many employees are paid at around minimum wage levels, the probability of finding 
underpaid workers may be higher. For instance, in Spain fewer than 1% of employees were paid 
minimum wages between 2004 and 2009, which may suggest that few are paid below minimum 
wage levels. Another potential factor is the size of the black economy, where the minimum wage 
is less likely to be observed. Several countries report cases where employment relationships take 
place between parties not bound by employment contracts, such as Romania and Bulgaria, where 
the proportion of employees without a labour contract was estimated at 3% in 2012 (down from 
6% in 2003). Illegal employment practices are typically concentrated in certain sectors, such as 
construction, catering, retail or repair (as reported in the Czech Republic, or in France where cases 
have been reported in large retail companies). Moreover, a particularly vulnerable group may be 
migrant workers, typically in the construction sector (as reported in the Netherlands, Finland and 
Belgium). A further area of concern in some countries (Hungary and Lithuania) is part‑time working, 
since employees may be in fact working longer hours than those stated in their contracts.39
Of course, current minimum wage levels and their distance from the hypothetical common target 
are a very important axis of divergence across Europe that would also have a very significant impact 
on the difficulty of establishing a coordinated EU policy. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
So the institutional difficulty, or potential institutional impact of EU minimum wage coordination, 
can be summarised by dividing the countries into three categories.
High degree of institutional impact or difficulty: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy 
and Sweden are the countries with collectively agreed minimum wages, and there are superimposed 
difficulties across most of the axes previously mentioned. The policy under discussion could involve 
a disruption of national industrial relations traditions or require a high degree of coordination from 
all economic actors; it would probably eliminate existing sectoral and company differentials with 
respect to minimum wage levels; and it would require expanding the coverage to make it universal.
Intermediate degree of institutional impact or difficulty: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Poland and Slovakia – most of these countries have also collectively agreed minimum wages, 
although at the national level and with universal coverage, and therefore occupy an intermediate 
position with respect to the rest of Europe. Cyprus is a particular case, with an underlying 
occupation‑specific statutory minimum wage for some cases and collectively agreed minimum wages.
Low degree of institutional impact or difficulty: Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and 
the UK. In these countries, minimum wages are set by government regulation and have more or less 
universal coverage: therefore the EU coordination would be considerably simpler, although not, of 
course, trivial.
39 A final point to note with respect to enforcement is that it can be itself affected by the system and scope of the minimum wage regulation: 
a single universal wage floor facilitates enforcement. For instance, in the German case, it has been argued that the existence of very 
different levels across sectors and firms complicates enforcement significantly (Bosch and Weiskopf, 2011).
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A final point to be made is that this differentiation of countries according to the institutional difficulty 
of establishing a coordinated EU minimum wage policy would also be relevant if such policy were 
to be implemented by ‘soft law’. This would require less institutional change in countries with 
collectively agreed minimum wages, since the existing diversity of systems could be kept almost 
totally intact and each country could move towards a commonly agreed target through its own 
means. However, it would certainly be easier to achieve in countries with a statutory system where 
it would just be a matter for the government to adapt the necessary regulation. In countries with 
collectively agreed minimum wages, it would require a commitment from many different actors and 
a considerable degree of coordination at the country level itself.
Box 2: The debate on the minimum wage in Germany
Since the mid-1990s, the low-paid sector seems to have grown significantly in Germany, 
comprising more than 20% of the employed population according to recent estimates 
(Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010). This is linked to the development of minimum wage 
systems after reunification, with rapidly declining coverage rates and weaker collective 
bargaining structures (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2011).
Against this background, in 2005 the ‘grand coalition’ (the Christian Democratic Union, 
the Christian Social Union of Bavaria and the Social Democratic Party) created two 
procedures by which industry-specific (binding) minimum wages could be created. 
However, little progress has been made, especially in industries without collective 
bargaining or with low coverage. As a consequence, different minimum wages coexist – 
with large segments of the workforce not covered by any minimum rate. In 2010, 
coverage of employees by industry-wide collective wage agreements was 56% in western 
Germany and 37% in eastern Germany (IAB, 2011). Since company-level agreements 
covered a small proportion of employees (7% in the West and 13% in the East), 37% of 
employees in the west and 51% in the east are not covered by a collective agreement. 
This explains why the debate over the establishment of a statutory minimum wage has 
gained momentum in Germany in recent years.
As this report is being finalised, the coalition government in Germany has agreed on the 
establishment of a statutory minimum wage of €8.50 per hour, a level which is close to 
the 60% of the median discussed in the next chapter of this report.
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The key objective of this second part of the report is to quantify the number of workers who are 
currently below a threshold established by a hypothetical EU minimum wage policy (HMW, 
considered fixed at 60% of the median wage in each Member State) and to identify the types of 
companies, jobs and individuals that would be most affected. To do this, the exercise uses the 
two main existing EU‑wide surveys on income and wages, the 2010 European Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU‑SILC) and the 2010 European Earnings Structure Survey. The main 
methodological decisions made in order to carry out this analysis, and the limitations imposed by 
the data, will be documented in this chapter.
Some definitions
Normally, the threshold established by minimum wages refers to gross earnings before taxes or 
other statutory deductions, including the base salary and premiums and bonuses, except where they 
refer to non‑standard work hours or overtime, and excluding payments in kind (OECD, 2003). The 
threshold is normally defined as an hourly rate, or monthly earnings adjusted for hours worked, so 
that equivalents for different working hours can be computed.
These are the attributes that should characterise the target measure of wages by which the 
hypothetical EU threshold shall be defined. But, of course, the analysis will be constrained by the 
characteristics of the data available, and the actual measures of wages used will not be identical to 
this definition. In the following pages, details of any departure from the definition are provided with 
their potential implications.
The key element of all the analysis in this paper is the identification of the wage level that corresponds 
to 60% of the median in each country, and of the workers that fall below the threshold. Here this 
report simply uses the most commonly used threshold in the literature, which roughly corresponds 
also with the OECD’s definition of low‑paid workers, those whose income is two‑thirds of the 
median (this is one of the most commonly used definitions). So, it can be said that establishing such 
a threshold would mean the statutory elimination of low‑paid work in Europe, at least according to 
a common definition.
The use of the median rather than the mean is normally justified by the excessive sensitivity of the 
latter to outliers in the distribution of income. Even a relatively few very high individual earnings can 
skew the mean upwards, resulting therefore in a very high threshold. In fact, when a minimum wage 
threshold is proposed with reference to the mean, it tends to be lower than when it is proposed with 
reference to the median (50% or 55% rather than 60%).40
However, this report will follow the most frequent approximation based on the median, both for 
reasons of simplicity and for its superior statistical robustness. There is always less precision in the 
measurement of high wages in surveys so it is better to use an approach that is less affected by them.
The European Survey on Income and Living Conditions
The EU‑SILC is a cross‑sectional, longitudinal database on income, poverty, social exclusion and 
living conditions in the EU, coordinated by Eurostat, with data drawn from different sources at the 
40 Another important problem with using the mean as reference is that it would in itself change the establishment of such minimum wage, 
leading to a spiral of ever‑increasing wages for purely mathematical reasons. The median is not mathematically increased by increasing 
the wage floor, although it may in practice go up (also as a result of spillover effects).
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national level. It is representative of all private households and their current members residing in the 
territory of the countries at the time of data collection.
It is a very rich source in terms of the information it contains; it has a reasonably large sample and 
has the advantage of incorporating both a longitudinal perspective and a household perspective, on 
top of the more usual individual cross‑sectional perspective.
The main problem with this source – for the purposes of this report – is that it is not really aimed 
at measuring wages as such, but rather income from employment at the individual and household 
level. Therefore, a measure of wages that matches completely the definition given above cannot be 
constructed from the EU‑SILC, which can offer only an approximation (and requires making some 
non‑trivial assumptions).
The variable on labour income in the EU‑SILC refers to overall income from work in the previous 
calendar year, measured in gross terms (some countries, but not all, also provide net data). Since the 
latest available cross‑sectional wave from 2010 is used, the income variable actually refers to 2009. 
This variable poses the following problems for the purposes of this report.
It does not necessarily refer to a job in particular: The variable it measures is any labour‑related 
income, so, in fact, it can come from more than one job if the respondent had more than one job in 
the previous year, either successively (if she changed jobs) or simultaneously (if she had multiple 
jobs during the same period). The proportion of employees with more than one job in the countries 
included in the EU‑SILC in 2010 was 4.73% (ranging from nearly 9% in Poland to less than 2% in 
Bulgaria). The proportion of employees who changed jobs in the year used as the reference for the 
income variables is 8% (ranging from 14% in the UK to 2% in Romania). So although this problem 
is not enormous, it can have significant implications for the results and therefore has to be taken 
into account. The current job does not necessarily equate to the job or jobs to which the variable on 
labour income refers. As mentioned before, around 8% of employees changed jobs in the previous 
year: hence, all of them are potentially affected by such a discrepancy.
A significant proportion of responses is imputed for a variety of reasons: Sometimes it is 
necessary to impute responses – that is, to assign certain responses where none were provided, based 
on the characteristics of the respondent. In some cases, this may be related to non‑response; in others, 
to the fact that the information is collected on a different basis; and it may be that procedures differ 
depending on the country. Although there is a variable that flags imputed values, it is not consistently 
coded, so it is very difficult to evaluate the implications of this problem (Brandolini et al, 2010). 
Nevertheless, this is a problem which is not specific to this analysis but which applies to anyone using 
EU‑SILC data.
To transform the EU‑SILC variable of labour income into a variable fit for the purposes of this report, 
the following formula (based on Brandolini et al, 2010) is applied:
That is, the main variable will be monthly full‑time equivalent gross wage, which equals the EU‑SILC 
variable of annual cash gross earnings (in the previous year) divided by the number of months in 
full‑time jobs of the respondent over the same year, plus the number of months in part‑time jobs 
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multiplied by a country‑sex specific ratio of median hours of work in part‑time jobs to median hours 
of work in full‑time jobs.41
To adjust for the potential bias introduced by workers that hold more than one job, a further 
adjustment to the previous figure is made by multiplying it by a ratio of the hours worked in the first 
job to the total hours of work (in all jobs). This involves the assumption that the person had the same 
work arrangements over the previous 12 months as she has now, which is not necessarily true but 
is reasonable (and unavoidable unless the problem of multiple job holders is ignored). No further 
adjustments are made to deal with the problem of workers who changed jobs over the reference 
period, because it is simply impossible to know how much of last year’s labour earnings can be 
attributed to each job. How many months they worked is known, so the months in unemployment 
or inactivity can be excluded from the denominator, but not how many of the months correspond 
to each job done in the course of the year. What this means is that for anyone who changed jobs in 
the previous year (around 8% of the total sample), the base variable collects the average wage for all 
jobs over the previous 12 months; this is a good approximation, to the extent that those who changed 
jobs maintained a similar wage level.42
The European Structure of Earnings Survey
The European Union Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) has been conducted every four years since 
2002. It collects representative and harmonised data on wages in enterprises with more than 10 
employees in all sectors except agriculture, fishing, public administration, education, health and 
community and social services. The inclusion of small enterprises and the above‑mentioned sectors 
is optional for the participating countries; in fact, many of them opted for this type of comprehensive 
coverage in the last edition of the survey (2010), which is the one used here. Although the actual 
method for collecting the information can differ considerably across countries (between specific 
surveys and administrative registers), in all cases it is collected at the company level and is based on 
payroll data (rather than on workers´ responses). The sample is representative of both enterprises 
and workers in the covered sectors and company sizes.
The SES has many obvious advantages over the EU‑SILC for the purposes of this report, but it has 
some significant problems too, which is why it will be used mostly as a secondary source to complete 
the picture. Its main advantage is that it is a survey explicitly aimed at measuring wages with a high 
degree of detail, whereas the EU‑SILC measures labour income and only does that secondarily. 
What this means is that the target variable can be constructed in a much more direct and precise 
way, with very little need for resorting to bold assumptions. The problem of multiple and changed 
jobs does not apply either, because the data refer to jobs rather than workers: even if someone had 
more than one job, the information would be correctly gathered for each of them. The sample is also 
considerably bigger in most countries, and the degree of imputation is in principle much smaller 
(although the documentation of the data does not say much about this explicitly).
41 This necessary adjustment for part‑time work can produce some minor bias in countries where the hours of part‑time work are highly 
spread (such as the UK), but it is highly unlikely to change the overall picture.
42 Using the longitudinal module of the EU‑SILC, the authors could check directly how reasonable was this assumption, by comparing the 
wage in the previous and current year for those that had changed and had not changed jobs. The average wage increase of those who had 
changed was only marginally above that of those who had not changed (an increase of 5.1% as against 5%). Furthermore, 55% of those 
who had changed did so within the same 2‑digit occupation (in which case the increase in pay was even smaller); only for the remaining 
45% (who had changed job and occupation) was the increase in pay relatively significant (6.3% as against 5%). Overall, not adjusting for 
those who had changed jobs is likely to lead to an inconsequential upwards bias, at most. 
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But, on the other hand, the SES presents the significant problem of providing only a limited coverage of 
EU workers – the target population. The authors could only get access to SES data for 19 countries of the 
EU. The eight unavailable countries of the EU27 were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Malta and the UK. Furthermore, for some countries the SES does not include small enterprises 
or many important sectors of the economy. The exclusion of small enterprises is especially problematic, 
affecting seven of the 19 countries, because it is known that low‑paid workers are overrepresented in 
such companies.
The measure of wages that will serve as the basis for analysis is in this case very precise and 
corresponds more or less exactly to the target variable defined previously, according to the following 
formula:
All variables except the monthly equivalent annual bonus refer to October 2010 for most countries 
adjusted for cases of partial unpaid absence. The monthly equivalent annual bonus is calculated as 
the total annual bonus received in 2010, divided by the number of months worked in 2010.43
Although the measurement of wages in SES is much better, the impact of excluding significant 
segments of the economy is very important. On the one hand, it affects the calculation of the median 
hourly wage that serves for the definition of the threshold to the extent that if, for instance, the 
proportion of low‑paid workers is larger in small firms, excluding them will tend to increase the 
median and consequently the threshold. On the other hand, if there are more low‑paid workers 
in small enterprises, excluding the latter would reduce the proportion of people falling below the 
threshold directly. Therefore, both effects may cancel out to some extent. In practice, as we will see 
later, excluding small companies tends to reduce the proportion of workers falling below the 60% of 
the median threshold in most countries.
43 Since SES data allow the calculation of hourly wages with precision, there is no need to adjust for part‑time work.
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How much change from existing minimum wage levels?
Any coordination of minimum wages in the EU would not start from scratch, but from the existing 
systems and levels of minimum wages in each Member State. It is very important, therefore, to start 
by contextualising the hypothetical common EU minimum wage with the existing arrangements in 
each Member State.
Tables 3 and 4 present the basic data that will be discussed in this section. The first column of 
both tables shows the existing levels of minimum wage (for 2009 and 2010, the base years for 
the two sources that will be used). In the case of countries with statutory minimum wages, this 
information was obtained from Eurostat and has a simple and direct interpretation: these are the 
actual levels, in euro, below which no employment relationship is permitted – although there may 
be exceptions. In countries with collectively agreed minimum wages, the figures shown in the tables 
are just an approximation, which will be used for comparative purposes, drawing on an estimation 
by Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx (2013).
In strict terms, there is no such thing as a national monthly minimum wage in those countries but 
rather, different minimum wage levels in different sectors and/or occupations that do not necessarily 
apply to the full working population. In the majority of literature on this issue, the effective levels 
of minimum wages in those countries are thus simply unknown, even if they do exist. In a recent 
paper, Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx gather data from sectoral agreed minimum wages for those 
countries, and estimate an average effective minimum wage level for the workers covered by collective 
bargaining.44,45 Even if such information has to be handled with care for the reasons mentioned, it 
is extremely useful for comparative purposes and will allow the report to provide a full picture in 
the simple accounting exercise. If the values of such countries are compared with the median wages 
shown in the second column of both tables, it can be seen that in most cases they are higher than in 
countries with statutory systems (even if they do not apply to the entire labour force).46
44 The authors are very grateful to Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx for having kindly provided their estimations for this report.
45 An alternative would have been to use the lowest sector‑level minimum in these countries. The sector‑level average tends to overstate 
its value relative to universal systems, whereas the lowest minimum tends to understate it. The authors prefer to stick to the average, the 
measure preferred by Kampelmann Garnero and Rycx (2013).
46 According to Kampelmann Garnero and Rycx (2013), the coverage of collective bargaining in those countries is: 76% in Austria, 56% in 
Germany, 52% in Denmark, 79% in Finland and 82% in Italy. They provide no estimate for Sweden.
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Table 3: Basic figures for minimum wages in 2009, EU-SILC
(1) 
Monthly statutory 
minimum wages or 
average collectively 
agreed minimum wages, 
2009 (€)
(2)  
Median 
monthly 
wage, 2009 
EU-SILC (€)
(3)  
Hypothetical 
minimum wage 
threshold 
(60% median) 
(€)
(4) 
Proportion 
of workers 
below the 
HMW (%)
(5) 
Proportion of workers below 
monthly statutory minimum wages 
or average collectively agreed 
minimum wages, 2009 (%)
(6) 
Relative difference 
between existing 
minimum wage 
and HMW 
[(3-1)/1] (%)
AT 1,388.3 2,414.0 1,448.4 14.6 7.3 4.3
BE 1,387.5 2,771.2 1,662.7 9.6 3.0 19.8
BG 122.7 281.2 168.7 12.2 1.0 37.5
CY 822.1 1,587.8 952.7 15.7 6.3 15.9
CZ 297.7 746.5 447.9 10.9 0.4 50.5
DE 1,379.1 2,500.0 1,500.0 24.5 16.7 8.8
DK 2,341.0 3,741.7 2,245.0 10.0 6.6 -4.1
EE 278.0 632.3 379.4 18.9 0.9 36.5
ES 728.0 1,625.9 975.6 13.0 2.7 34.0
FI 1,584.3 2,665.4 1,599.3 6.8 1.7 0.9
FR 1,321.0 2,036.7 1,222.0 12.0 8.1 -7.5
EL 817.8 1,515.5 909.3 11.4 3.2 11.2
HU 268.1 458.0 274.8 12.1 2.1 2.5
IE 1,461.9 2,858.4 1,715.1 19.7 6.8 17.3
IT 1,788.0 1,951.8 1,171.1 13.8 18.9 -34.5
LT 231.7 441.8 265.1 24.2 9.6 14.4
LU 1641.7 3678.4 2207.0 23.5% 3.2% 34.4%
LV 254.1 543.6 326.1 22.0% 3.6% 28.3%
MT 634.9 1315.7 789.4 12.7% 2.3% 24.3%
NL 1381.2 3198.9 1919.4 13.5% 2.8% 39.0%
PL 307.2 537.8 322.7 16.4% 4.8% 5.0%
PT 525.0 912.3 547.4 7.8% 1.9% 4.3%
RO 149.2 272.5 163.5 10.4% 1.1% 9.6%
SI 589.2 1302.1 781.2 13.2% 2.2% 32.6%
SK 295.5 600.0 360.0 8.4% 1.0% 21.8%
UK 995.3 2098.3 1259.0 18.9% 5.7% 26.5%
Source: Source for (1): GKR estimate for countries with non‑statutory minimum wage (AT, CY, DE, DK, FI, IT), Eurostat for 
the rest. DE figure is for 2007, adjusted for inflation; CY figure is an average for 2008–2009. All other figures from EU‑SILC 
2010, cross‑sectional.
 
Benchmarking existing minimum wage systems
107
Table 4: Basic figures for minimum wages in 2010, SES
(1) 
Monthly statutory 
minimum wages or 
average collectively 
agreed minimum 
wages, 2010 (€)
(2)  
Median monthly wage 
2010, EU-SES (€)
(3)  
Hypothetical 
minimum wage 
threshold (60% 
median) (€)
 
(4)  
Proportion of workers 
below the HMW (%)
(5) 
Relative difference 
between existing 
minimum wage 
and HMW 
[(3-1)/1] (%)
CY 822.1 1,774.9 1,064.9 16.7 29.5
CZ 302.2 860.5 516.3 12.6 70.8
EE 278.0 734.7 440.8 18.4 58.6
ES 738.9 1,869.7 1,121.8 9.0 51.8
FI 1,584.3 2,848.2 1,708.9 3.1 7.9
FR 1,343.8 2,520.0 1,512.0 3.4 12.5
HU 271.8 624.7 374.8 14.5 37.9
IE 1,461.9 3,120.0 1,872.0 15.7 28.1
IT 1,788.0 2,262.9 1,357.7 7.0 -24.1
LT 231.7 468.0 280.8 21.4 21.2
LU 1,682.8 3,282.9 1,969.8 9.4 17.1
LV 253.8 511.8 307.1 20.8 21.0
NL 1,407.6 2,921.3 1,752.8 13.7 24.5
PL 320.9 758.3 455.0 17.8 41.8
PT 554.2 1,029.5 617.7 7.6 11.5
RO 141.6 358.6 215.1 20.8 51.9
SI 597.4 1,446.2 867.7 9.1 45.2
SK 307.7 705.5 423.3 13.2 37.6
Source: For (1): GKR estimate for countries with non‑statutory minimum wage (CY, FI, IT), unadjusted 2009 values, Eurostat 
for the rest (2010). CY figure is an average 2008–2009. All other figures from SES 2010.
The third column of both tables shows the value that would have corresponded in 2009 and 2010 
to the HMW threshold of 60% of the median. Comparing this value with the one in the first column 
gives an idea of how much impact this coordination would have in practice. Figure 1 shows the 
comparison graphically, with the hypothetical level in the horizontal axis and the existing level 
in the vertical axis, and a diagonal line where both values are the same. The distance from this 
diagonal line reflects the amount of change that would be required by a hypothetical coordination of 
minimum wages, and the position with respect to the diagonal whether the change would be positive 
or negative.
To remind the reader of the difference between the countries with and without statutory minimum 
wages at present, the latter are indicated with a different marker (a star). These figures clearly show 
that the introduction of a common target of 60% of the median would entail an increase in the 
existing levels for many European countries, quite significant in a few cases (such as the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Spain, the UK and Ireland, and most eastern European Member States). There are some 
exceptions, though: the clearest one is Italy, where the average collectively agreed minimum wage 
level estimated by Kampelmann Garnero and Rycx (2013) is so high that a common EU threshold of 
60% of the median would be considerably smaller. It must be remembered that this minimum wage 
is just an average and that it does not cover the whole Italian labour force, which means that the 
coordination of minimum wage policy would also lead to a significant increase in the lowest wages in 
Italy, as will be seen later. The other two countries that are above the diagonal (France and Denmark) 
are so close that it can only be said that the establishment of a common EU threshold of 60% of the 
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median would have very little or no impact on levels in those countries, as would also be the case 
in other countries such as Finland, Austria, Germany – where, again, the main impact would be in 
terms of coverage – and in Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Greece.
Figure 1: Existing statutory or average collectively agreed minimum wage compared with 
hypothetical minimum wage, 2009
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Source: EU‑SILC, 2009
The key variable throughout this report will be the proportion of workers below the hypothetical 
common EU minimum wage level in various countries, sectors, and so on. A preliminary 
approximation to this variable is shown in the fourth column of Tables 2 and 3. It can be easily seen 
that in nearly all countries there would be a significant proportion of workers below the threshold, 
and their wages would therefore increase if the HMW were implemented.
According to the EU‑SILC, in most countries the proportion of workers below the threshold is between 
10% and 15%, with several countries around or above 20% (the Baltic states, the UK, Ireland, and 
Germany). These figures will be discussed in detail in the next section. For the moment, putting them 
in the context of the proportion of workers below existing minimum wage levels illustrates the point 
made before about the difference between countries with and without statutory minimum wages. 
Column (5) of Table 3 (only available for EU‑SILC data) shows the proportion of workers below 
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existing minimum wage levels in 2009 using the threshold of 75% of the value shown in Column (1), 
following Kampelmann et al (2013).47
As we can see, in nearly all countries, the proportion of workers who are below the existing minimum 
wage level is less than 5%, which suggests both a high level of compliance and that minimum 
wages are so low that they have very little effective impact. As for those countries where more than 
5% of workers are below the existing minimum wages, most have non‑statutory or non‑national 
minimum wages (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany and Italy), which means that the issue at 
stake is not compliance but coverage, and the existence of specific minimum wages that may be 
significantly below the overall national average. Only in France, Ireland, Lithuania and the UK is 
there both a statutory national minimum wage and a significantly high proportion of workers below 
the threshold, which may result from non‑compliance or the existence of sub‑minima for specific 
groups (such as younger workers) or, perhaps, some of the measurement problems mentioned earlier.
How many workers would be affected?
The most obvious indicator of the scale of the impact of a hypothetical common wage floor is 
the percentage of workers below the threshold. The lack of a dataset measuring wages for the full 
labour force in the different countries forces this analysis to compare the results using two different 
datasets (EU‑SILC and SES), which complicates the picture but allows a more correct evaluation of 
the potential impact of a hypothetical minimum wage coordination. Figure 2 shows the proportion 
of workers below 60% of the median wage in each country according to the two sources, including 
different specifications of the SES. This complicated figure will be discussed in some detail to be able 
to later provide a simple but faithful classification of countries.
As mentioned earlier, the source that provides a better measure of wages and a larger sample size is 
the SES. The problem with this source is that it does not cover the whole economy, most importantly 
leaving out small firms and public administration; moreover, the authors could not get access to 
data for all countries. In Figure 2, the countries have been sorted according to the base figure of 
the SES, excluding establishments with fewer than 10 employees and in the public administration 
sector; these are identified by a black square marker. Those countries for which the authors did not 
have SES data are shown separately at the right‑hand side of the chart, sorted by the proportion of 
workers below the HMW threshold, according to EU‑SILC.
The EU‑SILC figure is indicated by a diamond in the chart. The next two markers correspond 
to different specifications of the SES dataset, which are available only in some countries but are 
informative. The star shows the proportion of workers below the HMW threshold, according to the 
SES, for establishments of all sizes (for the countries that provide the data). The line marker shows 
the proportion of HMW workers according to SES – including in public administration (again, where 
such data is available). Finally, the circle symbol is used only for those countries for which the authors 
did not have access to SES data, but for which Eurostat itself has published a figure that is similar 
47 The existence of a statutory minimum wage tends to create a spike in the distribution of wages around the minimum wage level, to 
the extent that at least some of the jobs that would otherwise have lower pay tend to accumulate at the minimum level. Since the 
measurement of wages in surveys is not totally precise, using the exact value of the minimum wage as the threshold for identifying who 
earns less than that is likely to misclassify a large number of workers who are precisely around the threshold. For that reason, it makes 
sense to specify a slightly lower figure, as done by Kampelmann et al (2013). They specify a figure of 75% of the official value. This is 
safely below the spike and therefore minimises the number of wrong identifications. The same logic does not apply to the hypothetical 
minimum wage level of 60% of the median, because such value has no applicability nowadays and therefore there is no spike around it. 
Of course, there will be some misidentified cases, but they are likely to even out because they will be both above and below the threshold. 
In the next section some graphic evidence of this spike and its relationship with existing minimum wage levels will be discussed.
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to that of the authors: the percentage of workers below two‑thirds of the median in each country 
for establishments with more than 10 employees, excluding public administration. (These data are 
included so as to also be able to evaluate roughly the consistency between the two sources for 
those countries.)
Figure 2:  Proportion of workers below the HMW threshold – different sources and specifications
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In general terms, the consistency between the different specifications of the SES data is higher than 
the consistency between the SES and EU‑SILC. What this suggests is that the differences between 
both sources are not so much the result of their differences in coverage (EU‑SILC covering the whole 
economy and SES generally not) but the result of differences in the measurement and specification 
of wages. That said, the inconsistency between SES and EU‑SILC in the country comparison seems 
to be concentrated in a few countries, which are highlighted in the figure by a circle around the 
country label. In the majority of countries, the inconsistency is much smaller and seems reasonably 
within the boundaries of what would be expected according to the different specification of variables. 
This will be useful for the classification of countries in terms of the scale of the impact of the HMW, 
because in most cases the use of one or other source would not make much difference.
In a few countries, nevertheless, the inconsistency is quite considerable, so it justifies a more detailed 
discussion.
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Romania
The proportion of workers below the HMW threshold is significantly lower in the EU‑SILC than in the 
SES, being only around one‑half of the proportion recorded in the SES. The SES does not cover small 
establishments in this country, but EU‑SILC does, so it is possible to check whether the exclusion of 
small firms may bias the SES results. Romania is one of the countries where (according to EU‑SILC) 
low pay is less concentrated in small firms: 24% of low‑paid jobs are in small firms, compared to 15% 
of the rest of jobs (in most other countries, the difference is larger). The difference in the median wage 
of small establishments and the rest is not very big either. So the problem is probably not that the 
SES results are biased by the exclusion of small firms, but the different specification of the variable 
of wages, which is not very good in the SILC data. Although the authors do not have SES data for 
Bulgaria, it seems that this country would have a similar problem.
Luxembourg
Here the inconsistency goes the other way. According to the EU‑SILC, the proportion of low‑paid 
workers is nearly two‑and‑a‑half times that recorded by the SES. Contrary to Romania, in Luxembourg 
there seems to be quite a strong bias in the extent of low pay in small and large establishments. Nearly 
40% of workers in small establishments in Luxembourg are low paid according to the EU‑SILC, 
compared to less than 20% in other establishments. The median wage is also much smaller (being 
one‑third less in the SES). So in this case, the SES result may be biased downwards by its exclusion 
of small establishments, even if the SILC estimate may seem excessively high.
France and Italy
In a similar way to Luxembourg, the extent of low pay is significantly greater in small establishments 
in these countries, so the inconsistency between the two sources may point to SES data giving an 
excessively low estimate. The bias in the actual median values is, however, less important.
Sweden
The SES figure is extremely low in Sweden, almost negligible (less than 1%), whereas the EU‑SILC 
figure would put the country around the middle of the chart. In this case, both SES and EU‑SILC 
seem to provide biased results, in opposite directions. In the case of EU‑SILC, the Swedish data do 
not collect gross earnings as in most countries, but net and subsequently imputed earnings. The 
imputation process seems to have generated an implausibly high proportion of low‑paid workers.48.
The SES base estimation also seems problematic – in this case, because the figures for working hours 
seem implausibly low for many low‑paid workers. The base wage measure is calculated as an hourly 
rate, and therefore would tend to inflate the estimation if hours are too low. The problem can be seen 
by comparing the base SES estimation (the black square marker) with the SES estimation based on 
annual wages, which is normalised in terms of full‑time equivalents rather than working hours. These 
two magnitudes are very similar in most cases, because normalising by hours or full‑time equivalents 
does not make a big difference except in the case of Sweden, where one produces less than 1% of 
low‑paid workers and the other more than 5%.
48 SILC provides extremely limited documentation of these issues. According to the SILC dataset, all the results for Sweden were only 
collected net, which would mean that the variable of gross labour earnings that we are using here has been imputed: but in fact, the 
associated imputation factor has a value of 0 for Sweden, which would mean that there was no imputation at all. Does it mean that 
the Swedish figures for labour earnings in SILC are only provided net? We could find no mention of this in the SILC quality report or 
anywhere else. France is the only other country with a similar problem in SILC, although the bias seems not so large in that case.
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Figure 3: Proportion of workers below the hypothetical HMW threshold, final assessment
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Source: 2010 EU‑SILC, except * (average between EU‑SILC 2010 and SES 2010 figures, because of inconsistency between the 
two sources).
Taking into account these problems, Figure 3 provides a final assessment of the share of workers 
below the threshold of 60% of median national wages, which shall serve later for classifying countries. 
The source for the numbers behind this figure is EU‑SILC for most countries, with the exception of 
the already‑discussed problematic countries, for which we use the average between the EU‑SILC 
and the baseline SES result.
Box 3: An alternative threshold based on 50% of average wages in each country
As mentioned earlier, using the median or the average as reference for the HMW threshold 
can lead to important differences. The median is insensitive to the extent of inequality 
in the upper tail of the distribution (and also in the bottom tail, since the median simply 
refers to the wage that occupies the exact middle of the distribution, separating the 50% 
of the workforce earning more from the 50% earning less), while the average is very 
sensitive to it. Since wages tend to have a very skewed distribution, with many workers 
earning relatively low wages and a few earning very high ones, the average is higher 
than the median wage in all EU27 countries according to EU-SILC, ranging from around 
25% higher or more (Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, UK, Estonia) to less than 10% higher 
(Germany and Denmark).
Since countries are characterised by different wage distributions, they can be ranked 
differently depending on what measure is used. Using as the reference for the HMW 
threshold the average rather than the mean, therefore, can lead to some differences in 
the impact across different countries.
To test this, the basic measure has been recalculated using 50% of the average rather 
than 60% of the median in line with some of the proposals that have been put forward, 
as discussed earlier in this report. Figure 4 shows the proportion of the workforce that 
would be affected in each of the EU27 countries according to the two different methods 
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of calculating the HMW threshold. In most countries, the difference is very small, but 
there are a few where it is quite significant: the most extreme case is Portugal, where the 
proportion of workers below 50% of the average is more than twice the proportion of 
workers below 60% of the median. The proportion of workers below the average-based 
threshold is also significantly higher in the UK, Latvia and Lithuania. These are countries 
characterised by a high degree of wage inequality and therefore by an average much 
larger than the median.
Figure 4: Proportion of employees under the average-based HMW threshold (EU-SILC)
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Box 4: A sector-specific minimum wage threshold
The baseline scenario for this accounting exercise assumes a single wage floor for each 
country, relative to the median for the whole economy. Alternatively, the threshold could 
be referenced to the median wage in each sector. Although the authors are not aware of 
such a proposal in the debate, this alternative could in principle have some advantages.
The effect on the wage distribution could be more similar to that of the collectively 
agreed system (which is sector-specific as well), and it could pose fewer problems for 
competitiveness and profitability, theoretically being more in line with sector wage 
differentials and therefore with productivity. The following chart shows the share of 
workers affected by a national minimum wage (set at 60% of the median wage in each 
country, the baseline scenario in this report) and by a sector-specific minimum wage (set 
at 60% of the median wage in each sector and country). As can be seen, the difference 
in the overall share of workers affected would be very marginal.
All the analysis in this box is based on SES data. EU-SILC does not have the required level of 
detail in the sector classification. For the sector-specific minimum wage threshold, the report 
has used seven broad sectors of the economy: construction; low-technology industries (LTI); 
high-technology industries (HTI); less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS); knowledge-intensive 
services (KIS); education; and health. Public administration is not included in SES.
Figure 5: National and sector-specific minimum wage, proportion of workers affected, 
2010, SES
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Even though the number of workers affected would be very similar in both systems, the 
distributional implications are strikingly different, as can be seen in Table 5, which compares 
the proportion of workers affected in each sector and country in the two systems. This effect 
was to be expected, but perhaps not to such an extent. In all countries, the proportion 
 
Benchmarking existing minimum wage systems
115
of workers affected in the low-paid sectors would be drastically reduced, whereas that of 
workers affected in the high-paying sectors would increase very significantly.
For instance, if the lowest-paid sector in Europe is looked at, less knowledge-intensive 
(private) services, it can be seen that the proportion of workers affected would go 
down from 13.4% to 6.7% on average (from 13% to 3.5% in Spain, from 28% to 9.9% 
in Ireland, and from 25% to 13.5% in the Netherlands). Conversely, in the highest-paid 
sector (knowledge intensive private services) the proportion of workers affected would 
rise from 8% to 17.7% on average (from 6.7% to 19.3% in Spain, from 5.3% to 15.7% in 
Italy, and from 3.9% to 27.3% in Portugal).
While a national minimum wage significantly reduces wage inequalities across sectors 
(by raising the wages of the low-paid sectors in particular), a sector-specific minimum 
wage can in fact accentuate them. The strongest effect would not be on the lowest-paid 
workers in the economy, but on the lowest-paid workers in the highest-paid sectors – 
who may not be so poorly paid in general terms. To the extent that wage inequalities 
are linked to sector differentials, it could end up increasing overall inequality. Such 
a minimum wage scheme may be more consistent with productivity levels, but it seems 
difficult to justify in terms of its implications for equity.
Table 5:  National versus sector-specific minimum wage, proportion of workers 
affected, 2010, SES (%)
Construction LTI HTI LKIS KIS Education Health
CY
 
National 5.4 26.09 10.93 26.83 5.98 1.69 11.82
Sector-specific 13.59 15.86 8.21 6.45 20.83 17.66 13.5
CZ
 
National 8.28 12.09 6.65 18.71 14.72 4.82 8.43
Sector-specific 8.77 8.46 7.48 14 23.29 11.8 7.5
EE
 
National 12.67 15.99 10.85 24.12 11.81 20.35 20.15
Sector-specific 17.52 13.39 12.41 13.6 19.96 22.66 16.83
ES
 
National 2.26 5.6 1.22 13.17 6.73 5.41 8.89
Sector-specific 1.71 6.71 8.06 3.5 19.28 20.5 15.11
FI
 
National 0.68 0.64 0.32 5.39 1.37 2.05 2.9
Sector-specific 1.9 1.54 3.61 1.51 6.45 6.68 1.34
FR
 
National 7.77 2.44 2.12 2.93 1.71 0.13 5.72
Sector-specific 6.84 2.7 7.94 1.78 12.09 4.32 4.14
HU
 
National 22.36 18.34 10.15 18.36 10.19 3.13 8.78
Sector-specific 8.45 10.42 11.79 9.34 24.95 14.42 3.68
IE
 
National 19.95 14.45 8.65 28.26 9.38 4.51 9.99
Sector-specific 16.02 11.53 13.34 9.94 16.6 22.85 11.84
IT
 
National 7.68 7.46 3.35 11.13 5.25 0.58 5.31
Sector-specific 7.34 4.55 4.09 4.35 15.7 21.19 10.26
LT
 
National 25.37 21.43 6.97 26.3 13.1 24.46 12.63
Sector-specific 23.43 20.62 15.48 0 22.34 34.25 15.25
LU
 
National 6.03 5.22 10.19 20.92 3.86 0.55 8.67
Sector-specific 1.38 6.16 0.83 1.23 17.71 26.32 17.6
LV
 
National 27.28 26.66 9.64 23.95 12.67 18.59 13.87
Sector-specific 17.95 14.45 16.62 18.08 27.17 20.07 9.79
NL
 
National 4.96 8.15 3.61 25 14.72 2.7 6.17
Sector-specific 6.64 7.17 7.16 13.5 17.53 7.57 7.69
PL
 
National 26.14 22.02 8.67 23.58 18.44 5.29 7.68
Sector-specific 21.15 15.06 9.98 14.62 25.18 29.81 6.89
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PT
 
National 5.83 12.57 2.3 8.62 3.91 0.78 6.49
Sector-specific 0.59 0.03 6.63 1.06 27.29 24.62 6.31
RO
 
National 26.73 22.71 3.58 27.02 21.82 12.82 14.95
Sector-specific 19.27 15.2 9.59 19.6 32.29 20.1 13.22
SE
 
National 3.1 2.79 0.82 7.39 6.31 5.3 5.14
Sector-specific 4.87 3.54 2.27 6.06 11.09 3.65 3.26
SI
 
National 15.69 10.3 4.78 9.68 5.97 1.36 6.63
Sector-specific 3.18 2.69 2.87 2.58 17.81 21.7 9.43
SK
 
National 13.56 11.86 9.73 16.89 14.07 8.66 10.18
Sector-specific 13.34 11.85 9.07 8.58 21.76 15.32 8.99
Total
 
National 10.59 11.21 4.18 13.42 8.12 4.31 6.81
Sector-specific 8.7 7.89 7.23 6.67 17.67 17.15 7.46
The distribution of wages below the threshold
So far, this report has focused on the most simple and obvious measure of the potential quantitative 
impact of the establishment of a common HMW threshold of 60% of the median: the percentage of 
workers below the threshold. Although such an approach is useful, it has the problem of not taking 
into account the intensity of the effect on each individual case. Not all workers below the threshold 
earn the same wage. The distance between the current wage and the hypothetical minimum wage 
can vary considerably, altering the actual impact for different workers.
Figure 6 illustrates this point. It shows the cumulative distribution of relative wages below the median 
in each country. The horizontal axis shows the wage expressed as a percentage of each country’s 
median, and the vertical axis the cumulative share of employment associated with each wage level. 
For facilitating the interpretation of the country charts, a series of grey vertical lines has been drawn 
at the levels of 40%, 55%, 60% (the threshold that being studied in this paper) and 65% of the 
national median. A black vertical line has also been included at the level of the existing minimum 
wage (actual or estimated by Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx, 2013). So for instance, in Germany, 
the average collectively agreed minimum wage currently stands at around 55% of the median and 
more than 20% of workers have current wages below that level; below 40% of the median, there are 
around 15% of workers, and below 60% of the median (the HMW level), nearly 25% of workers. The 
countries have been arranged in the chart according to the three main categories of minimum wage 
systems already identified. The countries at the left‑hand side of the chart are those with collectively 
agreed and sector‑specific minimum wages; those in the middle (separated by lines) have collectively 
agreed but national minimum wages; and those at the right (the majority) have statutory national 
minimum wages. The area behind each curve in Figure 6 is proportional to the impact of establishing 
a common statutory minimum wage threshold of 60% of the median in each country. Not only do 
we see how many workers are below the threshold (where the next‑to‑last vertical grey line crosses 
the curve), but also by how much wages would actually increase. The more to the left the curve is 
located, the larger would be the increase in pay; the higher, the more workers would be affected.
This figure also shows how the different minimum wage setting mechanisms produce different 
distributions of wages below the median. The countries with national statutory minimum wages 
tend to have a bumpier distribution of wages below the median, with few workers below the minimum 
wage threshold and an abrupt increase after it. Countries with collectively agreed sector‑specific 
minimum wages, on the other hand, show a much smoother and continuous distribution of wages 
below the median, and the estimated average agreed minimum wage is not associated with any 
discontinuity in the cumulative distribution of wages.
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According to the authors’ analysis, there are exceptions to this general pattern in both groups 
of countries: Finland and Sweden show a relatively abrupt distribution of wages, with the curve 
turning upwards at around 50% and 55% of the median, respectively. In the case of Finland, this 
coincides with the effective average agreed minimum wage estimated by Kampelmann, Garnero 
and Rycx (2013). On the other hand, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and the UK show a rather continuous 
distribution in which the minimum wage line does not seem associated with any bump in the 
cumulative distribution, with workers more or less equally distributed below and above the line 
(quite similar, in fact, to the countries without statutory minimum wages). To some extent, this may 
be the result of data problems, since for three of those four countries (the exception being Ireland) 
the authors only have data from EU‑SILC, which has some problems in measuring wages. In fact, 
the countries for which they have SES data tend to show more clearly the effect of existing minimum 
wages than do the countries for which only EU‑SILC data is available. It may also be a result of the 
existence of sub‑minima and exceptions not taken into account for computing these charts.
The most important point, though, is that in some countries the area behind the curve is relatively 
small even if the share of workers below the minimum wage line is relatively large. This is the case 
for Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and Slovenia and may be an effect of existing minimum 
wages (in Lithuania, Latvia and Luxembourg, there is nobody below the existing minimum wage line 
and this reduces considerably the area behind the curve) or other factors (in Slovenia and Spain, the 
existing minimum wage is considerably below the turning point of the curve). The area behind the 
curve is larger in Germany, Estonia, the UK and Ireland, Cyprus, Austria and Romania.
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of wages below the HMW threshold
Notes: SES indicated in capital letters, SILC in lower case; * indicates estimated agreed average minimum wage from GKR
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An alternative index of the potential impact of establishing a minimum wage threshold of 60% of 
the median with a similar approximation to the one underlying Figure 6 can now be calculated. For 
each individual worker below the threshold, the relative distance between the wage that corresponds 
to 60% of the median and the current wage can be calculated. Figure 7 plots the median of the new 
indicator (distance of current wage to the HMW) in each country (along the vertical axis), together 
with the previously used indicator of the proportion of workers below the hypothetical HMW (along 
the horizontal axis). The distance to the origin in the figure is proportional to the impact that the 
establishment of a common EU threshold of 60% of the median would have. As might be expected, 
the biggest impact is in Germany, which really stands out from the rest of Europe in terms of the 
distribution of earnings below the median. Other countries where the impact would be high as 
a result of this new measure are the UK, Austria, Cyprus, Netherlands, Ireland, the Baltic states, 
Romania, Poland, and Denmark.
Figure 7:  Workers affected by a HMW and median distance between existing wage and the 
HMW threshold (EU-SILC)
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Final remarks
As has been repeatedly said in this report, the EU currently has no competences with respect to 
pay systems or levels, and many significant actors both at the EU and national levels are opposed 
to giving the EU any powers in this respect. Therefore, at least in the short run, it is very unlikely 
that there would be any form of coordination of minimum wage policies in the EU. Still, some 
recent EU policy discussions have touched upon this issue, so it seemed useful to discuss that 
possibility by conducting an accounting exercise to examine how many and which workers would 
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fall below a common threshold set at 60% of median wages. Such an exercise is also useful as a 
way of benchmarking minimum wage systems and levels, since it establishes a common metric for 
the comparison. After having discussed in detail such a scenario in the previous pages, it is now 
possible to make an overall assessment of the quantitative impact that a hypothetical coordination 
of minimum wages around 60% of each national median would have, adding also the assessment 
of the institutional impact that was discussed at the end of the previous section. Such a summary 
is provided in Table 6.
Table 6: Potential impact of HMW threshold, by country, EU27
Institutional impact:  
High Medium  Low
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
ve
 
im
p
ac
t
High DE EE, PL, CY LT, LV, RO, UK, IE
More than 15% of workers 
below the HMW threshold
Medium AT, IT, DK BG, EL HU, NL, CZ, LU, SI, ES, MT
Between 10 and 15% of workers 
below the threshold
Low FI, SE BE, SK PT, FR
Less than 10% of workers below 
the threshold
   
Collectively agreed sectoral 
and occupational MW
Collectively agreed national 
minimum wages
Statutory national minimum 
wages
 
According to the scenario evaluated in this report, it is in Germany that the impact would be greatest, 
and hence where it would be most difficult to establish such a system. The proportion of workers 
currently below 60% of the median is one of the highest in Europe, according to the EU‑SILC (SES 
data for Germany could not be accessed, but the data published by Eurostat show that the country 
also has one of the highest proportions of low‑wage earners). Moreover, minimum wages in Germany 
are currently collectively agreed and sector‑specific, so moving into some form of statutory national 
system would involve a large‑scale institutional transformation. As this report is being finalised, the 
German coalition government has agreed on the gradual establishment of a statutory minimum wage 
of €8.50 per hour, a level very close to the scenario discussed in this report, and which therefore 
would change completely the position of Germany in Table 6 and therefore the overall institutional 
and quantitative assessment made in the table.
The other countries with collectively agreed sector‑specific minimum wages are all in the same 
column as Germany, but the quantitative incidence of a threshold at 60% of the median would be 
considerably smaller because of the lower incidence of low pay. This is particularly the case in the 
Nordic countries, where the proportion of workers below 60% of the median is well below the EU 
average, even though they lack a statutory national threshold. This is one of the reasons why, in 
practice, Nordic countries are likely to be the most resistant to the introduction of a common EU 
threshold. In contrast to Germany, where the sector‑specific bargaining model has not prevented the 
expansion of a large low‑paid segment, this system seems to be producing good economic and social 
outcomes in the Nordic countries, and is widely supported by social partners and governments.
In the second column are those countries where minimum wage levels are currently set by social 
partners at a national level. The establishment of a common threshold of 60% of the median would 
simply change the level, not the structure and coverage, of minimum wages. Still, it could imply 
a significant change in the type of involvement of social partners on the setting of the threshold, 
which involves at least a medium level of institutional impact. In Estonia, Poland and Cyprus, 
between 15% and 20% of workers would be affected by the change, which is quite significant. In 
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Bulgaria and Greece, there would be a medium level of quantitative impact. And in Belgium and 
Slovakia, it would be low, because of the limited current incidence of low pay.
Finally, the third column includes all countries where minimum wages are statutory and national, 
and therefore where the impact would be mostly felt on the level of the minimum wage. In Lithuania, 
Latvia, Romania, the UK and Ireland there is a significant proportion of the labour force under the 
hypothetical threshold, and therefore the quantitative impact would be largest. The impact would be 
slightly less but still notable in Hungary, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Spain and Malta. Both types of impact would be low in Portugal and France: these would be the 
countries where the establishment of a common EU threshold of 60% of the median would be easier, 
because the arrangement would change the current situation very little.
Two final comments pertain to Table 6. First, it is interesting to note that the institutional and 
quantitative impact seem to go in opposite directions: most of the countries where the quantitative 
impact would be high (where many workers would be affected) are in the column of low institutional 
impact, and vice versa. This is because (perhaps paradoxically) countries with statutory national 
minimum wages generally have a larger low‑pay segment of employment and therefore would be 
more affected by a common higher threshold, whereas the opposite tends to be the case in countries 
with collectively agreed sectoral minimum wages. There are, of course, important exceptions to this. 
Germany has collectively agreed minimum wages and a very high share of low pay, whereas the 
opposite is true in France. 
A second factor to note is that European regions are associated with specific positions in Table 6: in 
particular, Nordic countries are associated with the low quantitative impact and high institutional 
impact category. The UK, Ireland and the Baltic states have a high quantitative impact and a low 
institutional impact, and most other eastern European and southern Member States have medium 
quantitative and/or institutional impact. The only group of countries that has no clear position in 
Table 6 are the continental European countries, which are scattered throughout all categories (in 
particular, Germany and France are polar opposites).
Of course, this association was to be expected, since these European regions are associated with 
similar institutional structures, and such structures affect both the minimum wage systems and 
incidence of low pay. However, the association is important for the debate about the possibility of 
establishing a common minimum wage policy in Europe because it highlights the fact that it would 
imply some degree of institutional convergence closer to a particular socioeconomic model (the one 
on the low right quadrant of the table).
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6
So far the empirical analysis has focused on estimating the proportion of the working population that 
would be directly affected by a HMW set at 60% of the median in each Member State. The focus 
will shift now to describing the composition of the population, using a range of company, job‑related 
and personal characteristics.
For reasons of simplicity, the results in this section will mostly come from the EU‑SILC dataset, 
while SES data will be used as a complementary source only when relevant. Table 7 presents a broad 
description of the characteristics of the affected population based on EU‑SILC data, while results 
using SES data are presented in the Annex.
For each variable, two types of measures are provided for the European aggregate:49 the proportion 
of employees that falls below the HMW threshold of 60% of the median in each category; and the 
proportion that the category represents over the total working population under the HMW threshold 
in Europe.
For instance, the proportion of employees affected in the primary sector is among the highest 
(32.6%), since almost one out of three agricultural employees receives a salary that is below 60% 
of the median wage in their respective countries. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the total working 
population potentially affected by the HMW, the primary sector only represents around 3%, since 
this sector represents a small proportion of overall employment in Europe.
Most of this section will focus on the incidence of the HMW threshold of 60% of the median in 
different groups of the working population, but it is useful to look at the broad characteristics of the 
segment of affected employees, shown in rows (b) of Table 7 and briefly explained in Box 5.
Box 5: A profile of the European workforce potentially affected by the HMW
Most of the workers below the HMW threshold work in small companies (nearly 40% 
work in companies with 10 employees or fewer and 70% work in companies with 
fewer than 50 employees), mostly in personal service sectors (nearly 20% in retail, 13% 
in health, nearly 10% in other services and 8% in hotels and restaurants – horeca). 
Almost half work in service and elementary occupations, and although the incidence of 
part-time and temporary employment is higher for this group, most have permanent 
and full-time contracts (77% and 64% respectively). Nearly two-thirds of the population 
potentially affected by a HMW are women. And they are predominantly young: 56% 
are below 40 years of age, and 35% are below 29 years.
49 EU‑SILC data includes all EU27 countries and companies of all sizes. For the SES data presented in the Annex, one European aggregate 
is presented for the sample, including 19 countries for which no data on the smallest companies (those with less than 10 employees) are 
available and another one for the sample – including 12 countries for which data on all company sizes are available.
Types of workers most affected
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Company-related variables
Economic activity
The sector dimension has a significant impact on the proportion of workers under the HMW threshold 
(see Figure 8). First, the HMW would affect around a third of all employees in the sectors of hotels 
and restaurants (horeca), agriculture, and arts and entertainment (NACE R–U). The proportion of 
employees affected in these three sectors is above the national average in all countries with some few 
exceptions (see Annex). In some cases, the proportion of employees potentially affected by the HMW 
would be close to or above 50% – in the horeca sector in Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Sweden and the UK; in the agricultural sector in Germany, Luxembourg and Greece; and in arts and 
entertainment in Cyprus. Nevertheless, due to the relatively small size of these sectors, the employees 
affected would represent less than 20% of the total number of employees affected by the HMW.
Figure 8: Employees affected by the HMW by sector (EU-SILC)
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Secondly, employees in the retail, real estate activity and health sectors would come next since 
around 20% of them would be affected. While the proportion of employees affected in retail and real 
estate activities would be above national averages in most countries, the picture is more mixed for 
the health sector. Due to the large employment share of these sectors, around 40% of the employees 
whose wages would be affected by the HMW threshold would come from these three sectors – 
especially from the retail sector.
Third, in the remaining sectors the proportion of employees affected by the HMW would vary – the 
highest proportion being in the construction, education and manufacturing sectors, and the lowest 
in finance and public administration. Looking at countries, the proportion of employees affected 
in these sectors would be lower than the national average in most cases, with the exception of the 
construction sector, where the proportion of employees affected would be higher than the average in 
many countries, such as Luxembourg, Denmark or Italy.
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Finally, a higher proportion of female than male employees would be affected, across all economic 
sectors. The largest gaps in the proportion of employees affected, considered in percentage points, 
occur in the arts and entertainment, horeca, retail and agriculture sectors. The proportion of women 
affected is double that of men in the financial, manufacturing, retail, arts and entertainment and 
public administration sectors.
The sectoral data in the SES is available at the two‑digit level and therefore allows for the construction 
of an alternative sectoral typology, which is also informative. Less knowledge‑intensive services 
(LKIS), low‑technology industries (LTI) and construction have the highest proportions of employees 
potentially affected, with more than 10% in each.50, 51 The LKIS sector really stands out: almost 
half of the employees whose wages would be increased by an HMW come from this sector. The 
proportion of employees affected in the LKIS sector is above the national average in all European 
countries except France and Sweden, two countries characterised by relatively high minimum wage 
levels (see Annex).52
Company size
The proportion of employees potentially affected by the HMW would be much higher among small 
companies. Figure 9 shows that this is the case for all countries. A blue line has been drawn along 
the diagonal: the closer to this diagonal, the less difference there is between the proportion of 
employees affected in small and large firms. As can immediately be seen, all countries sit well above 
the diagonal line, since the proportion of affected employees is considerably higher among those 
employees working in smaller firms.53
For the EU27 aggregate, the proportion of employees affected in companies with more than 50 
employees would be around 10%, a proportion that jumps to 25% for the smallest companies with 
10 employees or fewer. The difference in the proportions of employees affected by firm size would be 
especially significant in countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, Finland, France or Greece. Conversely, 
the gap (measured as the ratio of the respective proportion of employees affected) is smallest in 
countries such as Sweden, Estonia or Romania.
50 LKIS include retail, hotels, restaurants and catering, land transport, public administration, recycling and private households. For more 
details, see Felix, 2006.
51 The distinction between high and low technology industry is based on the intensity of research and development in the sector (ratio of 
R&D expenditure to value added) and the technology embodied in the purchases of intermediate and capital goods. For more details, 
see Hatzichronoglou, 1997.
52 The proportion of employees affected in the education, health or construction sectors reported in the SES is lower than when using 
EU‑SILC, since the former does not include small companies. In the case of the primary sector, the striking difference between both 
sources is mainly due to the fact that the primary sector in the SES only comprises mining and quarrying, characterised by higher levels 
of pay than agriculture.
53 Distinguishing by gender, the ratio in the proportion of employees affected between women and men would remain more or less constant 
across all firm sizes, with a higher proportion of women being affected in all cases.
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Figure 9:  Proportion of employees affected by the HMW, by company size, % (EU-SILC)
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Crossing company size and sector, it can be seen that the higher proportion of employees affected 
in small firms is the case in all economic sectors. In fact, the relationship between the size of the 
company and the proportion of workers below the threshold of 60% of the median wage is so strong 
that it is likely to partly explain the previously shown sectoral differences: it is in those sectors where 
more employees work in smaller companies (arts and entertainment, agriculture and horeca) that the 
effect of the HMW would be greater, and vice versa (see Figure 10).54
54 This significant correlation between the proportion of affected employees and the proportion represented by the smaller companies in 
each sector also exists in most Member States. The correlation is around 0.5–0.7 depending on the country, and only for some (Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and the UK) is it around 0.3.
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Figure 10: Proportion of employees affected by the HMW and working in small companies, 
by sector, % (EU-SILC)
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Collective bargaining
The high relevance of firm size for explaining the proportion of employees affected is further 
confirmed by looking at SES data.55 Additionally, the SES data makes it possible to evaluate the 
impact of collective bargaining. As shown by Figure 11, at the aggregate (country) level the proportion 
of workers potentially affected by the HMW is smaller in countries where a larger proportion of the 
workforce is covered by collective pay agreements, and vice versa. The same relationship can also 
be observed at the company level, since companies not covered by collective pay agreements would 
be much more affected by the HMW.56
As was seen in the literature review, minimum wage policy can often be understood as a functional 
equivalent for collective bargaining for companies and sectors with limited coverage: indeed, the 
HMW being evaluated here would affect these types of companies more.
55 As already explained, the authors have worked with two different SES samples, one covering companies with 10 or more employees for 
a wide sub‑set of countries (19 in total) and one that also includes the smallest companies (but only for 12 countries). In both cases, the 
relationship between firm size and the effect of the HMW is very strong (see Annex).
56 Collective bargaining coverage is positively correlated with the size of companies. The proportion of employees not covered by collective 
pay agreements (at any level) is: 22% in companies with 10–49 employees; 19% in companies with 50–249 employees; 14% in companies 
with 250–499 employees; 11.5% in companies with 500–999 employees; and only 7.3% in companies with more than 1,000 employees.
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Figure 11: Collective pay agreement coverage and incidence of low pay, by country (SES)
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Note: Sweden, the Netherlands and Ireland have been excluded due to problems in the coding of the variable on collective 
pay agreement coverage in the SES.
Therefore, company size, sector and collective bargaining coverage are three interrelated factors 
that have a consistent and combined impact on the share of workers below the HMW threshold. 
Generally, the sectors with smaller companies and lower collective agreement coverage are the ones 
where the impact of the HMW would be greatest.57
Job-related characteristics
Occupation
As expected, employees in lower‑skilled occupations would be most impacted by the HMW. As 
can be seen in Figure 12, the proportion of employees affected would be largest in elementary, 
skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery and service and sales occupations, while the more skilled 
occupations would be much less affected than the average. Taken together, almost half the employees 
affected in Europe would be service and sales workers or those in elementary occupations.58
57 With the data being used (cross‑sectional EU‑wide datasets) it is not possible to adequately disentangle the individual impact of each 
of these factors, in order to establish which one is most important. At most, what can be said is that they seem to have a combined and 
consistent impact. Later in this part of the report this issue will be examined within a multivariate statistical model, where each factor is 
controlled by the others (as a ceteris paribus table): this will permit the evaluation of which correlations seem most important; even then, 
however, the cross‑sectional nature of the analysis means that causal primacy cannot be established, but only (controlled) statistical 
correlation.
58 According to SES data, it is also clear that relatively more employees in lower‑skilled occupations would see their wages increase as 
a consequence of a HMW (see Annex). Those in elementary occupations, as well as skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, 
service and sales workers would be those relatively more affected, which is consistent with the results presented here.
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In terms of gender, a higher proportion of women would be affected across all occupation categories, 
but the greatest difference (in percentage points) arises in the lower‑skilled occupations: elementary 
occupations, skilled agricultural workers, service and sales occupations and plant and machine 
operators.
Figure 12: Employees affected by the HMW, by occupation, % (EU-SILC)
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Part-time employment
More than a third of all part‑time employees would be affected by the HMW – almost three times the 
proportion of full‑time employees that would be affected in Europe (see Figure 13). The gap (measured 
as a ratio) between the proportion of affected part‑time and full‑time employees would be largest 
in Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal. On the other hand, it would be narrower in Luxembourg 
and Sweden, according to EU‑SILC data (see Annex). When looking at part‑time employment, it is 
necessary to differentiate between men and women, since the latter are generally much more likely 
to fall into this category, but this will be done when dealing with the distribution by gender.
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Figure 13: Proportion of employees affected by the HMW, by type of employment (EU-SILC)
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It is important to remember that part‑time employment represents less than 20% of total employment 
in Europe and it is far less prevalent in many countries. So, in most countries part‑time workers would 
represent only a minority of the workers affected by the HMW. Only in countries with a significant 
proportion of part‑time employment (mostly the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the UK), would 
more than half of employees affected in the whole country be part‑time workers.
Temporary employees
Temporary employees would also be much more affected than their permanent counterparts by 
the HMW: almost one in three temporary employees would be affected, compared with 13.6% of 
permanent employees in Europe. The differential impact by type of contract holds in all countries, 
as shown in Figure 14. The ratio of temporary to permanent employees affected would be especially 
large in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Sweden, and narrower in Estonia, Lithuania and 
Ireland.59
59 For most countries, data from the SES reflects an even wider difference between the proportion of temporary and permanent employees 
affected by the HMW (measured as the ratio between the two) than the EU‑SILC source. But the overall impact would be the same in 
both sources: around a third of the total workforce affected by the HMW would be on a temporary contract (see Annex).
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Figure 14: Proportion of employees affected by the HMW, by type of contract (EU-SILC)
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Personal characteristics
Gender
The HMW set at 60% of the national median would clearly have a stronger impact on female 
workers. In the EU27, the proportion of women below the threshold is double that of men. The wages 
of 21.5% of all female workers across the EU are currently below the HMW threshold, compared to 
less than 11% of that of male workers.
Figure 15: Proportion of employees affected by the HMW, by gender (EU-SILC)
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This difference between women and men in the incidence of low‑pay is present in all European 
countries, as indicated by the fact that they are all above the diagonal line depicted in Figure 15, 
where all countries would be if the HMW equally affected both genders. Nevertheless, important 
disparities exist across countries. The gap (measured as a ratio of the proportion of female workers 
affected to the proportion of male workers affected) is very large in countries such as Cyprus and 
the Czech Republic but is almost negligible in Denmark and Hungary. If the gap is measured as the 
difference in percentages between the proportion of affected women and men, the gap would be 
largest in Cyprus, Germany and the UK. There is no relationship between the magnitude of the gap 
and the proportion of female employment in the various countries.60
When trying to tentatively explain why women may earn lower wages, the greater incidence of 
part‑time work among women appears to be a potential explanation. Figures 16 and 17 investigate 
this possibility; some interesting facts emerge. Both male and female part‑time employees would be 
more affected by the HMW than their full‑time counterparts. Nevertheless, the gap between men 
and women in the incidence of low pay exists only for full‑time employees, since male and female 
employees working part‑time would be similarly affected by the HMW. This is shown by the fact 
that the data points of most countries are relatively close to the diagonal in Figure 17 (representing 
part‑time employment), whereas the proportion of full‑time employees below the HMW threshold is 
much larger for women than for men (in all countries except Denmark, as shown in Figure 16).
Figure 16: Proportion of full-time employees affected by the HMW, by gender (EU-SILC)
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60 The SES data produces a considerably smaller gap by gender regarding the incidence of low pay, because of the sample limitations (it 
does not cover small companies and some sectors that have a different gender profile, such as public administration). For the EU27, the 
proportion of women affected would only be 3 percentage points greater than that of males according to the SES data (11.2% of women 
as compared to 8.15% of men). In some countries (Hungary and Latvia) the proportions would be essentially the same; in some the 
proportion for men would even be greater, as in France and Romania; for more, see the Annex. The EU‑SILC provides a less biased picture 
of the distribution of pay by gender than the SES.
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Figure 17: Proportion of part-time employees affected by the HMW, by gender (EU-SILC)
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Figures 16 and 17 show that the higher proportion of female employees potentially affected by the 
HMW threshold (that is, having a low‑paid job) may be partially explained by the fact that women 
are much more likely to work part time. But, importantly, there are other reasons, since having 
a full‑time job reduces the likelihood of being below the HMW threshold much more for men than 
for women.
Level of education
Less educated employees would be disproportionately affected by the HMW in nearly all countries. 
In the EU27, more than a quarter of all employees with a level of education no higher than lower 
secondary level are currently below the HMW threshold, compared to 13% of those with at least an 
upper secondary education.
In some countries, this difference in terms of education level is even higher. It is around three 
times higher in Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Bulgaria, Hungary, Luxembourg and Romania. 
However, Sweden, which is characterised by high (collectively agreed) minimum wage levels, is the 
only country where this gap between employees of different educational levels does not exist, as 
Figure 18 demonstrates.
If educational levels and gender are crossed, the ratio between the proportion of women and men 
who would be affected by the HMW remains similar for all educational levels. Among less educated 
employees, 37% of women and 18% of men would be affected by the hypothetical threshold; among 
higher‑educated employees, these proportions would be 18% and 9% respectively. This means that 
for both educational groups, the proportion of women affected would be about twice that of men.
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Moreover, the proportion of female employment is almost 50% in the higher‑educated population; in 
the less educated segment of the workforce, it is 43%. In other words, the gender gap in the incidence 
of low pay cannot be explained by differences in educational levels.
Figure 18: Proportion of employees affected by the HMW, by education level (EU-SILC)
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Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that employees whose highest educational level is lower secondary 
represent less than a third of the total workforce falling below the hypothetical HMW threshold, 
since they represent less than 20% of the working population (according to EU‑SILC data). But in 
those countries where less educated employees represent a proportion of employment, this group 
does represent most of the total affected segment. This is the case in the Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Malta, Spain and Italy) and in Luxembourg.
Age
As underlined in the literature review, most of the empirical studies on the employment effects of 
minimum wages have focused on teenagers, since this is the group generally considered to be most 
affected by minimum wages (see Chapter 1 of this part of the report). Figure 19 shows that the 
proportion of employees affected by the HMW would follow a U‑shape in terms of age: there is a high 
starting point for younger workers; the line falls for older workers, then it starts rising again for those 
aged 50 and above. The differentials by age are indeed quite large: 80% of those in the teenage group 
(aged 14–19 years) would be affected, 35% of those in 20–24 years age group, and 16% of those in the 
25–29 years age group. Then the proportion of employees affected in the next age categories would 
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remain at around 12%, before starting to pick up again in the 55–59 years age group. Moreover, the 
graph shows that the gender gap in the proportion of employees affected increases with age. 61
Nevertheless, the relative significance of the youngest segments of the population (and older workers as 
well) in the low‑pay sector varies markedly across Europe. The HMW would have a disproportionate 
impact on teenagers: 80% of them would be affected. However, teenagers represent a very small 
proportion of the European working population (less than 2%) and would therefore account for less 
than 8% of the total workforce affected by the HMW threshold. Conversely, young employees (aged 
20–29 years) would be less affected by the HMW threshold; however, they represent almost 20% of 
European employment, and would thus account for more than 25% of the total workforce affected by 
the HMW. This overall picture changes to some extent when looking at individual country profiles, 
as analysed in Box 6.
Figure 19: Employees affected by the HMW, by age and gender (EU-SILC)
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61 Information using the SES data is presented in the Annex and is consistent with that presented here. The main difference for the EU27 
aggregate is that the rise in the proportion of older employees affected only starts after the age of 65 years, while in EU‑SILC it occurs 
from age 50.
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Box 6: The divergent impact of the HMW threshold across age groups and selected 
countries
In countries such as Sweden, Austria or Malta, young employees (those aged 14–29 
years) represent a much larger proportion of those below the HMW threshold – around 
half or more of the total. On the other hand, in many central and eastern European 
countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia) and in the UK, employees above 50 
years of age represent a substantial proportion of the affected population (around 
30%). Figure 19 depicts the contrasting picture of Sweden and Estonia. In both cases, 
the incidence of low pay among the youngest groups is above the average: in Sweden, 
almost all of the impact would be felt by those aged under 35, whereas in Estonia those 
aged over 45 would be strongly affected as well.
Figure 20: Employees affected by the HMW, Sweden and Estonia, by age
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A multivariate approach
Here, a statistical analysis based on multivariate regression models to determine which variables 
influence the likelihood of an employee being affected by the HMW threshold will be presented. 
The logistic regression model will differentiate between three broad types of variables as explanatory 
factors: socio‑demographic variables (gender, age and educational level); company‑related variables 
(a firm’s size and economic sector); and job‑related variables (type of employment, work experience, 
supervisory role in the company, type of contract and occupation).
While the previous discussion looked at the extent to which certain groups would be impacted 
by the HMW, the present approach will try to quantify the specific effect of each variable on the 
probabilities of an employee being affected by the HMW, keeping constant the effect of all other 
variables in the model.
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A table with the detailed estimation results is presented in the Annex. The dependent variable is binary, 
holding a value of 0 if the individual falls above the HMW threshold of 60% of the median, and 1 if 
they fall below the threshold. For evaluating the impact of the different independent variables on the 
likelihood of falling below the HMW threshold, successive logistic regression models following a nested 
structure have been run, in four steps: firstly, including only socio‑demographic variables; secondly, 
adding company‑related variables; thirdly, adding job‑related variables; and finally, adding country 
dummies to control for national specificities and evaluate their impact.
The explanatory power of the successive models increases with each step, as measured by 
Nagelkerke s´ Pseudo R2, which goes from .08 to .23. Although the pseudo R2 of the models are 
relatively low (suggesting that there may be explanatory variables omitted in the models, and/or 
that the data used is subject to a significant amount of statistical noise), most of the variables are 
statistically significant, which allows discussion – with some care – of the results of the models.
To simplify the presentation of the results, only the odds ratios of the logit estimation including all 
variables is presented in Figure 21. Each bar in the chart represents the change in the odds of being 
below the HMW threshold associated with each categorical comparison. For instance, the odds of 
being below the threshold is 1.8 times (or 80%) higher for female employees than for male employees. 
In other words, being a woman considerably increases the probability of being below the threshold. 
If the odds ratios are below 1, it means the odds would be lower: for instance, the odds of being 
below the threshold are 0.35 times (or 35%) lower for employees working in bigger companies than 
for employees working in medium‑sized companies.
Regarding sociodemographic characteristics, female employees, those who are less educated and 
those who are younger have much higher odds of being affected by HMW, even if all other factors 
remain the same. In other words, even for the same type of employment status, occupation and 
sector, the odds of being below the HMW threshold are 1.8 times higher for women than men. The 
effect of age is particularly strong: the odds of being below the HMW threshold are 2.4 times higher 
for younger employees aged 15–29 years (and 1.12 higher for older employees over 55) than for the 
core of the workforce aged 30–54 years.
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Figure 21: Odds ratios of the logit regressions (EU-SILC)
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Sociodemographic
variables
Company variables Job variables 
Note: Bars fully coloured in dark blue indicate variables that are significant at the 1% level; bars with white stripes indicate 
variables significant at the 5% level; grey bars indicate variables not significant at the 5% level. For variables with only 
two categories, the one not shown in the graph is the reference. For variables with more than two categories, the reference 
categories are: firms employing 11–49 employees (company size); financial sector (economic activity); and technicians and 
associated professionals (occupation).
If the results of the model are looked at by steps, the explanatory power of sociodemographic 
variables is reduced mainly when job‑related variables are introduced.62 This is especially the 
case for gender and level of education, since a significant part of the difference is associated with 
a different composition of those groups. For educational level, the association between occupational 
level and education is actually endogenous, since the skills level is explicitly taken into account for 
classifying occupations. For gender, when occupation and employment status are taken into account, 
the reduction in its impact is largely the result of the well‑known phenomenon of occupational gender 
segregation (Grimshaw and Figuereido, 2012).
Overall, the impact of company‑related variables seems to be smaller than that of sociodemographic 
variables, since the Nagelkerke s´ Pseudo R2 of the model only increases marginally when the former 
are included (from 0.08 to 0.11), and the coefficients of company‑related variables are in general 
closer to 1 when looking at the general model, including all variables.
Nevertheless, working in smaller companies remains an important factor, since the odds of employees 
in smaller companies being below the HMW threshold are 1.5 times higher than for employees 
working in medium‑sized companies. When considering sectors, and as compared to financial 
workers (a sector characterised by a relatively low concentration of low pay), the odds of being below 
the HMW threshold would be highest for employees in the agriculture and arts and entertainment 
sectors (and, to a lesser extent, in the horeca, real estate activity, commerce, education, health and 
62 When company‑related variables are introduced, the only sociodemographic variable that significantly loses explanatory power is 
education, which is related to the high concentration of less educated workers in certain economic sectors such as agriculture or horeca.
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communication sectors). On the other hand, these odds would be lower only for employees working 
in public administration, while in the manufacturing, construction and transportation sectors the 
odds would not be significantly different than for financial employees.63
Lastly, job‑related characteristics seem most relevant when seeking to characterise which type of 
employees would be affected by the HMW. The model’s explanatory power increases significantly 
when these characteristics are introduced; many of them are associated with large odds ratios in the 
general model. Temporary and part‑time employees, and those with little work experience, would be 
more likely to be affected, while employees with a supervisory role would be less likely. The occupation 
of the employee has a strong impact: compared with employees working as technicians, those in 
service and sales, skilled agricultural workers and, especially, those in elementary occupations would 
be much more likely to be affected by the HMW. Employees in the remaining occupations would 
also have higher odds of being affected than technicians – excluding professionals and managers, 
who would have lower odds.
Since the logistic regression models provide information on the effect of each variable while controlling 
for all the rest, the coefficients associated with each country also provide an interesting picture 
(included in the detailed results presented in the Annex). They indicate the odds of employees in 
the different countries being affected by the HMW, keeping constant the broad differences in social 
and economic structure (due to sectoral and occupational composition, age structure or incidence 
of part‑time and temporary employment, among others). From this perspective, as compared with 
France (the country of reference), the countries where employees would have the highest odds of 
being under the HMW threshold would be Lithuania, Germany, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, the 
UK and Romania (all with odds more than twice as high as employees in France). At the other 
extreme, employees in Portugal, Malta, Finland, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Belgium would have 
lower odds of being affected by the HMW.
63 When job‑related variables are added, the explanatory power of the firm’s size variable remains almost the same, while some sectoral 
variables experience a reduction in explanatory power. This indicates that, in some sectors, the incidence of low‑pay is partially explained 
by factors such as occupational composition of the workforce or incidence of part‑time and temporary employment.
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Box 7: Determinants of being below the HMW threshold across different minimum 
wage-setting systems
In the first half of this part of the report, European countries were classified according 
to the minimum wage setting systems into two broad groups: countries with statutory 
national minimum wages and countries with collectively agreed sector-specific minimum 
wages. Since these systems produce rather different outcomes, it is useful to run the 
logistic regression separately within each of these country groups, to evaluate whether 
the determinants of being below the HMW threshold vary between them.
The results of the regressions run separately for these two groups of countries are shown 
in the Annex; some important divergences arise. Young employees and employees with 
work experience of a short duration (and, to a lesser extent, less educated employees) 
are much more likely to be under the HMW threshold in countries with collectively 
agreed sector-specific minimum wages. This seems to indicate that these segments 
of the workforce are more likely not to be covered by minimum wage protection in 
countries without statutory minimum wages. The sector variable loses much of its 
statistical significance for countries with statutory minimum wages, although it is very 
relevant for countries without them. In other words, sectoral differentials in the extent 
of low pay are more significant in countries with collectively agreed minimum wages 
than in countries with a statutory system.
Results are very similar when the regressions are run using SES data. Detailed estimation results are 
presented in the Annex. SES permits a more detailed breakdown by company size and the results 
clearly confirm that the odds of employees being affected increase when companies are smaller. The 
effect of sector becomes statistically insignificant when including the job‑related variables. Instead 
of work experience, the SES includes the seniority of the employee in the company; the results show 
that employees working less than two years in the company are more likely to be affected by the 
HMW.
SES includes two interesting variables that are not available in EU‑SILC. Employees working in 
companies covered by a collective pay agreement and companies controlled by the public sector are 
significantly less likely to be found among those potentially affected by the HMW. Within all the rest 
of variables, results are consistent between the SES and EU‑SILC databases.
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What impact would the HMW have on poverty?
As said in the first section of this report, the main justification for minimum wages is not the reduction 
of poverty, but the establishment of minimum labour standards below which no employment 
relationship is considered socially acceptable. But that said, there seems to be at least a potential 
link between minimum wages and poverty, at least in‑work poverty, since an increase in the lower 
earnings threshold should have an impact on the distribution of earnings at the bottom, and hence 
benefit those with insufficient earnings to make ends meet. Would a coordination of minimum wage 
policy under the hypothetical parameters being evaluated in this report (in other words, a common 
threshold of 60% of median wages) have an impact on poverty in Europe?
To evaluate this issue, it is necessary to change slightly the focus that has been placed so far. All 
the analysis up to this point has focused on individual workers. However, the issue of poverty is 
linked not only to the individual distribution of earnings, but also to the household distribution 
of income. Moreover, it concerns both workers and the population in general. In this section, the 
analysis will first keep to an individual work‑centred approach to evaluate to what extent the HMW 
policy may help the European working poor. Second, it will look at the household distribution of 
income and poverty for the whole population, and evaluate to what extent this may be affected by 
the hypothetical policy.
As a first approximation, Figure 22 shows the proportion of workers currently below the HMW 
threshold (60% of the median wage in each country) that is also below the poverty line at the 
household level: in other words, whether the workers who would in principle benefit from the HMW 
threshold live in poor households.64 On the one hand, this chart clearly shows that most HMW 
workers do not live in relative poverty. On average, only one in five workers across the EU are below 
the poverty line and, consequently, 80% of the workers who would benefit from the HMW threshold 
are currently above the poverty line. As could be expected, this magnitude varies considerably across 
EU countries, from around 30% in Italy, Luxembourg and Bulgaria to less than 10% in Ireland. 
Everywhere, the vast majority of workers below the HMW threshold live in households above the 
poverty line.
On the other hand, if workers below and above the HMW threshold (also shown in Figure 22, with 
grey bars) are compared, it can immediately be seen that the incidence of poverty for workers below 
the HMW threshold is notably higher than for workers above the threshold. For the EU as a whole, 
fewer than 4% of workers above the HMW threshold live in relative poverty, compared with 20% of 
those below. In other words, the incidence of poverty multiplies by five times for workers below the 
threshold. A similar pattern can be seen in all EU countries, without exception. So although most of 
the workers below the HMW threshold do not live in poor households, there is a clear association 
between poverty and having a wage below the hypothetical threshold.
64 The poverty line is here defined in relative terms, using the approach of the EU‑SILC: a household in relative poverty (or at risk of poverty) 
is one whose equivalised disposable income is less than 60% of the equivalised disposable income of the median household. Equivalised 
disposable income is calculated as the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or 
saving, divided by the number of household members converted into equivalised adults; household members are equivalised or made 
equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the so‑called modified OECD equivalence scale (the first adult receives a value 
of 1, other adults 0.5 and children 0.3).
Potential impact on poverty and 
competitiveness
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Figure 22:  Workers in households below relative poverty line as proportion of workers above 
and below HMW threshold, EU27, EU-SILC (%)
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Figure 23:  Workers in households below relative poverty line as proportion of all workers, 
and their share above and below the HMW threshold, EU-SILC (%)
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The reason for such a pattern lies in the fact that within the EU, in‑work poverty is a relatively 
limited phenomenon. Figure 23 shows the overall incidence of in‑work poverty at the individual 
level: in other words, how many workers in each country live in relative poverty. On average, for the 
EU as a whole, the figure is barely 6%, according to the 2010 EU‑SILC data being used; this ranges 
from around 10% in Lithuania and Luxembourg to less than 3% in Ireland, the Czech Republic 
and Finland. Figure 23 also shows the proportion of the working poor who are below the HMW 
threshold of 60% of the median national wage (the dark blue section of the bars). As can be seen, 
the proportion is a very sizeable one. For the EU as a whole, more than 50% of all working poor fall 
below the HMW threshold. At the country level, the percentage varies between 71% for Luxembourg 
and 25% in Portugal, but only in three countries is it below 40% (Portugal, Greece and the Czech 
Republic). If the establishment of a HMW of 60% of the median would raise the earnings of these 
people, it can be said that it would raise the earnings of a majority of the working poor in most 
countries.
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But as said earlier, poverty is a phenomenon best studied from the perspective of households, rather 
than individual workers. Figure 24 shows the overall incidence of relative poverty in Europe at 
the household level according to the EU‑SILC 2010 data used in this report. The percentage of 
households across Europe whose equivalised disposable income is below 60% of the median in each 
country is 17.5%, with the usual variation across countries (from 24% in Bulgaria to fewer than 10% 
in the Czech Republic). But the important point for the purposes of this report is that more than half 
of those households have no worker at all, as can be seen by the breakdown of the bars into grey 
segments (no worker in the household) and dark blue segments (at least one worker). Furthermore, 
the proportion of poor households with workers who are below the HMW threshold is even smaller, 
as can be seen by the small triangle.
Figure 24:  Percentage of households under the poverty line, and proportions according to 
the employment status of their members, EU-SILC (%)
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Figure 25 makes this point even more clearly by focusing on the proportion of poor households that 
have workers in them. As seen in Figure 25, the proportion is relatively low. For the EU as a whole, 
it is 39%, being only significantly above 50% in Luxembourg and Romania. So in Europe, relative 
poverty is mostly concentrated in non‑working households – households with no wage earner. But 
if the percentage is further broken down into households with at least one worker below the HMW 
threshold, and households where all earners are above the threshold, it can be seen that most of 
them are in the latter category. In other words, when the households below the poverty line have 
workers in them, they are more likely to be above the HMW line (for the EU as a whole, the share 
of poor working households with no worker below the HMW line is 66%). This is because the 
household composition of both groups differs; workers below the household poverty line but above 
the individual HMW line tend to live in households that are larger and have fewer wage‑earners.
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Figure 25:  Proportion of households in relative poverty, according to the employment status 
of household members, EU-SILC (%)
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Finally, Figure 25 can also be used to evaluate the potential impact of the HMW on overall poverty 
from a household perspective. The dark blue segment of the bars shows the percentage of EU 
households in each country that have at least one worker below the HMW line, and therefore the 
share of poor households that could benefit from the discussed policy. For the EU as a whole, the 
percentage is 13%, and only in two countries (Luxembourg and Lithuania) is it above 20%. So it 
seems fair to say that the overall impact of such a policy on relative poverty at the household level 
would be limited (of course, not taking into account potential spillover or disemployment effects, 
which are unpredictable but which could completely change the picture). This is because household 
poverty in Europe is more related to not working at all than to having low wages; in addition, it is 
because even for poor working households, the composition of the household often has a larger 
impact than being (or not being) below the HMW threshold.
In conclusion, it can be said that although the HMW could have a positive impact on individual‑level 
in‑work poverty in Europe, the significance of the impact is diminished by the fact that in‑work 
poverty is not a widespread phenomenon in Europe. Looking at poverty at the household level 
and expanding the focus to the general population, it could be seen that in fact, most poverty in 
Europe is related either to not working at all (most poor households having no wage‑earner) or to the 
composition of the household rather than to the wage earned by its members. What this means is 
that the impact that the HMW would have on household‑level relative poverty would be quite minor. 
Only 13% of poor households in Europe have one or more members currently earning below the 
HMW threshold, and could therefore potentially benefit from the policy.
What impact would the HMW have on trade and competitiveness?
An argument that is sometimes raised against minimum wage policy is that it can have a negative 
impact on international competitiveness and trade, because it involves an increase in unit labour 
costs (in other words, to the extent that the increase in pay is not compensated for by an increase in 
productivity of a similar magnitude). This is a very difficult issue to study empirically, because there 
is no data on international competitiveness and trade at the company level that could be used to 
evaluate the impact of the hypothesised change in the wage distribution.
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What can be done, though, is a rough approximation by linking data from the SES 2010 with external 
data on international trade, by country and 2‑digit NACE sectors. In other words, it is possible to 
see whether the sectors (within each country) that are more export‑oriented have a larger or smaller 
proportion of workers below the HMW threshold, by way of a rough evaluation of the potential 
impact of this type of policy on trade.
Table 8: Share of employment by exports to value added and broad sectors, SES (%)
Employment by share of exports in value added
Employment 
by sectorNon-tradable Less than 10% 10%–50% 50%–100% More than 100%
Primary 0.0 17.0 79.2 1.9 1.9 0.6
Construction 0.0 86.5 13.5 0.0 0.0 6.1
LTI 0.7 4.4 26.3 17.4 51.3 15.3
HTI 0.0 0.0 9.3 37.6 53.1 7.2
LKIS 60.5 33.1 5.0 1.0 0.4 31.5
KIS 16.8 43.6 24.9 3.4 11.3 16.4
Education 54.8 45.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7
Health 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5
Total 40.7 27.9 11.6 6.2 13.6 100.0
The external data on trade used here comes from the World Input–Output Database, and refer to 
the proportion of exports to total value added in each specific sector and country.65, 66 Table 8 shows 
for – the EU as a whole – the distribution of employment according to the share of exports to value 
added, breaking it down by broad economic sectors.
As can be seen, two‑thirds of employment is in sectors that are either non‑tradable or where exports 
account for less than 10% of overall value added. These sectors are mostly in less knowledge‑intensive 
services (LKIS), education and health. The next category, with a proportion of trade in value added 
of between 10% and 50%, accounts for 12% of employment – mostly in knowledge‑intensive services 
(KIS) and low‑technology industries (LTI). The two categories where exports account for a larger 
share of value added (more than 50%) account for roughly 20% of employment, and are mostly linked 
to high‑technology industries (HTI) and LTI, and marginally to KIS.67
65 The authors are very grateful to Robert Stehrer, from the Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies, for providing this data.
66 To avoid being biased by short‑term fluctuations, the average of the period 2000–2010 was used.
67 The value of more than 100% occurs when a sector imports intermediate goods, adds some value to them, and exports them again. 
The value of those exports include the value of the intermediate goods, hence the seemingly strange result.
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Table 9:  Proportion of workers below the HMW threshold, by exports’ share to value added 
and broad sectors, SES (%)
Proportion of workers below the HMW threshold by share of exports in value added
Non-tradable Less than 10% 10%–50% 50%–100% More than 100%
Primary 0.0 3.9 1.8 5.3 0.2 2.2
Construction 0.0 8.3 25.1 0.0 0.0 10.6
LTI 23.5 33.9 14.5 12.5 6.9 11.2
HTI 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.1 5.3 4.2
LKIS 14.6 12.0 9.3 9.7 5.6 13.4
KIS 6.6 13.0 3.9 2.2 2.5 8.1
Education 7.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3
Health 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8
Total 10.5 10.3 9.7 7.4 5.9 9.5
Table 9 shows the proportion of workers below the HMW threshold for the same categories of trade 
share in value added and broad sectors. There is a clear relationship between the export intensity 
of the sector and the proportion of such HMW workers. Overall, the impact of the policy would 
be twice as great in the non‑traded as in the highly traded sectors; within each sector, the most 
traded sub‑sectors have a consistently smaller proportion of workers below the HMW threshold. 
For instance, overall, 11% of workers in LTI are below the HMW threshold (which is slightly above 
the average), but the proportion is much larger in those subsectors with a lower trade intensity. The 
LTI subsectors where trade intensity in value added is below 50% (which account for roughly one 
third of all LTI employment) have on average 20% of employment below the HMW threshold. This 
compares with 13% for those LTI subsectors in which trade accounts for between 50% and 100% of 
value added and only 7% for the LTI subsectors in which exports are above 100% of value added. 
In the most export‑oriented subsectors of HTI and KIS, by contrast, only between 2% and 5% of 
workers are below the HMW threshold.
Figure 26 shows the proportion of workers in the most export‑oriented sectors (where trade accounts 
for more than 50% of value added) who would be affected by the HMW policy. As can be seen, only 
in Latvia would more than 20% of workers be affected. The equivalent figure is 15% in Lithuania, 
13% in Poland, and 12% in Ireland and Hungary. In all other countries, fewer than one employee in 
10 in these sectors would be affected (less than 1 in 20 in Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, Luxembourg, 
Sweden and Finland).
 
Potential impact on poverty and competitiveness
147
Figure 26: Proportion of workers below the HMW threshold in export-oriented sectors (%)
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Note: Export‑oriented sectors are here defined as those where the share of exports to value added is above 50%.
So with very few exceptions, it seems very unlikely that an HMW policy setting a threshold of 60% 
of the national median wage would have any impact of significance on exports and international 
competitiveness.
Of course, this is only a rough approximation and not based on a precise measure of trade intensity. 
Nor does it take into account, for instance, possible spillover effects or other indirect effects, which 
could change the picture significantly. Still, there are reasons to believe that the results presented in 
this short section may have even overestimated the potential impact of the HMW on exports and 
trade. The SES had to be used for this exercise because EU‑SILC does not include the necessary detail 
in the sector variable. However, as has been repeatedly stated, SES has the significant limitation of 
not including companies with fewer than 10 employees, a bias that is particularly significant in this 
case because the vast majority of these companies are probably not export oriented and (as shown 
in previous sections) have a much larger proportion of workers below the HMW threshold.
Secondly, the fact that the HMW would involve a simultaneous increase in the minimum wage 
towards the threshold in most European countries could reduce significantly the potential impact 
on competitiveness at the country level, since most international trade of Member States is intra‑EU 
trade. If the wage structure of the most important competitors increases similarly, their relative 
competitiveness would remain unchanged.

149
Abbott, L. F. (2012), Statutory minimum wage controls: A critical review of their effects on labour markets, 
employment and incomes, Industrial Systems Research, Manchester.
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and Stein, J. (2008), ‘Academic freedom, private‑sector focus, and the 
process of innovation’, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 617–635.
Allegretto, S. A.,Dube, A. and Reich, M. (2011), ‘Do minimum wages really reduce teen employment ? 
Accounting for heterogeneity and selectivity in state panel data’, Industrial Relations, Vol. 50, No.2, 
pp. 205–240.
Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2011), ‘Top incomes in the long run of history’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 3–71.
Autor, D. H., Manning, A. and Smith, C. L. (2010), The contribution of the minimum wage to US wage 
inequality over three decades: A reassessment, NBER Working Paper No. 16533, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachussets.
Bloomberg (2013), ‘Juncker says euro‑area countries need common minimum wage’, 10 January.
Borrás, S. and Radaelli, C.M. (2010), Recalibrating the open method of coordination, Swedish Institute 
of European Policy Studies, Stockholm.
Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C. (2011), ‘Industry‑wide minimum wages in Germany: uncertain progress 
along a bumpy road’, conference presentation, Regulating for a fair recovery, Second Regulating for 
Decent Work conference, 6–8 July, Geneva, Switzerland.
Brandolini, A., Rosolia, A. and Torrini, R. (2010), ‘The distribution of employees’ labour earnings in 
the European union: Data, concepts and first results’, in Atkinson, A.B. and Marlier, E. (eds), Income 
and Living conditions in Europe, Eurostat Statistical Books, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg.
Brosnan, P. and Wilkinson, F. (1988), ‘A national statutory minimum wage and economic efficiency’, 
Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1–48.
Brown, C. (1999), ‘Minimum wages, employment, and the distribution of income’, Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 3, Part B, pp. 2101–2163.
Brown, C., Gilroy, C. and Kohen, A. (1982), ‘The effect of the minimum wage on employment and 
unemployment’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 487–528.
Busch, K., Hermann, C., Hinrichs, K. and Schulten, T. (2013), Euro crisis, austerity policy and the 
European Social Model. How crisis policies in southern Europe threaten the EU’s social dimension, 
Friedrich‑Ebert‑Stiftung, Berlin.
BusinessEurope (2012), Towards a job‑rich recovery, Position paper, 11 July, Brussels.
Cahuc, P. and Michel, P. (1996), ‘Minimum wage unemployment and growth’, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 40, No. 7, pp. 1463–1482.
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1994), ‘Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast‑food 
industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania., The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 772–
793.
References
 
Pay in Europe in the 21st century
150
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1995), Myth and measurement: The new economics of the minimum wage, 
Princeton University Press.
Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (2000), ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study of the fast‑food 
industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, pp. 
1397–1420.
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S.J.,Manning, A., Margolis, D., Teulings, C., Saint‑Paul, G., and 
Keen, M. (1996), ‘The economic impact of minimum wages in Europe’, Economic Policy, Vol. 11, No. 
23, pp. 319–372.
Dostal, J. M. (2012), ‘The German political economy between deregulation and re‑regulation: Party 
discourses on minimum wage policies’, The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 
91–120.
Eldring, L. and Alsos, K. (2012), European minimum wage: A Nordic outlook, Fafo, Oslo.
ETUC (2012), Solidarity in the crisis and beyond: A social contract for Europe, ETUC resolution adopted 
by the Executive Committee at its meeting on 5–6 June 2012, European Trade Union Confederation, 
Brussels.
Euractiv (2012), ‘Brussels to push for EU‑wide minimum wage’, 17 April.
Eurofound (2011) EIRO, ‘Cyprus: Ministry announces further minimum wages increases’, 27 July.
Eurofound (2013) EIRO, ‘Germany: Mixed reaction to minimum wage proposals’, 7 May.
European Commission (2011), ‘The Euro Plus Pact: Stronger economic policy coordination for 
competitiveness and convergence’, in European Council – 24/25 March 2011: Conclusions, EUCO 
10/1/11, Brussels.
European Commision (2012), Annual Report: Employment and Social Developments in Europe, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
European Parliament (2007), European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2007 on social reality 
stocktaking (2007/2104 (INI)), Brussels.
European Parliament (2008), European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on promoting social 
inclusion and combating poverty, including child poverty, in the EU, (2008/2034(INI)), Brussels.
European Parliament (2010), European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on the role of minimum 
income in combating poverty and promoting an inclusive society in Europe, (2010/2039(INI)), Brussels.
Felix, B. (2006), High‑tech industries and knowledge‑based services: The importance of R&D and human 
resources in science and technology, Eurostat Statistics in Focus 13/2006, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
Freeman, R. B. (1996), ‘The minimum wage as a redistributive tool’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, 
No. 436, pp. 639–649.
Gautié, J. (2010), ‘Towards the end of the active minimum wage policy?’, in Vaughan‑Whitehead, D. 
(ed), The minimum wage revisited in the enlarged EU, Edward Elgar/ILO, Cheltenham/Geneva.
 
References
151
Georgiadis, A. (2012), ‘Efficiency wages and the economic effects of the minimum wage: Evidence 
from a low‑wage labour market’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, Issue 6, pp. 
962–979.
Gordon, R. J. and Dew‑Becker, I. (2008), Controversies about the rise of American inequality: A survey, 
NBER Working Paper No. 13982, May 2008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachussets.
Grimshaw, D. (ed.) (2013), Minimum wages, pay equity, and comparative industrial relations, Routledge, 
London.
Grimshaw, D., Bosch, G. and Rubery, J. (2013), ‘Minimum wages and collective bargaining: what 
types of pay bargaining can foster positive pay equity outcomes?’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, DOI 10.1111/bjir.12021
Grimshaw, D. and Figuereido, H. (2012), ‘Women’s changing job structure in Europe: Patterns of 
job concentration, low pay and welfare state employment’, in Fernández‑Macías, E., Hurley, J. and 
Storrie, D. (eds.), Transformation of the employment structure in the EU and USA, 1995–2007, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London.
Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997), Revision of the high‑technology sector and product classification, OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 1997/02, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Herr, H. and Kazandziska, M. (2011), Principles of minimum wage policy – Economics, institutions and 
recommendations, Working Paper No. 11, Global Labour University, Berlin.
Heumer, M., Lesch, H., and Schröder, C. (2013), Mindestlohn, Einkommensverteilung und Armutsrisiko 
[Minimum wage, income distribution and poverty risk], IW‑Trends, Issue 2013/1.
IAB (2011), Branchentarifbindung der Beschäftigten, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt‑ und Berufsforschung 
Nürnberg.
Kampelmann, S., Garnero, A. and Rycx, F. (2013), Minimum wages in Europe: does the diversity of 
systems lead to a diversity of outcomes?, Report 128, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels.
Kalina, T. and Weinkopf Claudia (2010): Niedriglohnbeschäftigung 2008: Stagnation auf hohem 
Niveau – Lohnspektrum franst nach unten aus, IAQ‑Report No. 2010‑06, Duisburg.
Kaufman, B.E. (2009), ‘Promoting labour market efficiency and fairness through a legal minimum 
wage: The Webbs and the social cost of labour’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
pp. 306–326.
Kleinknecht, A. (1998), ‘Is labour market flexibility harmful to innovation?’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 387–396.
Lee, S. (2012), ‘“Varieties of minimum wage system” through the dubious lens of indicator‑based 
rankings’, International Labour Review, Vol. 151, No. 3, pp. 261–275.
Lörcher, K. (2006), ‘Das Recht auf angemessenes Arbeitsentgelt nach der Europäischen 
SozialCharter’, in Sterkel, G. , Schulten, T. and Wiedemuth, J. (eds.), Mindestlöhne gegen Lohndumping: 
Rahmenbedingungen – Erfahrungen – Strategien, VSA‑Verlag, Hamburg, pp. 216–226.
 
Pay in Europe in the 21st century
152
Maître B., Nolan B. and Whelan C.T. (2013), A critical evaluation of the EU 2020 poverty and social 
exclusion target: An analysis of EU‑SILC 2009, GINI Discussion Paper 79, Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam.
Manning, A. (1995), ‘How do we know that real wages are too high?’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 110, No. 4, pp. 1111–1125.
Martin, J., and Immervoll, H. (2007), ‘The minimum wage: Making it pay’, OECD Observer, No. 261, 
pp. 11–12, Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development, Paris.
Marx, I., Marchal, S. and Nolan B. (2012), Mind the gap: Net incomes of minimum wage workers in the 
EU and the US, IZA Discussion Paper No.6510, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels.
Marx, I., and Nolan, B. (2012), ‘In‑work poverty’, in Cantillon, B. and Vandenbroucke, F. (eds.), 
For better for worse, for richer for poorer: Labour market participation, social redistribution and income 
poverty in the EU, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
McLaughlin, C. (2007), The productivity‑enhancing impacts of the minimum wage: lessons from 
Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland, Working Paper No. 342, Centre for Business Research, University 
of Cambridge, Cambridge.
Murray, C., (2004), The definition of “adequate remuneration”, Radical Statistics, Issue 85, pp. 30‑39.
OECD (2003), Main economic indicators – Comparative methodological analysis – wage related statistics, 
Volume 2002, Supplement 3, Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development, Paris.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2006), The evolution of top incomes: A historical and international perspective, 
NBER Working Paper 11955, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachussets.
Rasmussen, P. N. and Delors, J. (2006), ‘The new social Europe’, conference presentation, Seventh 
Congress of the Party of European Socialists, 7–8 December, Porto, Portugal.
Riley, R. and Rosazza Bondibene, C. (2013), The impact of the national minimum wage on firm 
behaviour during recession, report to the UK Low Pay Commission, National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research, London.
Rizov, M. and Croucher, R. (2011), The impact of the UK national minimum wage on productivity by 
low‑paying sectors and firm‑size groups, Report to the Low Pay Commission, Middlesex University 
Business School, London.
Schmitt, J. (2013), Why does the minimum wage have no discernible effect on employment? Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, Washington DC.
Schulten, T. (2008), ‘Towards a European minimum wage policy: Fair wages and social Europe’, 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 421–439.
Schulten, T. (2012), European minimum wage policy: A concept for wage‑led growth and fair wages 
in Europe’, International Journal of Labour Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 85–105.
Schulten, T., Schäfer, C., Bispinck, R., Rieger, A., Ringger, B., Baumann, H. et al (2005), ‘Theses for 
a European minimum wage policy’, conference presentation, Minimum Wages in Europe, 21–22 April, 
Zurich.
 
References
153
Stockhammer, E. ( 2011), ‘Rethinking wage policy in the face of the euro crisis: Implications of the 
wage‑led demand regime’, International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 191–203.
Teulings, C. N. (2003), ‘The contribution of minimum wages to increasing wage inequality’, Economic 
Journal, Vol. 113, No. 490, pp. 801–833.
van Ark, B., Stuivenwold, E. and Ypma, G. (2005), Unit labour costs, productivity and international 
competitiveness, Research Memorandum GD‑80, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
University of Groningen.
Vaughan‑Whitehead, D. (ed) (2010), The Minimum Wage Revisited in the Enlarged EU, Edward Elgar/
ILO, Cheltenham/Geneva.

155
Table A1:  Characteristics of working population affected by HMW threshold 
(SES, with 19 countries)
Company characteristics
Economic sector
Primary(a)
Construc-
tion LTI HTI LKIS KIS Education Health
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) (b) 2.2 10.6 11.2 4.2 13.4 8.1 4.3 6.8
Share over affected 
workforce (%) (c) 0.1 6.8 18.0 3.1 44.2 13.7 4.4 9.7
Company size (employees) Collective bargaining coverage(d)
10–49 50–249 250–499 500–999 1000 No Yes
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) 15.5 9.7 8.2 7.7 5.8 17.7 8.1
Share over affected 
workforce (%) 40.6 25.2 7.7 6.8 19.8 27.4 72.6
Personal characteristics
Sex Age
Male Female 14–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60+
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) 8.1 11.1 19.1 8.1 7.3 7.0 7.9
Share over affected 
workforce (%) 45.2 54.8 35.3 23.8 21.4 16.1 3.5
Education
Low Medium High
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) 14.5 10.6 2.3
Share over affected 
workforce (%) 35.2 59.3 5.5
Job characteristics
Occupation
Manag-
ers
Profes-
sionals
Techni-
cians Clerical Service Skilled Craft Plant
Elemen-
tary
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) 1.8 1.8 3.1 6.2 17.3 20.9 12.6 9.7 25.1
Share over affected 
workforce (%) 1.1 3.4 5.1 8.4 28.2 0.7 15.9 10.3 26.9
Type of contract Type of employment
Permanent Temporary Full-time Part-time
Proportion of employees 
affected (%) 7.7 22.1 8.5 14.6
Share over affected 
workforce (%) 68.0 32.0 73.2 26.8
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey (SES 2010); sample including 19 countries but excluding smaller companies with fewer 
than 10 employees.
a. Data for the primary sector exclude agriculture, typically characterised by relatively higher levels of low pay, and includes 
mining and quarrying (code B under NACE rev.2).
b. This refers to the ratio between the number of affected employees (earning wages below 60% of the median wage in their 
country) and the total number of employees in a certain category.
c. This refers to the proportion represented by the affected employees in a certain category over the total number of affected 
employees in Europe.
d. This indicates whether at least 51% of the employees of the local unit where the employee is working are covered by a collective 
pay agreement, regardless of the level at which it is negotiated. It is assumed that all companies in Sweden and Netherlands are 
covered by an agreement.
Annex: SES and EU-SILC data
 
Pay in Europe in the 21st century
156
Ta
b
le
 A
2:
  C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 b
y 
H
M
W
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld
 (
SE
S,
 w
it
h
 1
2 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s)
C
o
m
p
an
y 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 s
ec
to
r
Pr
im
ar
y 
(a
)
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
LT
I
H
TI
LK
IS
K
IS
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
H
ea
lt
h
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 
(b
) 
(%
)
1.
7
11
.0
12
.8
5.
5
18
.0
11
.2
5.
6
6.
1
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(c
) 
(%
)
0.
1
6.
3
15
.4
2.
7
51
.7
14
.4
4.
1
5.
3
C
o
m
p
an
y 
si
ze
 (
em
p
lo
ye
es
)
C
o
lle
ct
iv
e 
b
ar
g
ai
n
in
g
 c
o
ve
ra
g
e(
d
)
<
 1
0
10
–4
9
50
–2
49
25
0–
49
9
50
0–
99
9
>
 1
00
0
N
o
Ye
s
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 (
%
)
20
.8
16
.9
10
.5
8.
1
8.
1
7.
0
18
.4
9.
8
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(%
)
26
.6
30
.7
19
.0
5.
4
5.
0
13
.2
44
.9
55
.1
Pe
rs
o
n
al
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Se
x
A
g
e
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
14
–2
9
30
–3
9
40
–4
9
50
–5
9
60
+
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 (
%
)
10
.6
14
.3
22
.5
9.
7
9.
5
9.
8
11
.5
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(%
)
44
.7
55
.3
37
.3
22
.7
19
.7
16
.1
4.
2
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
Lo
w
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 (
%
)
16
.9
14
.6
3.
3
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(%
)
31
.8
61
.7
6.
4
Jo
b
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
A
rm
ed
M
an
ag
er
s
Pr
o
fe
ss
io
n
al
s
Te
ch
n
ic
ia
n
s
C
le
ri
ca
l
Se
rv
ic
e
Sk
ill
ed
C
ra
ft
Pl
an
t
El
em
en
ta
ry
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 (
%
)
5.
1
2.
4
4.
8
9.
3
22
.9
22
.9
12
.8
12
.1
26
.8
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(%
)
2.
4
3.
6
5.
7
8.
0
33
.2
0.
8
13
.6
9.
4
23
.2
Ty
p
e 
o
f 
co
n
tr
ac
t
Ty
p
e 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
Pe
rm
an
en
t
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
Fu
ll-
ti
m
e
Pa
rt
-t
im
e
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 (
%
)
10
.1
22
.2
10
.7
18
.7
Sh
ar
e 
o
ve
r 
af
fe
ct
ed
 w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
(%
)
66
.5
33
.5
67
.8
32
.3
So
ur
ce
: S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f E
ar
ni
ng
s 
Su
rv
ey
 (
SE
S 
20
10
);
 s
am
pl
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
12
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 s
m
al
le
r 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 o
f f
ew
er
 th
an
 1
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
a.
 D
at
a 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
se
ct
or
 e
xc
lu
de
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, t
yp
ic
al
ly
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ed
 b
y 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
hi
gh
er
 le
ve
ls
 o
f l
ow
 p
ay
, a
nd
 in
cl
ud
es
 m
in
in
g 
an
d 
qu
ar
ry
in
g 
(c
od
e 
B
 u
nd
er
 N
A
C
E
 r
ev
.2
).
b.
 T
hi
s 
re
fe
rs
 to
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
(e
ar
ni
ng
 w
ag
es
 b
el
ow
 6
0%
 o
f t
he
 m
ed
ia
n 
w
ag
e 
in
 th
ei
r 
co
un
tr
y)
 to
 th
e 
to
ta
l n
um
be
r 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 c
at
eg
or
y.
c.
 T
hi
s 
re
fe
rs
 to
 th
e 
sh
ar
e 
re
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 c
at
eg
or
y 
ov
er
 th
e 
to
ta
l n
um
be
r 
of
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 E
ur
op
e.
d.
 T
hi
s 
in
di
ca
te
s 
w
he
th
er
 a
t l
ea
st
 5
1%
 o
f t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
of
 th
e 
lo
ca
l u
ni
t w
he
re
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
 is
 w
or
ki
ng
 a
re
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
a 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
pa
y 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
re
ga
rd
le
ss
 a
t t
he
 le
ve
l a
t w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
d.
 
It
 is
 a
ss
um
ed
 a
ll 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 S
w
ed
en
 a
nd
 N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 a
re
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t.
 
Annex: SES and EU-SILC data
157
Table A3:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by economic sector (EU-SILC) 
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AT 44.2 11.4 13.5 20.0 12.5 38.9 9.7 0.7 14.0 7.8 7.0 13.9 27.9
BE 16.2 5.5 8.5 14.5 4.6 29.6 4.2 3.0 9.4 6.5 9.0 12.5 21.9
BG 37.0 10.2 9.5 15.3 6.2 15.9 3.0 3.1 15.8 8.0 7.6 14.1 16.6
CY 16.7 14.7 5.6 20.2 9.2 14.8 5.5 5.0 11.6 4.3 11.4 6.8 72.1
CZ 12.9 10.8 5.2 21.7 3.3 21.0 4.0 3.8 8.7 5.4 12.2 9.7 17.1
DE 49.4 18.6 22.1 34.1 21.1 58.2 17.6 8.5 34.9 10.5 14.1 30.4 45.4
DK 17.2 7.2 18.4 17.6 4.9 38.3 5.4 1.6 10.2 6.0 5.5 5.3 21.2
EE 27.0 18.7 10.4 22.2 12.3 34.0 2.2 2.2 26.6 6.1 24.9 15.9 33.5
EL 48.4 7.2 15.6 11.2 2.4 22.3 8.9 3.7 27.0 5.0 8.1 7.4 27.7
ES 35.7 9.9 7.2 16.9 9.4 18.7 9.7 7.5 14.9 6.2 8.6 7.9 34.2
FI 17.2 2.1 7.4 10.4 3.5 17.6 3.8 0.3 10.0 3.6 5.6 5.5 8.3
FR 26.5 4.7 9.7 11.2 5.8 17.3 6.2 3.7 11.5 7.4 10.3 23.1 24.4
HU 24.8 10.8 19.8 13.2 6.8 25.7 4.0 4.5 12.7 14.5 4.1 7.0 13.6
IE 40.1 10.3 17.8 34.4 25.6 47.2 7.1 4.5 19.4 4.3 15.8 19.1 31.8
IT 44.3 9.3 19.4 15.0 6.7 32.6 8.1 4.0 19.9 4.7 6.9 9.4 37.6
LT 43.0 23.8 19.8 28.2 23.5 54.4 25.4 20.9 20.7 12.3 20.9 18.2 43.8
LU 59.8 11.8 33.9 43.8 14.6 65.5 12.8 1.6 33.1 6.5 7.0 25.8 33.0
LV 43.8 26.5 21.5 29.8 11.0 42.3 8.1 4.5 23.2 8.9 18.7 15.1 25.5
MT 10.1 11.2 18.3 17.2 9.8 24.0 4.2 4.9 15.4 3.6 7.9 8.5 27.7
NL 26.4 8.5 6.8 23.7 9.1 35.3 6.6 3.8 11.9 2.4 8.0 14.8 25.5
PL 28.9 14.4 17.3 25.3 9.0 37.0 9.4 7.7 24.7 7.3 7.9 12.9 33.7
PT 31.5 8.6 5.4 7.3 0.5 9.1 1.9 0.9 9.9 2.8 3.0 4.2 26.6
RO 18.5 10.8 7.2 13.9 4.3 20.1 1.2 0.0 12.1 8.2 7.2 10.8 27.5
SE 20.3 9.7 16.5 15.9 7.9 46.1 7.4 7.9 16.4 8.7 13.3 14.4 25.0
SI 14.5 11.9 17.5 14.1 10.1 25.0 7.1 5.0 16.0 4.7 8.5 9.8 19.2
SK 13.5 6.9 4.9 11.7 3.8 22.0 2.5 3.7 7.5 6.1 9.5 16.2 7.6
UK 31.9 9.7 14.8 30.6 13.0 51.9 5.3 7.0 15.9 5.1 22.2 19.8 33.4
EU27 32.6 11.8 13.9 22.0 10.5 33.0 9.0 6.0 19.7 7.3 12.1 18.8 33.5
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Table A4:  Proportion of employees affected by the HMW threshold by economic sector 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country Primary Construction LTI HTI LKIS KIS Education Health
CY 1.8 5.4 26.1 10.9 26.8 6.0 1.7 11.8
CZ 2.2 8.3 12.1 6.7 18.7 14.7 4.8 8.4
EE 3.4 12.7 16.0 10.8 24.1 11.8 20.3 20.2
ES 1.3 2.3 5.6 1.2 13.2 6.7 5.4 8.9
FI 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 5.4 1.4 2.0 2.9
FR 0.9 7.8 2.4 2.1 2.9 1.7 0.1 5.7
HU 18.2 22.4 18.3 10.1 18.4 10.2 3.1 8.8
IE 3.8 20.0 14.4 8.6 28.3 9.4 4.5 10.0
IT 2.0 7.7 7.5 3.4 11.1 5.2 0.6 5.3
LT 9.8 25.4 21.4 7.0 26.3 13.1 24.5 12.6
LU 3.4 6.0 5.2 10.2 20.9 3.9 0.5 8.7
LV 9.1 27.3 26.7 9.6 23.9 12.7 18.6 13.9
NL 0.0 5.0 8.2 3.6 25.0 14.7 2.7 6.2
PL 0.8 26.1 22.0 8.7 23.6 18.4 5.3 7.7
PT 4.4 5.8 12.6 2.3 8.6 3.9 0.8 6.5
RO 3.9 26.7 22.7 3.6 27.0 21.8 12.8 15.0
SE 0.4 3.1 2.8 0.8 7.4 6.3 5.3 5.1
SI 1.4 15.7 10.3 4.8 9.7 6.0 1.4 6.6
SK 3.1 13.6 11.9 9.7 16.9 14.1 8.7 10.2
EU 2.2 10.6 11.2 4.2 13.4 8.1 4.3 6.8
Note: Data for the primary sector exclude agriculture, typically characterised by relatively higher levels of low pay, and includes 
mining and quarrying (code B under NACE rev.2). The distinction between HTI and LTI is based on the intensity of research 
and development in the sector (ratio of R&D expenditure to value added) and the technology embodied in the purchases of 
intermediate and capital goods. LKIS include retail, hotels, restaurants and catering, land transport, public administration, 
recycling and private households. Other services such as financial intermediation, real state, water and air transport or posts and 
communication are included under KIS.
Figure A1: Employees affected by the HMW by sector (SES, with 19 countries)
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Table A5:  Proportion of employees affected by the HMW threshold by company size 
(EU-SILC) (%)
Country <11 employees 11–49 employees >50 employees
AT 22.3 14.4 9.8
BE 20.8 10.5 6.1
BG 22.7 12.0 6.8
CY 28.4 9.3 5.6
CZ 19.9 10.8 7.2
DE 44.6 27.9 16.2
DK 16.4 9.4 7.2
EE 26.5 20.5 13.4
EL 18.5 9.1 3.9
ES 20.3 12.2 6.8
FI 12.1 5.1 2.3
FR 23.7 8.6 5.8
HU 19.6 12.6 5.8
IE 35.8 21.9 8.2
IT 23.6 11.2 5.9
LT 43.8 28.1 16.3
LU 38.0 26.9 14.7
LV 32.3 21.3 10.6
MT 12.7 - -
NL 27.7 11.9 8.1
PL 30.6 18.6 9.4
PT 14.7 4.9 3.7
RO 16.3 10.4 8.0
SE 17.9 15.9 9.6
SI 20.5 12.6 9.2
SK 12.1 6.7 5.0
UK 31.3 22.1 12.4
EU27 26.5 16.0 10.2
Table A6:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by company size 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country 10–49 employees 50–249 employees 250–499 employees 500–999 employees 1,000 employees or more
CY 20.3 17.8 14.1 18.6 5.5
CZ 19.4 12.1 11.8 9.1 5.8
EE 23.6 15.8 12.4 15.5 17.1
ES 11.4 8.8 8.3 8.9 5.9
FI 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4
FR 5.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.4
HU 23.3 12.5 11.4 10.9 6.6
IE 28.4 18.8 11.7 10.4 7.0
IT 10.4 5.3 8.0 7.0 4.6
LT 36.0 18.6 10.5 15.4 8.9
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LU 11.1 8.7 11.8 12.5 6.1
LV 37.4 19.7 13.0 8.7 10.2
NL 18.9 12.6 10.1 10.2 13.6
PL 29.9 15.4 10.2 10.0 9.7
PT 11.0 5.5 4.1 5.9 5.6
RO 47.7 25.7 16.6 12.7 7.8
SE 7.3 5.7 4.8 4.3 4.4
SI 10.2 7.7 5.1 4.6 9.3
SK 17.5 11.8 12.9 12.7 9.3
EU 15.5 9.7 8.2 7.7 5.8
Table A7:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by company size 
(SES, with 12 countries) (%)
Country 1–9 employees 10–49 employees 50–249 employees 250–499 employees 500–999 employees 1,000 employees or more
CY 17.1 11.1 9.3 4.9 11.1 1.3
CZ 35.4 17.2 9.9 9.8 7.5 4.7
EE 41.4 20.8 13.4 9.1 12.4 13.1
ES 13.3 5.5 4.5 4.4 4.9 2.9
HU 14.1 12.7 7.9 7.4 6.9 4.4
IE 30.2 24.7 16.6 10.7 9.6 5.9
LT 45.3 31.9 15.3 8.0 11.5 5.9
LV 28.9 18.8 9.1 5.4 2.8 6.0
NL 25.8 17.1 11.1 8.8 8.7 12.0
PL 44.6 29.5 15.2 10.0 9.8 9.5
SI 13.6 7.0 5.3 2.8 2.8 5.4
SK 24.3 17.2 11.5 12.6 12.4 9.0
EU 20.8 16.9 10.5 8.1 8.1 7.0
Table A8:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by occupation (EU-SILC) (%)
Country Managers
Profes-
sionals
Techni-
cians Clerical Service Skilled Craft Plant
Elemen-
tary
Armed 
forces
AT 1.5 6.5 9.4 13.1 27.8 27.4 14.2 10.0 23.7 12.0
BE 1.8 4.3 5.1 6.1 21.3 23.4 9.0 6.6 28.8
BG 1.7 1.3 5.1 7.9 19.9 46.1 6.0 8.0 31.5 0.0
CY 2.2 2.5 5.2 14.4 19.9 3.4 8.7 12.3 48.0 0.0
CZ 0.7 2.3 3.8 7.7 27.4 19.5 9.7 9.9 37.9 0.0
DE 6.1 7.5 17.0 25.1 47.0 53.8 23.7 20.5 58.7
DK 2.8 4.1 4.4 9.8 18.1 21.4 14.6 7.9 22.2 3.6
EE 6.3 6.9 12.0 17.4 34.6 41.3 14.2 18.7 56.0 12.2
EL 2.4 5.4 6.0 8.2 18.1 50.6 12.7 3.0 28.3 2.6
ES 4.8 3.1 9.3 8.3 20.4 21.0 9.9 8.7 32.2 6.0
FI 0.7 3.0 5.4 6.7 13.0 21.6 6.3 5.2 13.2 1.0
FR 2.6 6.1 5.7 8.7 23.3 29.6 8.5 9.2 31.4 3.5
HU 1.6 1.9 3.3 4.4 16.7 29.6 14.4 12.1 36.1 0.0
IE 7.1 5.2 5.7 15.0 42.5 46.7 19.1 24.5 27.4 0.0
IT 11.3 5.3 6.3 7.6 24.1 36.8 15.6 10.3 34.1 6.1
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LT 6.4 12.1 20.6 23.7 41.3 42.3 28.6 24.9 44.5 0.0
LU 3.1 1.9 6.5 16.9 48.8 69.6 32.8 26.5 56.1 32.8
LV 8.7 6.1 10.3 18.4 34.4 60.5 28.2 18.7 47.4 7.8
MT 2.1 2.7 6.4 12.7 27.4 18.0 19.0 12.2 22.6 0.0
NL 3.9 3.8 10.5 15.4 35.8 22.1 9.7 9.3 40.0 12.1
PL 2.0 3.6 10.4 14.7 35.4 27.9 18.4 10.1 37.6 1.7
PT 2.7 1.2 4.4 3.1 8.2 36.3 7.5 6.5 17.8 0.8
SE 6.6 10.5 12.9 17.0 18.9 35.0 12.6 9.4 29.3 18.9
SI 6.6 5.8 7.6 9.3 18.9 15.8 13.0 13.1 26.3 4.7
SK 1.5 2.0 4.0 6.5 20.8 12.8 7.0 6.7 26.7 0.0
UK 5.5 5.1 10.9 20.8 40.5 18.3 11.1 15.9 33.5
EU27 4.7 5.2 10.3 14.5 30.6 34.1 15.0 12.0 36.2 4.4
Table A9:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by occupation 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country Managers Professionals Technicians Clerical Service Skilled Craft Plant Elementary
CY 0.0 1.2 3.4 8.2 36.9 14.3 5.1 20.3 38.0
EE 3.8 1.0 5.5 14.9 40.9 27.6 14.0 17.7 54.2
ES 0.2 1.6 2.9 8.7 17.2 7.8 3.9 6.9 19.6
FI 0.1 0.5 0.8 2.1 5.6 14.2 0.7 1.2 11.3
FR 0.2 1.8 1.1 2.8 3.8 12.9 5.5 2.5 10.3
HU 1.9 1.0 6.3 8.8 23.1 33.1 17.3 19.6 37.4
IE 6.9 3.3 8.2 13.5 29.9 19.7 15.6 21.3 33.3
IT 1.2 0.7 2.2 3.9 8.8 13.3 13.8 7.8 18.2
LT 7.0 6.5 15.7 17.2 41.0 34.9 27.6 16.4 57.4
LU 0.4 0.3 0.5 3.8 22.4 9.0 7.2 8.2 38.6
LV 12.5 4.9 12.4 14.2 33.3 35.6 25.2 24.3 41.4
NL 2.1 1.8 3.4 11.1 27.6 28.8 10.2 9.9 39.0
PL 4.0 2.4 8.3 12.1 41.1 46.3 24.4 18.1 38.1
PT 1.2 0.4 1.0 2.7 7.9 16.1 9.9 9.6 20.1
RO 3.2 2.8 8.8 11.9 47.4 45.2 18.7 16.7 51.4
SE 0.2 1.2 1.9 8.1 9.2 12.3 2.9 3.4 19.0
SI 0.4 0.3 1.6 2.7 13.6 12.8 9.9 10.1 25.2
SK 2.5 1.0 3.2 9.2 30.9 34.7 13.4 15.1 36.6
EU 1.8 1.8 3.1 6.2 17.3 20.9 12.6 9.7 25.1
Table A10:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by type of employment 
(EU-SILC) (%)
Country Full-time Part-time
AT 11.2 26.2
BE 5.0 22.7
BG 11.6 31.0
CY 14.5 36.3
CZ 10.5 23.3
DE 18.5 44.4
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DK 8.2 21.1
EE 17.4 33.9
EL 8.5 39.3
ES 11.0 27.1
FI 5.8 15.9
FR 7.5 32.8
HU 10.5 38.8
IE 12.0 37.9
IT 12.0 28.3
LT 23.0 45.6
LU 21.7 31.0
LV 21.3 33.0
MT 11.4 29.9
NL 8.5 20.7
PL 15.2 33.9
PT 6.9 26.8
RO 10.4 35.2
SE 12.5 19.9
SI 11.7 41.9
SK 7.9 24.6
UK 12.1 40.5
EU27 12.2 34.8
Table A11:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by type of employment 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country Full-time Part-time
CY 15.3 42.5
CZ 11.6 24.0
EE 17.2 24.9
ES 6.5 17.5
FI 1.7 9.2
FR 3.3 2.5
HU 14.5 8.5
IE 12.4 30.7
IT 5.1 17.7
LT 19.0 34.7
LU 8.0 19.2
LV 16.9 33.1
NL 6.3 20.7
PL 16.9 21.6
PT 6.3 16.3
RO 20.0 39.7
SE 4.4 7.5
SI 7.8 17.4
SK 12.4 21.1
EU 8.5 14.6
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Table A12:  Proportion of employees affected by the HMW threshold by type of contract 
(EU-SILC)
Country Permanent Temporary
AT 10.7 48.9
BE 7.5 29.7
BG 9.9 31.7
CY 10.4 48.7
CZ 9.6 20.3
DE 22.3 44.8
DK 9.8
EE 18.6 25.9
EL 5.2 25.8
ES 9.6 22.2
FI 5.7 14.7
FR 8.6 30.4
HU 9.2 31.7
IE 18.1 27.9
IT 10.6 35.3
LT 23.8 33.8
LU 20.5 54.5
LV 21.1 35.2
MT 11.5 25.7
NL 10.1 24.6
PL 11.5 30.2
PT 5.3 14.5
RO 10.0 28.8
SE 10.1 42.5
SI 11.0 30.2
SK 7.3 17.0
UK 17.6 34.3
EU-27 13.6 31.3
Table A13:  Proportion of employees affected by the HMW threshold by type of contract (SES, 
with 19 countries)
Country Permanent Temporary
CY 16.5 13.5
CZ 10.0 21.5
EE 18.2 17.8
ES 7.0 14.3
FI 1.9 8.2
FR 1.6 18.9
HU 12.8 30.4
IE 14.7 21.7
IT 5.9 16.5
LT 21.3 25.8
LU 7.4 31.5
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LV 20.6 26.4
NL 10.2 39.0
PL 11.1 31.8
PT 5.5 11.9
RO 20.5 26.0
SE
SI 5.1 15.7
SK 11.4 21.3
EU 7.7 22.1
Table A14:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by gender (EU-SILC) (%)
Country Male Female
AT 9.9 20.4
BE 6.3 13.3
BG 9.8 14.9
CY 6.0 26.5
CZ 4.8 18.1
DE 16.2 33.8
DK 9.7 10.3
EE 11.3 25.3
EL 8.0 15.5
ES 8.6 18.2
FI 5.1 8.3
FR 7.5 16.6
HU 11.8 12.4
IE 14.2 24.8
IT 10.8 17.8
LT 19.8 27.8
LU 18.7 29.5
LV 18.9 24.8
MT 10.7 16.0
NL 7.4 20.6
PL 13.8 19.1
PT 5.5 10.3
RO 7.1 14.8
SE 11.6 16.5
SI 10.2 16.5
SK 5.3 11.6
UK 11.3 26.5
EU27 10.8 21.5
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Table A15:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by gender 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country Female Male
CY 22.5 11.0
CZ 16.6 8.8
EE 23.2 11.6
ES 12.6 5.1
FI 3.5 1.6
FR 3.0 3.3
HU 14.1 13.7
IE 17.9 12.7
IT 8.2 5.8
LT 23.5 19.2
LU 15.4 6.6
LV 20.9 20.9
NL 15.0 12.5
PL 18.5 16.1
PT 9.9 4.2
RO 20.4 20.8
SE 6.7 3.7
SI 9.2 6.8
SK 15.7 10.5
EU 11.1 8.1
Table A16:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by educational level 
(EU-SILC) (%)
Country Lower Higher
AT 36.8 10.4
BE 19.3 7.2
BG 28.1 9.6
CY 25.1 13.2
CZ 31.7 9.7
DE 54.3 19.4
DK 20.1 6.7
EE 34.4 17.6
GR 19.2 9.6
ES 20.2 9.1
FI 10.9 6.1
FR 21.5 9.6
HU 29.3 9.5
IE 28.3 17.3
IT 19.1 10.9
LT 39.8 23.3
LU 44.6 13.2
LV 42.0 19.5
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MT 19.0 6.8
NL 24.8 10.9
PL 30.2 15.5
PT 9.8 3.9
RO 26.3 8.7
SE 12.3 14.2
SI 23.6 11.6
SK 21.1 8.0
UK 29.0 17.1
EU27 26.5 13.3
Table A17:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by educational level 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country Lower Higher
CY 27.7 14.6
CZ 29.3 10.6
EE 35.1 16.9
ES 12.9 5.3
FI 5.5 2.3
FR 5.5 2.6
HU 29.4 11.2
IE 23.0 13.8
IT 11.5 3.8
LT 36.9 20.9
LU 25.1 4.6
LV 33.3 19.9
NL 29.6 7.8
PL 32.1 16.3
PT 11.0 2.2
RO 40.7 19.2
SE 7.1 5.0
SI 19.8 5.9
SK 36.0 11.2
EU 14.5 8.1
Table A18:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by age (EU-SILC) (%)
Country 14–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65+
AT 79.4 21.0 12.8 8.7 11.1 9.7 9.7 11.9 8.7 2.1 25.2
BE 59.0 19.0 10.9 7.3 7.1 7.0 10.4 6.3 11.1 11.7 55.4
BG 28.9 16.5 11.3 11.3 10.8 9.6 10.1 13.1 11.7 20.9 35.8
CY 53.6 26.8 21.0 10.8 15.6 15.2 12.8 11.4 12.6 11.2 28.0
CZ 25.1 16.5 8.3 9.5 9.4 8.9 12.1 13.2 12.4 8.4 19.7
DE 98.0 64.3 22.5 19.5 19.6 16.4 16.3 17.0 22.7 22.7 57.2
DK 80.3 41.2 19.0 11.4 4.7 5.1 3.9 5.4 6.6 7.8 24.0
EE 37.2 25.6 12.5 10.9 15.7 14.1 18.0 21.9 25.6 25.7 45.8
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EL 29.6 46.0 18.8 9.1 8.8 6.6 7.6 6.2 8.2 6.8 6.0
ES 39.4 28.2 18.5 10.8 11.9 11.1 9.7 9.1 11.2 15.2 33.6
FI 44.0 23.4 10.6 5.8 4.3 2.9 4.5 5.7 4.1 4.0 5.5
FR 62.9 26.1 11.6 8.1 8.8 10.3 9.4 11.4 11.1 18.8 18.1
HU 50.6 19.5 15.0 10.8 10.8 12.9 11.1 9.7 8.9 15.3 10.5
IE 57.7 44.1 17.6 19.8 13.7 13.4 13.9 13.6 12.8 26.6 53.4
IT 57.9 36.4 18.5 13.6 12.5 12.7 10.1 9.8 9.5 11.3 13.9
LT 52.9 36.2 27.6 27.2 25.0 20.5 19.9 22.6 20.7 14.9 34.2
LU 87.6 49.2 32.5 21.6 20.7 19.1 20.7 16.6 14.7 15.7 5.6
LV 44.9 29.9 20.8 22.9 20.2 22.2 23.2 20.2 20.8 11.4 23.0
MT 51.5 21.7 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9 7.9 9.5 8.9 10.8 15.8
NL 93.3 38.0 14.5 8.4 12.7 11.3 11.7 10.7 11.4 13.2 0.0
PL 65.1 32.8 18.7 12.9 12.4 13.7 15.3 12.0 15.0 19.9 29.9
PT 32.4 15.2 7.0 5.5 5.5 10.1 4.7 8.1 8.7 9.7 14.5
RO 20.7 16.5 8.1 11.7 10.5 10.6 10.1 7.6 10.9 4.3 47.7
SE 81.2 38.9 24.6 18.0 11.5 7.1 6.4 5.1 6.7 4.9 19.6
SI 38.9 24.9 20.4 16.8 10.1 11.1 9.5 9.2 12.3 11.3 4.4
SK 41.1 13.2 5.6 7.6 7.6 8.9 7.5 8.9 9.0 8.3 21.1
UK 77.9 37.0 16.4 12.5 17.3 13.2 12.2 15.4 17.2 24.0 43.6
EU27 80.5 35.7 16.2 12.4 12.9 12.4 11.7 12.3 14.4 18.0 36.1
Table A19:  Proportion of employees affected by HMW threshold, by age 
(SES, with 19 countries) (%)
Country 14–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65+
CY 80.3 41.6 18.1 12.5 14.3 13.1 14.5 11.8 9.7 16.6 21.3
CZ 37.9 19.6 10.3 10.0 10.9 11.7 10.9 13.5 11.9 12.4 24.7
EE 41.7 20.5 10.2 11.1 13.8 15.2 17.2 21.0 23.6 27.2 36.7
ES 35.9 22.7 11.6 8.4 7.8 7.6 6.9 6.5 5.3 5.5 6.4
FI 33.9 10.7 3.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 3.2
FR 85.5 21.1 4.6 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5
HU 39.2 25.5 15.2 14.4 14.0 13.9 12.4 12.4 11.6 11.1 10.1
IE 30.9 45.3 25.6 16.0 11.7 11.2 10.9 10.4 12.0 14.1 25.7
IT 35.6 19.8 11.5 7.5 6.5 5.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 6.3 6.9
LT 57.0 28.7 17.1 20.0 19.7 22.9 19.3 21.9 23.6 22.3 30.7
LU 76.8 28.0 11.7 8.5 6.8 7.0 6.6 5.9 5.7 10.4 17.0
LV 37.2 23.8 19.0 19.2 19.7 21.0 21.5 22.4 21.9 17.6 20.9
NL 89.4 42.9 10.0 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.4 3.6 3.6 4.8 24.0
PL 50.4 31.1 18.3 15.6 15.9 15.3 15.3 16.1 16.5 21.8 26.0
PT 26.8 15.3 7.2 4.9 6.0 7.0 6.1 6.1 5.2 6.0 10.8
RO 47.2 31.7 23.4 22.9 21.6 19.9 18.7 17.4 13.6 13.7 27.6
SE 49.2 22.6 8.3 5.0 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.8
SI 34.1 18.0 9.9 7.0 7.4 8.2 7.4 7.1 4.7 4.6 0.9
SK 31.9 19.7 12.2 11.4 12.2 13.0 12.9 13.1 12.5 12.3 20.1
EU 70.6 26.6 11.1 8.3 7.9 7.6 6.9 7.3 6.5 6.6 16.0
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Table A20:  Estimation results using EU-SILC for EU27
Variables Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios
Personal-related variables
Sex (Ref: Male)
Female 2.49 ** 2.29 ** 1.78 ** 1.84 **
Age (Ref: above 30)
Young (15–29) 2.92 ** 2.73 ** 2.44 ** 2.44 **
Old (>55) 1.30 ** 1.34 ** 1.29 ** 1.17 **
Education (Ref: medium or high education)
Low-educated 2.58 ** 2.20 ** 1.44 ** 1.79 **
Company-related variables
Firm’s size (Ref: 11–49 employees)
10 or fewer employees 1.46 ** 1.38 ** 1.55 **
50 or more employees 0.67 ** 0.77 ** 0.67 **
Sector (Ref: Financial) **
Agriculture 3.59 ** 2.06 ** 2.07 **
Manufacture 1.35 ** 1.27 ** 1.11
Construction 1.45 ** 1.25 ** 1.09
Commerce 1.90 ** 1.53 ** 1.33 **
Transportation 1.24 ** 1.12 0.95
Horeca 2.66 ** 1.74 ** 1.65 **
Communication 1.04 1.33 ** 1.24
Real estate 1.85 ** 1.67 ** 1.43 **
Public administration 0.80 ** 0.81 ** 0.78 **
Education 1.15 * 1.31 ** 1.21 *
Health 1.71 ** 1.41 ** 1.29 **
Arts and entertainment 3.05 ** 2.26 ** 2.07 **
Job-related variables
Type employment (Ref: full-time)
Part-time 2.49 ** 2.06 **
Work experience (Ref: 2 or more years)
Up to 1 year 2.20 ** 2.04 **
Supervisory responsibility (Ref: No).
Supervisory responsibility 0.43 ** 0.43 **
Type of contract (Ref: permanent)
Temporary contract 1.72 ** 2.11 **
Occupation (Ref: Technicians)
Armed forces 0.92 1.51
Elementary 3.02 ** 3.74 **
Operators 1.50 ** 1.81 **
Craft 1.79 ** 1.99 **
Skilled 2.99 ** 3.23 **
Service 2.10 ** 2.42 **
Clerical 1.16 ** 1.30 **
Professionals 0.52 ** 0.59 **
Managers 0.82 * 0.81 *
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Countries (Ref: France)
Austria 1.40 **
Belgium 0.87
Bulgaria 1.12
Cyprus 1.25 **
Czech Republic 1.29 **
Germany 3.60 **
Denmark 1.18 *
Estonia 2.56 **
Spain 0.83 **
Finland 0.68 **
Greece 0.80 *
Hungary 1.15 *
Ireland 1.75 **
Italy 1.09
Lithuania 4.43 **
Luxembourg 2.78 **
Latvia 2.57 **
Malta 0.63 **
Netherlands 1.58 **
Poland 1.64 **
Portugal 0.35 **
Romania 2.16 **
Sweden 1.68 **
Slovenia 1.79 **
Slovakia 0.80 **
UK 2.40 **
Constant 0.07 ** 0.05 ** 0.04 ** 0.02 **
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.23
Observations 180505 180505 180505 180505
Note: ** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, while * indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 
5% level.
Table A21: Estimation results using EU-SILC for countries with collectively agreed 
sector-specific minimum wages:  Finland, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Italy
Variables Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios
Personal-related variables
Sex (Ref: Male)
Female 2.67 ** 2.41 ** 1.77 ** 1.76 **
Age (Ref: above 30)
young (15–29) 4.28 ** 4.27 ** 4.16 ** 4.08 **
Old (>55) 1.17 * 1.27 ** 1.27 ** 1.15 *
Education (Ref: medium or high education)
Low-educated 2.88 ** 2.43 ** 1.68 ** 2.10 **
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Company-related variables
Firm’s size (Ref: 11–49 employees)
10 or less employees 1.35 ** 1.31 ** 1.57 **
50 or more employees 0.69 0.80 0.65
Sector (Ref: Financial)
Agriculture 6.28 ** 2.81 ** 2.72 **
Manufacture 1.87 1.64 1.25
Construction 2.28 ** 1.87 ** 1.40 **
Commerce 2.86 2.24 1.61
Transportation 2.19 ** 1.81 ** 1.32 *
Horeca 4.98 ** 3.32 ** 2.66 **
Communication 1.94 ** 2.32 ** 1.71 **
Real estate 3.17 ** 2.64 ** 1.92 **
Public administration 1.19 1.31 * 0.96
Education 1.10 1.16 0.98
Health 2.44 ** 2.19 ** 1.59 **
Arts and entertainment 5.19 ** 3.68 ** 2.80 **
Job-related variables
Type employment (Ref: full-time)
Part-time 2.53 ** 2.03 **
Work experience (Ref: 2 or more years)
Up to 1 year 5.42 ** 4.81 **
Supervisory 
responsibility (Ref: No).
**
Supervisory 
responsibility
0.35 ** 0.35 **
Type of contract (Ref: permanent)
Temporary contract 2.04 ** 2.24 **
Occupation (Ref: Technicians)
Armed forces 1.25 2.82 *
Elementary 3.44 ** 4.05 **
Operators 1.67 ** 1.87 **
Craft 1.86 ** 1.91 **
Skilled 4.10 ** 3.80 **
Service 1.94 ** 2.16 **
Clerical 1.27 ** 1.33 **
Professionals 0.65 ** 0.68 **
Managers 0.97 0.97
Countries (Ref: Finland)
Austria 1.84 **
Germany 5.21 **
Denmark 1.84 **
Italy 1.44 **
Sweden 2.64 **
Constant 0.08 ** 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.01 **
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.27
Observations 50463 50463 50463 50463
Note: “**” indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, while “*” indicates coefficients statistically significant at 
the 5% level.
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Table A22:  Estimation results using EU-SILC for those countries with statutory national 
minimum wages
Variables Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios
Personal-related variables
Sex (Ref: Male)
Female 2.46 ** 2.26 ** 1.81 ** 1.86 **
Age (Ref: above 30)
Young (15–29) 2.34 ** 2.12 ** 1.71 ** 1.71 **
Old (>55) 1.39 ** 1.41 ** 1.35 ** 1.22 **
Education (Ref: medium or high education)
Low-educated 2.26 ** 1.91 ** 1.14 ** 1.37 **
Company-related variables
Firm’s size (Ref: 11–49 employees)
10 or less employees 1.48 ** 1.40 ** 1.51 **
50 or more employees 0.62 ** 0.69 ** 0.65 **
Sector (Ref: Financial)
Agriculture 2.90 ** 1.80 ** 1.69 **
Manufacture 1.08 1.02 0.97
Construction 1.13 0.99 0.91
Commerce 1.53 ** 1.18 * 1.11
Transportation 0.89 0.79 * 0.72 **
Horeca 2.00 ** 1.20 1.21
Communication 0.66 ** 0.84 0.90
Real state 1.27 ** 1.15 1.09
Public administration 0.65 ** 0.61 ** 0.64 **
Education 1.12 1.25 ** 1.12
Health 1.39 ** 1.04 1.07
Arts and entertainment 2.27 ** 1.60 ** 1.58 **
Job-related variables
Type employment (Ref: full-time)
Part-time 2.45 ** 2.32 **
Work experience (Ref: 2 or more years)
Up to 1 year 2.06 ** 1.80 **
Supervisory responsibility (Ref: No).
Supervisory responsibility 0.50 ** 0.50 **
Type of contract (Ref: permanent)
Temporary contract 1.74 ** 2.10 **
Occupation (Ref: Technicians)
Armed forces 1.00 1.31
Elementary 3.29 ** 3.72 **
Operators 1.58 ** 1.83 **
Craft 1.67 ** 1.92 **
Skilled 2.48 ** 2.99 **
Service 2.40 ** 2.57 **
Clerical 1.10 1.24 **
Professionals 0.44 ** 0.51 **
 
Pay in Europe in the 21st century
172
Managers 0.76 * 0.70 **
Countries (Ref: France)
Belgium 0.99
Bulgaria 1.28 **
Cyprus 1.49 **
Czech Republic 1.41
Estonia 2.81 **
Spain 1.01
Greece 0.95
Hungary 1.29 **
Ireland 1.92 **
Lithuania 4.80 **
Luxembourg 3.25 **
Latvia 2.86 **
Malta 0.87
Netherlands 1.54 **
Poland 1.84 **
Romania 2.42 **
Slovenia 1.99 **
Slovakia 0.89
UK 2.54 **
Constant 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.05 ** 0.03 **
Pseudo R2 0.0586 0.0969 0.183 0.2015
Observations 130042 130042 130042 130042
Note: ** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, while * indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 
5% level.
Table A23:  Estimation results using SES for the 19 European countries for which data are 
available
Variables Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios
Personal-related variables
Sex (Ref: Male)
Female 1.50 ** 1.69 ** 1.63 ** 1.61 **
Age (Ref: above 30)
Young (15–29) 3.03 ** 2.72 ** 1.96 ** 1.94 **
Education (Ref: medium or high 
education)
Low-educated 2.10 ** 2.08 ** 1.16 ** 1.64 **
Company-related variables
Firm’s size (Ref: 11–49 employees)
10–49 employees 1.44 ** 1.52 ** 1.73 **
250–499 employees 0.87 ** 0.85 ** 0.79 **
500–999 employees 0.85 ** 0.83 ** 0.79 **
1000 or more employees 0.72 ** 0.70 ** 0.75 **
Sector (Ref: Knowledge intensive services, KIS)
Primary 0.40 ** 0.28 ** 0.20 **
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Construction 1.15 * 0.72 ** 0.64 **
Low technology industry (LTI) 1.25 ** 0.90 * 0.75 **
High technology industry (HTI) 0.53 ** 0.46 ** 0.38 **
Low Knowledge intensive services 
(LKIS)
1.41 ** 0.89 ** 0.90 **
health 0.77 ** 0.86 * 1.15 *
educsect 1.07 0.73 ** 1.28 **
Ownership (ref: private)
Public 0.49 ** 0.62 ** 0.36 **
Collective pay agreements (Ref: not covered)
Covered 0.37 ** 0.38 ** 0.79 **
Job-related variables
Type employment (Ref: full-time)
Part-time 1.30 ** 1.36 **
Seniority (Ref: 2 or more years)
Up to one year 1.36 ** 1.59 **
Supervisory responsibility (Ref: No).
Supervisory responsibility 0.39 ** 0.55 **
Type of contract (Ref: permanent)
Temporary contract 2.08 ** 2.13 **
Occupation (Ref: Technicians)
Elementary 5.17 ** 6.40 **
Operators 2.27 ** 2.80 **
Craft 2.76 ** 3.38 **
Service 3.19 ** 3.92 **
Clerical 1.11 * 1.64 **
Professionals 0.37 ** 0.43 **
Managers 0.49 ** 0.55 **
Countries (Ref: France)
Cyprus 1.00
Czech Republic 0.13
Estonia 1.50 **
Spain 0.36 **
Finland 0.18 **
Italy 0.41 **
Lithuania 2.26 **
Luxembourg 0.54 **
Latvia 1.87 **
Poland 1.38 **
Portugal 0.23 **
Romania 2.69 **
Sweden 0.42 **
Slovenia 0.52 **
Slovakia 1.02
Pseudo R2 0.05 ** 0.11 ** 0.19 ** 0.25 **
Observations 5775453 5775453 5775453 5775453
Note: ** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, while * indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 
5% level
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